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Grinevskiy Briefs Legislators on Vienna Talks

LD0603211590 Moscow TASS in English 2053 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—In the opinion of Oleg Grinevskiy, Soviet chief delegate at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, the key question now is how to tally reductions and appropriate ceilings of armaments and armed forces for a future united Germany with a collective security system which is being created in Europe.

Speaking today at a joint hearing of the Committee on International Affairs and the Committee on Defense and State Security of the Soviet parliament, Grinevskiy informed Soviet legislators of the state of affairs at the negotiations.

He noted that the year which passed since their start, witnessed considerable headway in drafting a treaty which would considerably bring down the level of military confrontation in Europe and the danger of a surprise attack.

He said that the framework of the future document is based on understandings on six most dangerous and destabilising categories of armed forces and armaments, including military personnel, tanks, armoured cars, artillery, helicopter gunships and warplanes.

Grinevskiy said that the levels for tanks and helicopters were virtually agreed upon and for artillery and armoured cars are close to agreement.

Speaking of the numerical strength of armed forces, he stressed the importance of an understanding reached in Ottawa on the ceilings of Soviet and American troops outside their national territories in Europe.

Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet and American military presence in central Europe is formalised, according to international legal practices, on the basis of this understanding and in the future—on the basis of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

In actual fact, it is the second (after Potsdam) multilateral agreement defining the presence of the two superpowers' troops in the region in a new political situation.

Dealing with the Soviet proposal on achieving an understanding in Vienna to cut NATO and Warsaw Treaty troops to 700,000-750,000, Grinevskiy pointed to serious difficulties in this field.

In his opinion, the difficulties are caused by the fact that the Soviet proposal is not supported by all Soviet allies. The NATO countries also flatly reject it.

The Soviet chief delegate cited the exchange of information and control over the observance of understandings among the most important problems.

Pointing to the proximity of the sides' positions in this field, he noted that the definition of the volume of information to be exchanged is one of the most serious outstanding issues.

Assessing the progress at the Vienna talks on the whole, Grinevskiy stressed that progress in some spheres is concomitant with difficulties in others. He attributed this both to attempts of Western partners to win unilateral advantages and to imperfect work of the Soviet side.

Nazarkin Discusses Nuclear, Space Arms Cuts

LD0603212190 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The implementation of the U.S.-USSR Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will help improve Soviet-American relations and the world political atmosphere as a whole, head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons Yuriy Nazarkin told a joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees for International Affairs, Defense and State Security.

It is necessary to turn the forthcoming agreement on strategic offensive weapons into a starting point for the progress towards a more radical agreement on the reduction and qualitative restriction of strategic weapons, Nazarkin stressed.

He briefed Soviet parliamentarians on the state of Soviet and American stratgic forces. Nazarkin said the Soviet Union had 2,484 carrier and 10,000 nuclear ammunition pieces, and the United States has 2,260 carriers and 14,000 military load pieces.

Under the strategic offensive weapons treaty, each side will have to cut the number of carriers down to 1,600 and the number of military loads to 6,000.

The Soviet negotiator noted that the practical ceilings of nuclear loads to result directly from the implementation of the treaty, would be somewhat higher than the previously established levels of 6,000. It is connected with the fact that the sea-based cruise missiles and nuclear war loads they carry have been left beyond the scope of the present agreement.

Touching upon the economic concerns linked to the implementation of the treaty, Nazarkin said that during the talks it was agreed to convert some of the intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles into boosters for launching peaceful installations into space.

Approximately 80 per cent of the texts of the treaty and accompanying documents have been agreed to date, the Soviet negotiator said. Questions awaiting resolution include the reduction of air-based cruise missiles and heavy bombers. However, a certain rapprochement has been achieved recently on this score, too, on the basis of a package approach, linking the number of air- based cruise missiles with the number of heavy bombers. The

sides continue to differ on the range of cruise missiles and the range of sea-based and air-based missiles.

Mukachev Radar Facility Prompts Local Protests

WA0503202190 Moscow TRUD in Russian
25 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by V. Badurkin, TRUD special correspondent: "What Super-Secrecy Leads To—About the Mukachev Radar and More"]

[Text] It is readily visible from the southern outskirts of Mukachev, the huge "mastodon" of the receiving station of the radar, commensurate in size with the Egyptian pyramids, it would seem. But according to "popularity" in recent months, it has already eclipsed them. There is probably no more pressing or burning issue in the Trans-Carpathian region today than the cessation of construction of this facility. It is discussed at block meetings, in labor collectives, in auditoriums of institutes of higher education, in the local press. An extraordinary session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies was even dedicated to this question. What lies at the heart of the issue? Five years ago near the village of Pestryalovo, in an atmosphere of strictest secrecy, they began building "an air force maintenance and repair base." As the height of the structures increased, so did the interest of the local population in the facility being erected. Rumors were soon spreading all around Mukachev and neighboring villages—this is no base whatsoever, but a radar station of great capacity. Then the sad and well-known snowball effect—"They've brought a nuclear reactor to the station....", "It will use up all our water....", "We will be exposed to radiation...." Emotions around the radar facility flared up at lightning speed while military and local authorities continued to pretend nothing was going on. Only when the unsatisfied interest of the community assumed the form of rallies and pickets, when an indignant people began to call to account specific responsible individuals—only then did officials start worrying—and not about how to tell people the truth, but rather where to find a "scapegoat."

Well, what does this facility constitute anyway? And is it necessary to our state?

It is well known that we have a system for monitoring space and providing early warning of nuclear missile attack. The basic elements of this system are centers which track space objects. These comprise very complex radio-electronics facilities which automatically detect and track a tremendous number of space "targets" (including ballistic missiles). They are the unique "eyes" of the country's leadership which enable them to make time-sensitive evaluations of the strategic situation in order to take proper decisions.

Let us say that no one is threatening us, that there are no strategic submarines in the ocean's depths, no missile attack groups on the ocean surface, that the Americans are consistently pursuing their SDI just because of excess funds and they do not intend to employ their silo-based and mobile strategic forces. Even if such were the case we could not forget about the 17,000 space objects which are in near-Earth orbit today. And these are not all exclusively "civilian" by any means; some have nuclear reactors.

Many recall that in June 1979, Chinese radar detected an American orbital laboratory U.S. tracking facilities had lost control of. The radar determined the moment of its entry into the dense layers of our atmosphere within an accuracy of four minutes and the location to which its fragments would fall. A Soviet satellite which became disabled in January 1983 and other well-known incidents show that we, too, are not blameless in this regard.

In the absence of appropriate centers for obtaining and processing information, these space fragments might well be taken for attacking ballistic missiles.... Thus, the disabling of even one such early warning station is fraught with the most serious consequences....

Now to the situation at hand—the Mukachev radar. Its construction was occasioned by the fact that the station presently "guarding" the southwest orientation used itself up, as they say. Towards the end this equipment resource and its technological capabilities, we will state quite frankly, had become somewhat antiquated. A new radar facility had to be built. Where? Nearby, naturally. Otherwise, there would be a breach in the coverage of the radar belt surrounding the country.

If responsible officials in the Ministry of Defense had explained all this to Trans-Carpathian residents (in greater detail, of course, with facts and figures) five years ago, I believe there would be far fewer individuals protesting construction of the radar facility today. But the infamous "secrecy policy" existing up until recently (and still not completely eliminated) would not permit it....

And this is not the fault of the military so much as it is our common misfortune. That same secrecy hindered open dialogue between military and civic leaders and the population of Mukachev, while tension grew. If we discard unlikely conjecture regarding a nuclear reactor and laser apparatus, there remain two most serious questions—water supply for the radar facility and its radiation effect on people.

An independent commission was formed in June of last year to answer these questions. Headed by corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences V.M. Shestopalov, it included prominent experts of academic institutions in the republic, of Uzhgorod and Lvov universities.

The commission devoted particular attention to the problem of water supply. This may seem strange to some. But the fact of the matter is that in Mukachev water is being supplied on a strictly scheduled basis. Residents of neighboring villages are also suffering from inadequate water supply. Yet the cooling system for the radar requires 1,800 cubic meters per day; thus, people's

fears are quite understandable. Commission members ascertained that exploratory search for underground water which was conducted for the first time in the region (at the direction of the military) showed prospects were good for an adequate supply of water, well protected from technological influence. And so, not only will the radar facility not cause detriment to the Trans-Carpathian springs—it will even help those villages in the Mukachev region which today lack water.

With respect to radiation, scientists confirmed that the level of predicted electromagnetic radiation over the territory adjacent to the radar facility's health-safety exclusion zone would not exceed 10 micro watts per square centimeter.

Is this a lot or a little? The norm for ordinary devices (microwave ovens) allows an emission intensity (so-called "leakage radiation") 50 times greater. And in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other developed countries, the permissible level of electromagnetic radiation per individual is an order of magnitude greater than what is predicted to be the "ceiling" of the Mukachev facility.

But towards December of last year, when the commission's findings were published, few people believed them. Nothing was able to calm public opinion—not the commission's conclusions, not the decision of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] to turn to "high authority" concerning the advisability of continuing construction, not the effort which was finally made to explain what was going on. And again "secrecy" added fuel to the fire, only those with appropriate access being appointed members of the commission.

Today things are uneasy in the Trans-Carpathian region. Passions are raging, emotions flaring.... Informal associations as well as local authorities are demanding that construction of the facility be terminated. But already 100 out of a planned R160 million of the people's money has been spent on it.... Is the project advisable? We feel this matter must be resolved not at rallies, not "in the heat of the moment," but in a stately manner, studying everything once again quite carefully and weighing all the pros and cons. A commission was recently established to do this. Headed by Academician and USSR People's Deputy Ye.P. Velikhov, a scholar famous throughout the country, the commission will get to work tomorrow.

Editor's note. When this issue was being printed we were informed that, in consideration of the anxiety of the community, the union government considered it necessary to suspend construction of the radar facility over the period of the commission's work. The author of this article has been invited to commission meetings, and our newspaper will have the opportunity to inform readers of its work.

Bovin Examines Future German Role in NATO

LD0603210590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Mar 90

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin; "excerpts" of Bovin's comments were published in the 5 March Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 4, column one, under the headline "German Role in NATO Examined."]

[Text] As you realize, the end of postwar Europe could not have failed to put the question of the unification of Germany onto a practical footing. The first steps are already being taken toward resolving it. There is an enormous number and variety of issues involved, but the most acute of them, perhaps, is that of the military and political status of a united Germany.

Well, the question is: Will a united Germany be a member of NATO, or will it remain outside the blocs—in other words, will it be a neutral state? Our government inclines, naturally, toward the second option—the neutralization of Germany. I understand very well both the logic and the psychology of that position, and yet some quite considerable doubts remain.

Suppose we get our way, and Germany becomes neutral. But will this strengthen stability in Europe? Let us put the question in that way. I fear that it won't. Germany is not Austria or Switzerland; and it isn't difficult to imagine that both in and around Germany itself—despite all statements to the contrary—we'd see the beginning of an endless struggle to incline the compass needle of German sympathies toward one's own side. And this tug-of- war between East and West—between us and, say, the Americans—could be a constant source of suspicion and distrust, a constant source of destablization in Europe. And that is the very thing we want to avoid. Well, my argument is of course hypothetical, but I think this hypothesis is quite within the bounds of reality.

Now another option: a unified Germany joins NATO. Well, of course there's no denying that this would underline what would be for us a major political defeat; but after all, comrades, the transformation of the GDR is only part of the picture. It's a consequence. The point is that we are forced—and here I'm using the old political language, the terminology of the old political thinking—we're forced to withdraw from East Europe, pull out our troops from there, and allow each country and each nation to choose its own path. And ultimately this is a victory for common sense, a victory for a really rational policy, a victory for democracy. But in order to reach that ultimate point, we've got to overcome a great many of the conventional stereotypes to which we've become accustomed.

Well, it's hardly likely—we can look at the map—it's hardly likely that the inclusion of the present territory of the GDR in the territory of NATO could affect our security in any degree. After all, in the nuclear age, comparisons with 1914, or 1939, or 1941 are entirely meaningless. And it's scarcely reasonable, either, to view one or another of the options for the status of Germany from the point of view of violation or nonviolation of the military- strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. That balance will be violated, and is already being violated, but by quite different factors. The Warsaw Pact has ceased to be an organization of fraternal states—that is, of states sharing a common political ideology. Interests have been purged of ideology. A completely different situation has been created. It's hard to imagine, say, that Poland, for example will leave the Warsaw Pact in the near future.

But this is what one influential Polish newspaper is already writing now. I'll quote it: An independent Poland, by virtue of its own sovereign decision, can remain in the Warsaw Pact until the elimination of both blocs. But everything else in our military policy has to change quickly. No matter what Moscow does or has done with military doctrine, or with its forces, Poland cannot take part in a military structure designed for the eventuality of war between blocs and bear the costs connected with this. It also has to be said that Poland would not be on the side of the Soviet Union in such a war. Neither will we support either in military or technical respects any military and terrorist actions by states or movements in the interests of Moscow if, as before, they have been inspired by it, the newspaper continues. That is what they are telling us. We will stay in the Warsaw Pact, but we will cease to be your allies. And in the view of Hungary's Foreign Minister Horn, it is quite possible that Hungary, as he put it, while remaining in the Warsaw Pact, will become a member of various political organizations of NATO. Once again a curious topic. I think that feelings of this kind will grow, and that we ought indeed to get used to considering the future of our security while avoiding the usual rhetoric about the Warsaw Pact. In my opinion our state interests allow this totally. But let's get back to the subject of Germany. The important thing is that a unified Germany should not become a threat to peace. This is the most important thing. This is of concern both to the West and the East of Europe. And this is the aim of our political efforts. But is it possible to assert that Germany's participation in NATO or Germany's nonparticipation in NATO will be of itself guarantee that the new German state will be peace-loving? In my opinion, any straightforward reply to these questions would be to oversimplify things. And consequently, perhaps one should concentrate attention not upon the outward, formal signs—participation or nonparticipation in NATO—but upon those conditions which in any event will work toward stability. Well, understanding how difficult it is for Moscow to agree, say, to the NATO option, the West is now seeking all manner of compromise ideas, which boil down to a kind of special military status, as they say, for the territory of what is now the GDR—that is to say, a united Germany will be a member of NATO, but NATO troops, including the Bundeswehr—will not be able to be stationed east of the present border between the FRG and the GDR. Or

there is another option—a more radical one, so to speak—that the Soviet Union should retain a part of its troops that are currently located upon the territory of the GDR, even after the formation of a united Germany belonging to NATO. In connection with this latter point, Jiri Dienstbier, Czechoslovakia's minister of foreign affairs, noted wittily that under the conditions in which we live, under the symbiosis of the good soldier Schweik, Franz Kafka, and Josef Stalin, nothing is absurd. So it is in truth. Overall the discussion is going to be a difficult and lengthy one, and in my view it is important not to cast aside in advance any of the possible options, the conceivable options, but to weigh again and again all the pluses and minuses of each one of them, the pluses and minuses not from the viewpont of yesterday's Europe, not from the viewpoint of yesterday's political geometry, but from tne viewpoint of the Europe of tomorrow. And from the Europe of tomorrow, our possibilities within it, the conviction of our arguments, the viability of the very idea of a common European home depend first and foremost upon the progress of our restructuring, and in this respect, comrades, the main thing for Europe is perhaps not the German question, but the Soviet question.

CEMA Adviser Discusses Problems, Reforms

90UI0384A Moscow TRUD in Russian
20 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with CEMA Secretariat adviser E.Ya. Sheynin, by S. Prokopchuk; date and place not specified: "CEMA: Need for Changes"]

[Text] The collapse of CEMA—as some people were predicting on the eve of the 45th meeting of the CEMA session—did not happen at this forum. In addition, the representative of the CSSR Government refuted the "sensational" report of a number of newspapers concerning Czechoslovakia's alleged readiness to pull out of this international organization if its terms were not accepted at the meeting in Sofia.... Nonetheless, what "sore points" did emerge in Sofia?

Thus began our discussion with Eduard Yakovlevich Sheynin, candidate of economic sciences and adviser to the CEMA Secretariat.

[Sheynin] I would emphasize right away that no CEMA country raised the question of its withdrawal in Sofia. There was unanimity on another issue—CEMA cannot continue in its present form. After all, its mechanism, as N.I. Ryzhkov rightly declared in his speech, does not correspond to the socioeconomic reforms occurring in our countries. Romanian Prime Minister P. Roman, in particular, is also of this opinion.

A real market and reciprocal payment principles and more mobility and flexibility are needed, as are, finally, an entirely new cooperation mechanism....

[Prokochuk] The ideal thing, of course, would be for us to achieve convertibility of the ruble and the national currencies of the CEMA countries and, even better, to pay one another in dollars for in reciprocal payments the transfer ruble has become an anachronism virtually no longer capable of really serving as a full-fledged payment medium....

[Sheynin] This is the crux of the problem, and solving it immediately is unrealistic. Specialists believe that given the current economic situation of the CEMA members, another route would be more acceptable for us—transferring interstate cooperation to a bilateral and, where possible, trilateral level. This has already started along enterprise lines. Part of the foreign trade balance formed annually among the countries, in the opinion of Lazslo Borbey, general director of Hungary's Ministry of Finance, could be settled in convertible currency. I agree with him here. This really would force the manufacturers to put a higher value on the sales market and adopt a more serious attitude toward the quality of the commodities.

No less complex is the question of a change in the price base. One group of countries is advocating a switch to current world prices, another that we keep the 2- to 3-year price base, approaching current prices gradually.

[Prokopchuk] Yes, but there is also a third group of countries which (not without reason, evidently) are calling for the preservation of CEMA in almost the same form as now, which concerns primarily the preferential pricing in trade with them....

[Sheynin] These include Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia.... They are asking that account be taken of the particular features of their economic situation. As a whole, this meets with understanding among the CEMA countries. There is a difference, however, when it comes to methods of realization—on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Incidentally such preferences are also accorded in the Common Market countries in trade with underdeveloped partners.

[Prokopchuk] Will the diktat of the "center" really still be sufficient henceforward in bilateral economic and S&T and trade cooperation between enterprises and organizations of countries of our community? No admittance is allowed here....

[Sheynin] No. In any event, it should not be. The trend of the expansion of cooperation directly between enterprises and organizations of the CEMA countries is assuming an irreversible nature, and nothing should prevent this here. Enterprises need to be accorded the right themselves to negotiate the price and themselves determine the forms of mutually profitable contacts. Unfortunately in practice they are still being inhibited in their operations by the ministries and departments defending their sectoral interests.

[Prokopchuk] As far as the development of interstate commercial transactions is concerned, do prices remain the "weakest spot" here?

[Sheynin] Yes, in the same way that, I repeat, the currency-finance problem—the fate of the transfer ruble—is not decided. What will happen to it? This question is today at the center of various multilateral and bilateral consultations and negotiations. What can we say here? As an accounting unit, as a collective currency, as a unit recording the CEMA countries' obligations on a bilateral basis, the transfer ruble performed its role, and not badly. When, I specify, cooperation was developing on an extensive basis. We give you so much oil and gas, you give us so many suits, shoes.... That is, when it was not trade with its characteristic market attributes but simple physical exchange which was developing and when the financial-economic instrument was virtually inoperative. Today, when there is an aspiration to an intensification of relations, the countries have started to look for ways of incorporating the national units of currency in economic relationships which create the prerequisites for convertibility in the immediate future of the transfer ruble, and of the national currencies, into convertible currencies.

[Prokopchuk] Are actual steps being taken?

[Sheynin] Bilateral agreements have been concluded between a number of CEMA members in accordance with which enterprises entering into direct relations with one another are already beginning to settle accounts in a new manner—in national currency. In the currency of the exporter. If, say, the Soviet Union sells Bulgaria some machine tools or consumer goods, it pays us for them in Soviet rubles. And, conversely: If we are in the role of importer, we settle in lev.

[Prokopchuk] And what about the idea of the creation of a joint market of the CEMA members? After all, the corresponding decisions have been adopted in this connection.

[Sheynin] The urgency of this problem remains. But it can hardly be solved in the immediate future. First, the commodities must be competitive; second, we need to have substantial—"surplus"—commodity supply. After all, where is the guarantee that some people would not tomorrow begin to "push" this popular, scarce commodity or the other, of which there is a shortage on the shelves of the stores of our states, onto more profitable trading partners outside of the CEMA region? In a word, it is not a question of half-measures but of the need for a fundamental, radical restructuring of the entire system of cooperation and the creation of an essentially consummate new mechanism of our interaction.

How this will proceed it is difficult to predict as yet. The commission concerned with these problems formed at the 45th meeting of the CEMA session is starting work. It should deliver its proposals and findings within the next 6 months.

[Prokopchuk] It is no secret that a stumbling block in the CEMA countries' reciprocal trade is its structure. It is in need, many people believe, of fundamental change. The USSR, for example, cannot continue to squander its currency-earning commodity—to be oriented mainly toward selling off its finite raw material and energy resources, resembling an underdeveloped power....

[Sheynin] You are right. In reciprocal trade priority should truly be given trade in the most up-to-date technology and equipment—all that without which survival in the cruel competitive struggle on the world market is inconceivable.

Shevardnadze Gives 'Weekly' Briefing to Newsmen

Military Conversion Policy

PM0603165290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report on press briefing by Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze at the USSR Foreign Ministry building by diplomatic correspondent G. Charodeyev; date not given: "E. Shevardnadze: Foreign Policy Is Profitable"]

[Text] Journalists from the leading Soviet mass media gathered on the seventh floor of the Foreign Ministry building for a briefing. They were addressed by USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze, who spoke about the most significant and interesting steps taken by our diplomatic service in recent days. Thus, for instance, at the traditional morning conference on Monday [5 February], the question of restoring full diplomatic relations between the USSR and Chile was examined. It is well known that the new Chilean leadership shows an interest in establishing relations with our country, and has said so repeatedly. On 11 March 1990 a Soviet delegation will take part in the procedure for the transfer of power in Chile. It is possible that talks will then be held on the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations, the minister announced.

The minister also said that another serious problem for the Soviet Union was touched on at the conference—the economic aspect of conversion, or, as he himself explained, "the efficiency of all our policy."

"We concluded an agreement on intermediate-range missiles and are completing work on a strategic offensive arms agreement. The Soviet Union has stopped the production of chemical weapons and is withdrawing its troops from East Europe and reducing tanks and aircraft. At one time enormous sums of money were spent on all of this. Or remember Afghanistan, which cost us about R60 billion. And how much does it cost to maintain our troops in Mongolia.... How much does all this together cost the state? No one can answer that—there is no scientific methodology in such calculations. But people are asking: Where is the real return from arms reductions?

"The USSR Foreign Ministry adopted a decision to set up a commission of experts in order to form a full idea of what has been achieved as a result of arms reductions recently. It turns out that foreign policy is one of the most profitable 'production units.' But there are problems, too. The country proved totally unprepared for conversion: Ministries and departments have not carried out the necessary reconstruction, and the people themselves are not prepared. And all because they did not believe that we would bring the troops out of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia, that we would stop producing chemical weapons. As a result, in a number of regions of the country some highly qualified workers and engineers are unemployed, and plants are forced to produce saucepans instead of electronic equipment."

A TASS correspondent asked: During a recent trip to Pakistan I was able to meet with both officials and Afghan opposition leaders. For all the differences between these groupings, they are in favor of talks with the Soviet Union. They believe that the key to talks is in Moscow's hands. They declare that they are ready to begin talks, ready to offer any guarantees of further Soviet-Afghan cooperation. Have there been any changes in the Soviet position with regard to a settlement of the situation in and around Afghanistan?

"Yes, we are ready to meet with all parties that have an interest in a political settlement in Afghanistan," E.A. Shevardnadze stressed. "But if they want the Soviet Union to start talks with the 'Peshawar Seven' as a government, we will not do that. That is our firm position. Such talks would mean that the Soviet Union recognizes that government.

"Please note: Very interesting processes have now begun in Afghanistan. Najibullah declares his readiness to meet with any representatives of the opposition on Saudi territory. He is in favor of free elections if they are carried out honestly—as happened, for instance, in Nicaragua under UN auspices. Provided that a substantial, comprehensive monitoring system is ensured."

A question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent: Tehran Radio reported the other day that the Iranian Government has decided to appropriate millions of dollars for arms purchases abroad. Do we sell weapons to countries like Iran?

"Until such time as the process of selling weapons is regulated on a worldwide scale," E. Shevardnadze replied, "the Soviet Union will continue to deal in weapons. That is the reality. Talks are in progress with Iran. To all appearances, we will sell arms to the Iranians, but only arms of a defensive nature. The Soviet Union will also build various enterprises and plants in Iran, and in exchange will receive oil and gas. Naturally, there will be no secrecy about any of this."

Open Skies, Germanys, Africa Tour

LD0603134390 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Commentator Oleg Shchedrov report]

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has introduced a new practice: weekly briefings of Soviet newsmen. Our commentator, Oleg Shchedrov, has the story.

[Shchedrov] It's difficult to single out the main things out of the two-hour briefing with the minister, and I'll start with the results of the International Open Skies Conference in Ottawa. Speaking about the results, Eduard Shevardnadze noted this:

The accord in principle to open the skies, so to say, has been reached. There's good understanding on many problems, but complex unsolved issues also remain.

Eduard Shevardnadze added that the second round of the Open Skies Conference as he expects may be held in mid-summer in Budapest. Things are moving toward global openness of the seas, oceans, and outer space, said the Soviet foreign minister.

One more important topic was discussed at the Ottawa conference: the German issue. It was decided to hold talks in a suitable capital on the formula four plus two—that is, between the two German states and the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France.

Eduard Shevardnadze told newsmen that he had sent a letter to the members of the six calling for an early meeting even before the elections in the German Democratic Republic, so as to start practical work. As for the conference of the Warsaw Treaty Organization scheduled for the 17th of this month it will be postponed till after the elections in the GDR. The reason given by Eduard Shevardnadze is that the Polish foreign minister, Mr. Skubiszewski, is busy at the time.

Newsmen were eager to hear an announcement about the coming African tour by Eduard Shevardnadze later this month:

It's difficult to speak of what to expect, said the Soviet foreign minister. The main thing though is first to mark a major event of the recent past, the decolonization of Namibia, and secondly I'll get into contact with the leaders of African countries and feel the atmosphere.

This will be the first tour of Africa by a Soviet foreign minister. During it Eduard Shevardnadze plans to visit Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and some other countries.

Changes in South Africa are being scrutinized at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said Eduard Shevardnadze.

He also spoke of expected restoration of diplomatic relations with Chile and about the Soviet Union's interest to eventually take part as an observer in the work of the Organization of American States.

Shevardnadze Cited on Council of Europe's Role

PM0603143390 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English Nos 8-9, 4 Mar 90 p 26

[Article by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, published under the rubric "The World and Us": "The Road Towards a Greater Europe"—first paragraph is unattributed introduction]

[Text] In a few days Joao de Deus Pinheiro, chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council, will arrive on a working visit in our country.

I would like every development in our foreign policy activities (and this visit definitely belongs to the category of such events) and its significance for the country's life, for its challenging, dramatic day-to-day endeavours, to be clear to all our citizens. I would like them to be perfectly well aware why we establish some or other contacts and what we expect from them.

About our relations with the Council of Europe—I would like to explain that we consider them to directly bear on the task of overcoming the political, military, and economic division of Europe—a task of overriding importance for us which we have been pursuing since April 1985, actively and purposefully. Quite a lot has been done in a relatively short period.

However, developments in Central and Eastern Europe—chiefly, the new developments in the German question—have made the problem more acute, and called for a more intensive search for ways to set up common European structures of cooperation and security.

We cannot count on a one-shot solution. A common European political space cannot be created on the move. There is a need to develop it step by step, doing this quickly enough, and utilizing the whole of the positive experience gained since the war both in the West and East of Europe. In the given case, the experience of integrating and stabilizing structures such as the Council of Europe.

The latter is the oldest (set up in 1949) and most representative organization, consisting of 23 West European countries. Only a few years ago hardly anything was known about it in our country: for a whole number of reasons the Council of Europe was a "blank spot" for us on the continent's political map. Now that the walls of mistrust and confrontation are crumbling, we are "discovering" this organization for ourselves for the first time, and in a positive light. This has been largely facilitated by its own evolution, and the new interpretation of its fundamental objective—to assist in "European cohesion"—on a broader scale than the West European framework, as the cohesion of the whole continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Let us recall July 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev visited the Council of Europe's headquarters in Strasbourg and made a speech in the Council's Parliamentary Assembly. That was a beginning of the reciprocal movement. As Anders Bjorck, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, emphasized at the time, the Soviet leader's visit to Strasbourg had become the main event for the Council of Europe in recent years, and imparted fresh stimuli and impulses to its activities.

We are impressed by the Council of Europe's desire to make its distinctive contribution to the improvement of relations and to the process of Eastern and Western Europe's mutual adaptation, and to become the venue for meetings between the East and West. We see how ample are the Council of Europe's possibilities in building a "common European home". As this becomes a reality, the Council could well become a common European forum for jointly handling appropriate initiatives.

A question arises: How should these functions be combined with the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe?

As we see it the mechanisms of cooperation, already worked out by the Council and verified by life, should be included in the future institutions of the united Europe, and some of them should be placed at its permanent service. For example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has the chance of becoming a would-be common European parliametary forum. Or let us take an agency of the Council of Europe such as the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which holds its sessions regularly, twice a year. It stands to reason that in line with consolidating the positive changes in European affairs, with advancing towards European unity in the 21st century this Committee could form the backbone of a corresponding agency for the future single Europe. In the framework of the Council of Europe there already exist basic structures for the institution of promoting the CSCE's "local dimension", i.e., the European countries' more active and extensive cooperation at the level of local authorities.

This would naturally call for expanding the Council of Europe's sphere of action by drawing into its activities in one form or another not only the USSR, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, which received special status in the summer of last year, but also all the other countries of Eastern Europe.

We know that a discussion is now going on in the Council of Europe concerning participation of the United States and Canada. Different views have been voiced on this score. I believe that in any case these countries' contribution to the Council of Europe's efforts at overcoming the continent's division would be useful.

Seen as the most promising specific activity of the Council of Europe is the formation of a European legal space—a legal framework for the "common European home". In this field the Council has gained a wealth of experience and laid down a solid foundation of legal ideas and norms. Suffice it to say that the 135 European conventions, agreements, and complementary protocols to them, which have been signed in the framework of the Council of Europe, have replaced upwards of 2,500 bilateral legislative acts in the most diverse spheres: from human rights to public health, from culture and education to ecology and information. Moreoever, the standards ae not minimal, but serve as rigorous guideposts for all European nations. This is an existing practical coure of a future European legal space.

The Soviet Union is prepared for the broadest possible cooperation with the Council of Europe. Success here arises from a single understanding of the objective of creating a European legal space—not in a simplified way as a code of laws absolutely identical for the whole of Europe, but as a peculiar code of European legal ideas predicted on Protagorus' principle that "Man is the measure of all things".

For all that, each state must retain the freedom to choose its political, economic, social and cultural development, and its national identity. Universally recognized legal values devoid of any ideological coating can serve as the common denominator.

I can say that we are already engaged in practically working out the questions linked to the USSR's accepting a "package" of the Council of Europe's conventions and agreements. Here are some of them: the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, the European Convention on information on Foreign Law, the European Convention on Transfrontier Television, Partial Open Agreement on the Prevention of Protection Against, and Organization of Relief in Major Natural and Technological Disasters. Of special interest for the USSR would also be participation in the European Cultural Convention—one of the basic conventions of the Council of Europe, laying down the main principles and orientation of cultural cooperation among the countries of the continent. I am sure that the Soviet Union with its rich European cultural legacy and its present-day potential could contribute in a big way to the realization of this convention.

We also keep in our field of vision the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom—the first international treaty which has, on a regional level, transformed the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into specific legal commitments by envisaging a mechanism of international control over their observance—the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Our fundamentally new approach to the problems of human rights, to expanding the USSR's participation in the corresponding international mechanisms of control, and the democratization of domestic Soviet legislation have opened up a real possibility for the Soviet Union's joining this convention as well. It mustn't be forgotten, however, that it still has a "closed" character: The Council of Europe member-countries alone can take part in it. So that everything here by no means depends on us alone.

Can the Soviet Union become a full-fledged member of the Council of Europe? We do not see any insurmountable obstacles of a principled nature here and are ready to raise the status of relations with the Council of Europe to a higher level. We are convinced that today our country meets the cardinal criteria of membership in the Council of Europe. The supremecy of law is one of the main goals of perestroyka, and I believe that from now on no one will cast aspersion on the sincerity of our desire to reach the highest international standards in the field of human rights.

"The present-day Council of Europe must become a Council of Greater Europe"—this is how Catherine Lalumiere, the organization's secretary general, has formulated its credo. I would add: "The Council of Greater Europe is also the Soviet Union."

Gerasimov 6 Mar Briefing on World Issues

Kabul Situation 'Unclear'

LD0603124890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1235 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow 6 March (TASS)—"Clashes are currently taking place in Kabul," Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, has just stated at a briefing. He said "the situation still remains unclear," stressing that "we may be talking about an attempted coup."

Responding to additional questions from journalists about this information, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman refused to add anything to his statement, merely repeating that "the situation still remains unclear."

Shevardnadze To Visit Africa

LD0603161290 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—A Soviet delegation, led by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, will attend celebrations to mark Namibia's independence, to be held in Windhoek on March 21, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing today.

Namibia's independence is a major milestone on the road towards the final decolonisation of Africa.

The Soviet spokesman said that Shevardnadze may meet U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during the visit.

The African trip will take the Soviet foreign minister also to Zambia, Zimbawe, Mozambique and Angola.

'Optimistic' View of New Germany

LD0603162690 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The Soviet Union takes an optimistic view of its relations with the new Germany, if the unification of the two German states proceeds the way it should proceed—stage-by-stage and with a due sense of responsibility—a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

"The idea was expressed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during talks he had here with German Democratic Republic Prime Minister Ha[illegible]lodrow," the spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov to[illegible]riefing.

The spokesman added that during their talks the German guest and Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov agreed that a new mechanism be sought for economic relations, and bilateral links between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic be continued with account for the strong degree of integration existing between them.

Gerasimov said the Soviet side is opposed to a united Germany joining NATO.

He recalled the proposal to hold a meeting of experts from six countries—2 plus 4—even before the GDR elections on March 18. "It will probably take place," the spokesman said. "All the countries have expressed their consent, with the exception of the United States which, one has to assume, will also give its consent."

Referring to European frontiers, Gerasimov said that in the process of the unification "the principle of their (frontiers') must in no way be violated.

On the possibility of Poland taking part in the frontiers consultations, Gerasimov said the Soviet side "takes an understanding attitude to this Polish desire," but "at issue at this stage is convening a meeting of officials of the GDR and West Germany plus the four states legally responsible for preventing Germany from ever again threatening peace in Europe."

U.S. 'Realism' on Israel Settlements

LD0603161790 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—In the Soviet Union's opinion, the stand of the U.S. Administration on the settlement of immigrants on the Israeli-occupied Arab teritories attests to its growing sense of responsibility and realism, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

In this connection he noted that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said the other day that the U.S. Administration will not back a bill granting Israel a loan of 400 million dollars, if these funds are spent on the construction of settlements on the occupied Arab territories.

The spokesman said that settlements on the occupied territories were discussed during the Moscow meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker.

At that meeting the U.S. side did not agree to adopt a joint statement on this matter, even though it expressed disapproval of Israel's actions.

But the wave of indignation in Arab countries after Yitzhak Shamir made a statement about "greater Israel for greater immigration", apparently had an effect on the stand of the U.S. Administration, Gerasimov said.

"One cannot disregard the fact that Israel's actions might damage prospects for the settlement in the Middle East, including efforts for the establishment of a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue which the U.S. side itself suggests," the spokesman said.

Denial of Nicaragua 'Exchange'

LD0603173590 Moscow TASS in English 1637 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov described the recent Western reports alleging that the USSR has "exchanged Nicaragua in a game to improve Soviet relations with Washington" as "variations of the old imperial ideas and notions about the division of the world into spheres of influence, in which sovereign states can be 'traded-off' or 'split.'"

The principled Soviet policy on Central America, Gerasimov said, respects the peoples' right to free choice and aims at assisting a just political solution of the existing set of problems and contentious issues there.

The spokesman said that the February 25 elections in Nicaragua were a "free and democratic expression of the will of the country's people, exercised under broad international supervision." This will must be respected by all members of the international community who have to make practical steps to encourage the policy of national reconciliation in Nicaragua and create conditions for its economic and national rebirth.

In the Soviet opinion, Gerasimov said, an early disarmament and demobilisation of the contra rebels must now become an important factor of further stabilisation of the internal political situation in Nicaragua.

Further on Briefing

LD0603191290 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The Soviet Union takes an optimistic view of its relations with the new Germany, if the unification of the two German states proceeds the way it should proceed—stage-by-stage and with a due sense of responsibility—a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

The idea, expressed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev during talks he had here with German Democratic Republic Prime Minister Hans Modrow, was emphasised by spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov.

Gerasimov told journalists about some media reports alleging that some of the Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia will be stationed in the Baltic republics. As the Defence Ministry has already reported, Gerasimov said, such allegations are groundless. No such troop deployments are planned in the Baltic republics.

Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tesfaye Dinka will visit Moscow briefly on March 7, Gerasimov said.

On the recent session in New York of the U.N. Special Committee on the Charter and the strengthening of the U.N. role, Gerasimov said that the session "became a significant step forward in finding specific arrangements to better utilize the U.N. peace building potential and increase its efficiency." The spokesman said the special committee also focused on the question of establishing the actual circumstance of international disputes and conflicts and strengthening the U.N. role in the area.

Gerasimov described the recent Western reports alleging that the USSR has "exchanged Nicaragua in a game to improve Soviet relations with Washington" as "variations of the old imperial ideas and notions about the division of the world into spheres of influence, in which sovereign states can be 'traded-off' or 'split.'"

The principled Soviet policy on Central America, Gerasimov said, respects the peoples' right to free choice and aims at assisting a just political solution of the existing set of problems and contentious issues there.

Twenty years ago last Monday the nuclear nonproliferation treaty entered into force. In connection with the anniversary, Gerasimov said the Soviet Union regards "the stability of the treaty as an indispensable condition for a stable uninterrupted process of nuclear disarmament."

The spokesman said the USSR will continue to resolutely support the treaty. "We are convinced that the treaty must operate until even one nuclear weapon remains on the earth," he said. [sentence as received]

The U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's recent statement that the U.S. Administration will not support a bill granting Israel a loan of 400 million dollars if the money goes into building settlements in the occupied Arab territories, was described by Gerasimov as "evidence of increased responsibility and realism."

"It is now hard to avoid stating the fact that Israel's actions may prejudice the prospects for a settlement in the Middle East, including the efforts to establish a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, which is proposed by the American side itself," he said.

U.S. Agreement to Two Plus Four Talks Reported

LD0703091790 Moscow TASS in English 0854 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Washington March 7 TASS—The United States agreed to a proposal to hold the first talks on German reunification in Bonn on March 14.

The talks will be held according to a two-plus-four formula—the two German states and four victor powers, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told journalists on Tuesday [6 March].

The meeting is expected to discuss procedures for substantive talks after East German elections on March 18 and after discussions between the GDR and the FRG on unification, he said.

According to the spokesman, the first meeting will probably be held at deputy ministers' level. No future meetings have been scheduled, Fitzwater said.

Chernyshev Views NATO-Like Space Alliance

LD0603140290 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 6 Mar 90

[TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev report: "People Do Not Need NATO-Like Space Alliance"]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—Can the idea of establishing yet another, NATO-like, alliance with a limited number of members, which would also be assigned military tasks, be regarded as fruitful in our days which have been mainly characterised by the end of the cold war, by disarmament progress, confidence-building and disbandment of military-and-political alliances?

Surprising though it may seem, there is an organisation that has called for forming an "international space alliance", which would include the United States, West European countries and Japan.

These recommendations are contained in a survey, recently issued by the Rand Corporation Research Organisation at the request of the U.N. Defence Department.

The alliance, which this "think tank" suggests, is contemplated to be formed after the pattern of NATO.

Other recommendations listed in the survey are also significant. In particular, it is suggested that the Pentagon seek a considerable role in all space projects and assume the leading role in limiting cooperation with the Soviet Union in space research to such spheres as space medicine, research data analysis, and astronomy.

It is particularly emphasised that cooperation with the Soviet Union in large-scale programmes, during the implementation of which the need for a "transfer of technology" may arise, should be avoided.

A whole number of questions arise undoubtedly in connection with the Rand Corporation's survey. To begin with, what are the purpose of creating a space alliance after the pattern of the military-and- political bloc? Will not it signify a U.S. attempt to draw its allies that possess the newest technologies into Space weapon development or, in particular, into the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme?

Why does someone need to impose additional restrictions on joint space research with the Soviet Union precisely now that tendencies towards broader East-West cooperation are manifest?

Of course, there are no answers to these questions in the Rand Corporation's survey. It even lacks a mention of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union with a view to turning outer space into the sphere of growing peaceful cooperation, the benefits of which could be utilised by all peoples.

Apparently, it would be useful to remind the authors of the survey that the Soviet Union called for founding a world space association from the rostrum of the United Nations as far back as 1985.

The topicality of the idea of such an association has undoubtedly grown still further now. The Soviet Union believes that such an organisation would become the centre for practical elaboration of a universal model of international space exploration efforts. The peoples of the world clearly do not need a NATO-like space alliance.

VESTNIK English Edition Launched in Feb

PM0603121690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by J. Voelker, West German journalist attached to IZVESTIYA: "VESTNIK Premiere"]

[Text] The skinny little infant which appeared at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs three years ago, as Yu. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, put it, has now started to speak English. He meant the magazine VESTNIK MID SSSR, which began distribution in dozens of countries from February this year under the title VESTNIK. The first issue was officially presented a few days ago to chiefs of diplomatic missions accredited to Moscow.

Speaking at the presentation, Yu. Vorontsov expressed confidence that the English-language VESTNIK will become a reliable helpmate to those wishing to gain a correct impression of the USSR and its foreign policy.

The innovation is the fruit of joint creative efforts by Soviet and Austrian diplomats, businessmen, and journalists. The Soviet-Austrian enterprise "Vestnik" was set up in order to publish the magazine. It will be prepared in Moscow and printed in Vienna.

FRG, Polish Spokesmen Cited on Border Issue

PM0603123290 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS reports: "On the Question of Immutability of Borders"]

[Text] Bonn, 3 Mar—D. Vogel, the FRG Government's deputy official spokesman, stated at a press conference that Chancellor H. Kohl intends to link the question of recognition of Poland's western borders with Poland's waiving of reparation claims and with the guaranteeing by treaty of the rights of ethnic Germans living in Poland. According to him both these aspects must be reflected in statements on the borders which will be made by the parliaments of both German states after the forthcoming elections in the GDR. D. Vogel emphasized

that these statements must demonstrate that the Polish Government's decision to waive reparations claims remains valid. Then a treaty between the governments of Poland and a united Germany, containing guarantees of the rights of the German minority in Poland, must be worked out and signed.

Warsaw, 3 Mar—In connection with D. Vogel's statement, Polish Government press spokesman M. Niezabitowska made a statement on television.

D. Vogel's statement surprised us, she said. This is chiefly because it links a treaty on the settlement of Poland's western borders with the question of guaranteeing the rights of Polish citizens of German descent. We are completely fulfilling the obligations in respect of the German minority which Poland took upon itself in the statement signed by Chancellor Kohl and Premier T. Mazowiecki in November 1989, and merely wish to point out that the statement was a joint one.

On the subject of waiving reparations claims, or more precisely of reaffirming the treaty signed by Poland in 1953, Poland would not wish to link the question of settling borders with any other questions.

U.S. Nerve Gas To Be Removed From FRG

LD0603094590 Moscow TASS in English 0928 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Washington March 6 TASS—The United States and West Germany have finalised details to remove several thousand U.S. artillery shells with nerve gas from West Germany, between August and December of this year, Pentagon officials said on Monday [5 March].

The shells were stocked in 1967 in case of a European war and are being withdrawn at the request of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who asked Washington to remove the weapons before the December parliamentary elections, WASHINGTON POST writes.

Under the plan, the weapons will be moved to an island south of Hawaii, according to Europe's NATO Forces Commander U.S. General John Galvin, who is now in Washington.

United States & Canada

Karpov Receives U.S. Ambassador Matlock

LD0203230890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1728 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow 2 Mar (TASS)—Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, today received Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

Kovalev, U.S. Ambassador Discuss Europe

LD0303175590 Moscow TASS in English 1738 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 3 TASS—First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Anatoliy Kovalev and Ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock met at the request of the U.S. ambassador here today to discuss a number of questions of mutual interest, including those relating to the situation on the European Continent.

USIA Head, Petrovskiy Address Washington Meeting

PM0503120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash: "Soviet-American Meeting"]

[Text] Washington, 27 Feb—The state flags of the United States and the Soviet Union are flying at the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) building near Capitol Hill. The latest Soviet-U.S. meeting on information exchange opened here Monday. An in-depth, businesslike discussion will take place on how to transfer the concept of trust in the sphere of information, formulated in the course of preceding Soviet-U.S. contacts, into the realm of practical actions. A key theme will also be the discussion of the Soviet proposal to transform the nineties into a decade of rapprochement between the peoples of the USSR and the United States.

In opening the meeting, USIA Director Bruce Gelb said: "I note with satisfaction the warm friendship which has of late characterized relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet-U.S. relations are moving toward greater cooperation. There is no better way to back up and expand these relations than exchange in the sphere of information, which is conducive to a relaxation of tension between our countries. Disinformation has decreased considerably, and there is more truthful reciprocal information available. This helps to strengthen trust and mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union."

V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister and head of the Soviet delegation, noted in his speech that the present stage of Soviet-U.S. dialogue is marked by highly dynamic progress in dismantling the vast structure of military confrontation which took shape in the world during the years of the "cold war." It is the firm intention of our delegation to maintain the set pace and fruitfulness of the dialogue and to bring the situation in the sphere of information and cultural exchanges into line with the formula adopted by the leaders of our foreign policy departments about moving on from mutual understanding to joint actions based on universal human values.

The head of the Soviet delegation went on to emphasize that the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Malta and the runup to the new summit in Washington create the necessary preconditions for advancing cooperation in the sphere of information to a qualitatively new level.

"Cooperation at the intergovernmental level appears highly promising," V.F. Petrovskiy noted. "We are satisfied with the progress of the talks held in Moscow in 1989 on the opening of cultural and information centers in our capitals. There are no fundamental differences in our positions in this sphere. We have proposed that an agreement on this question be signed during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States. Summit meetings and the improvement of the general state of Soviet-U.S. relations are conducive to the expansion of cultural and scientific exchanges between the two countries and the broadening of contacts between people. We propose an expansion in scope and depth in the sphere of 'people's diplomacy' and in the development of ties between our countries' social, creative, women's, and children's organizations. I would like to express our support for President Bush's proposal to increase student exchanges between the USSR and the United States to 1,000 people on either side beginning in the 1990-1991 academic year."

"We cannot ignore numerous instances," he said in conclusion, "where Western news media, including media belonging to the U.S. Government (for instance VOA, the government's radio station, and Radio Liberty) spread unobjective, distorted, and tendentious information about events in the USSR and interpret Soviet actions in the foreign policy arena in a prejudiced manner. As for the USSR, I would like to state with the utmost responsibility that it does not engage in spreading deliberate disinformation about U.S. domestic and foreign policy, nor does it use its information media to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. I believe that as a result of the relations which are developing, disinformation will also be consigned to the archives by the U.S. side as no longer needed. We regard it as feasible to create, together with the United States, a model of positive collaboration in the information sphere which would rule out damage to the other side and ensure an adequate reflection of reality."

Petrovskiy, U.S. Officials View UN, Environment

LD2402095190 Moscow TASS in English 0754 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 24 TASS—In accordance with an arrangement that had been made, consultations

were held in Washington between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and John Bolton, U.S. assistant secretary of state, the Bureau for International Organisation Affairs.

They had an in-depth exchange of views on cooperation at the United Nations and U.N. specialised agencies, and reached mutual understanding on the need for joint efforts to raise U.N. effectiveness and to rationalise its activities, and for better utilisation of material and intellectual resources in all fields.

Within the framework of the consultations, Petrovskiy also met Robert Kimmitt and Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. under-secretaries of state.

Petrovskiy also had a detailed conversation with William Riley, director of the Environmental Protection Agency, who has just been incorporated into the cabinet as minister. Petrovskiy and Riley spoke out in favour of close Soviet-American cooperation in environmental protection.

U.S. Aid Sent to Chernobyl Zone

PM2802113990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Sergey Tsikora under the general heading "Direct Line: IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Charity Landing Force From Across the Ocean"]

[Text] There is seldom a smile on the face of the people now living in the zones which suffered from the catastrophe at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]. But a recent act of charity has warmed their hearts. Nearly 100 tonnes of rare medicines, vitamins, medical equipment, and children's toys have been delivered to Kiev from the American continent. On 14 February these gifts began to be distributed to hospitals, schools, and kindergartens in Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts.

Apart from its purely humanitarian aspect, this action is also of great political significance. The point is that its implementation required the efforts of organizations which until recently had had virtually no contact. This time the government of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka (RUKH), and numerous public organizations of Ukrainian emigres in the United States and Canada found a common language.

Events developed as follows. RUKH and several USSR people's deputies appealed to Ukrainian emigre organizations across the ocean where several million people of Ukrainian origin live to provide help in the form of medicines in short supply for the victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, particularly children. Numerous branches of the society to assist RUKH and the fund to assist the children of Chernobyl were immediately created in the United States and Canada. In a few months hundreds of thousands of dollars were collected through their efforts.

The first consignment of freight from across the ocean is estimated at several million dollars. The republic's government undertook to deliver the freight to the Ukrainian capital. To this end a "Ruslan" transport aircraft was assigned which made a special flight to deliver the medical supplies, food, and clothing so necessary now in the pollution zone.

A group of Ukrainians has arrived from Canada and the United States to pass them on to doctors in hospitals and to present them personally to the inhabitants of the afflicted regions. At a press conference at the Ukrainian SSR Health Ministry, one of them—Professor Taras Gunchak from the United States' Rutgers University—said that they know no tiredness when it is a case of aid for their first motherland. We are now preparing 200 computer systems for the republic's Ukrainian-language schools. That is only the start of the mounting flood of fraternal aid to the people of the Ukraine, Professor T. Gunchak noted in conclusion.

Air Safety Agreement Signed With U.S.

LD1702212190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0924 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Nikolay Orekhov]

[Text] Washington 17 February (TASS)—A memorandum on cooperation was signed on 16 February in the U.S. capital between the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and the U.S. Transportation Department's Federal Aviation Administration. The object of this agreement was to define the spheres in which the two sides intend to cooperate in order to increase the safety and efficiency of aircraft flights between Alaska and the Soviet Far East. In particular, the talk was about coordinating the work of the two countries' air traffic control services and about an exchange of meterological and aeronavigational information.

Signing the memorandum on behalf of the American side, Dale MacDaniel, the Federal Aviation Administration's deputy associate administrator for policy planning and international aviation, told journalists that this agreement opens new opportunities for commercial aviation flights between the United States and the USSR.

V.G. Shelkovnikov, head of the Main Air Traffic Control at the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and the leader of the Soviet delegation, stressed that joint efforts on this sort of scale to coordinate air traffic in this sector of the Pacific Ocean region were being undertaken for the first time since Soviet-American cooperation during World War II.

"This agreement lays the foundations for the start of businesslike talks at air company level, said V.G. Shelkovnikov. "It will promote the development of trade and tourism."

China

Economic Reform Symposium Held in Moscow

Delegation Head Interviewed

OW2502150890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 18 Feb 90

[Text] Dear listeners, the first Soviet-Chinese symposium on problems in economic reform has ended in Moscow. (Ryurkov), chief editor of the newspaper WORKERS FORUM, has interviewed Academician Shatalin, head of the Soviet delegation, on the results of that symposium. The following is a short excerpt of that interview:

(Ryurkov) asked: China has adopted many policy decisions since it began to carry out reforms 10 years ago. Of course, there have also been mistakes. Did the symposium touch on how the Soviet Union could use some of the experiences that China gained in its economic reform?

Shatalin answered: China has smoothly completed the first stage of its reform, in which the economic system in rural areas was reformed. The system of contract responsibility linked to output on a household basis has been popularized everywhere, under which remuneration for labor is directly linked to the final results of production. Measures adopted in this area have brought about startling achievements in agricultural development.

We should also make use of the good experiences the Chinese comrades have gained in establishing an open economic system. China has set up many special economic zones, imported capital from the West, and formulated a strategy for economic development in the coastal areas to open itself more widely to the outside world.

As a result of the development in the past 10 years, the import-export trade volume increased four times, exceeding $100 billion. Certain achievements have also been made in industrial reform. More than 90 state-run enterprises have switched to contract systems and are leased or operated as stockholding companies. The switchover of reform to urban areas and the serious mistakes in macroeconomy have become major factors contributing to economic crisis. It is always said that we should learn from other people's mistakes. We should keep this in mind.

(Ryurkov) asked: How did those mistakes manifest themselves?

Shatalin answered: In his report, Liu Guoguang, head of the Chinese delegation and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, explained this in detail. In the mid-1980's when the focus of reform was switched to urban areas, there were rapid changes in the market relations and certain mistakes were made, triggering very serious inflation and resulting in a double-digit price index in 1988. The economy was overheated and there was panic buying in the market. Elements of this situation are also present in the Soviet Union today.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that (Ryurkov) will visit China in mid-March with a delegation of journalists.

USSR, PRC Academicians Interviewed

PM0103115190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Academician S.S. Shatalin, head of the Soviet delegation at Soviet-Chinese symposium on economic reform problems, and Li Jingwen, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Quantitative and Technical Economics Institute, by V. Ganshin: "USSR and PRC: Paths of Economic Renewal"—date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Ownership relations, planned regulation and the market, combining the deepening of economic reform with urgent measures to improve the national economy, and the state and prospects of Soviet-Chinese economic relations—these and other problems were discussed by economists at the first Soviet-Chinese symposium on the problems in economic reform in the USSR and the PRC. Our correspondent asked Academician S.S. Shatalin, head of the Soviet delegation, and Li Jingwen, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Quantitative and Technical Economics Institute, to answer a number of questions about the results of the meeting.

[Ganshin] Contacts between Soviet and Chinese scientists have recently developed quite dynamically. In your view, what is the symposium's role and the place in this process?

[Li Jingwen] It is true that academic exchanges have existed for quite a long time between our two countries. M.S. Gorbachev's visit to our country in spring of last year gave a new impetus to scientific contacts between China and the Soviet Union. But the symposium that has just taken place must be mentioned in particular. Scientists and economists gathered together for the first time to discuss the problems in the economic reform taking place in our countries. The high level of the participants in the meeting assured a good-quality, professional discussion of a subject that is worrying us. During the debates various points of view and opinions on the most diverse problems of economic life were expressed quite frankly.

[Shatalin] I believe that the symposium that has just taken place is of great significance. The USSR and China are customarily called great powers; however, the prevailing situation in our two countries' economies is

inappropriate to their status. Cardinal decisions capable of changing the situation are needed. Instead of patching things up, we must start afresh...

[Ganshin] As is well known, the Chinese reform is "older" than Russian perestroyka. Both positive and negative experience has already been accumulated during its implementation. What could be singled out in this respect?

[Shatalin] First of all, the sphere in which the reform in China began. It started with the countryside. It was here, in agriculture, that very perceptible results were achieved in a relatively short time which made it possible to move on to the further deepening of reform. Speaking about successes, I must also stress that the necessary conditions existed for this in China: The peasantry (that is, people who had not lost their love for the land or desire to work on it) had been preserved, and the ability to work in the fields 14-16 hours a day had also not been lost. I do not mean that the situation in our country is the direct opposite. Despite the "depeasantization" of rural inhabitants, the farmers of many regions—Central Asia, the Caucasus, Siberia, the Kuban region, and here in the Chernozem Zone—have retained their skills. And as for the bad points of the Chinese reform, it will be best if my Chinese colleague tells us about them...

[Li] The reform begun in the spring of 1979 has come up against difficulties. Its first steps took place in conditions where there were no mature or comprehensively substantiated theoretical studies of this process in the country. They were formed as a result of analysis of the drawbacks of the traditional economic system and the search for new forms of management. So, to a certain extent, both the successes and the failures are connected with insufficiently developed theory. Chinese scientists are now working to generalize from a Marxist standpoint the experience and lessons of the more than 10-year period of reform. We believe that this should contribute to the creation of a new economic socialist system with a specific Chinese character...

[Shatalin] We have our own specific character, too; but we too must to pay attention primarily to agriculture. We must help the countryside to stand on its own two feet and work out a strategy for its revival and transformation. This strategy must, in my opinion, consist of three elements: First of all, capital investments in agriculture must not be reduced on any account. Second, a multiplicity of forms of ownership must be recognized—leasing, the cooperative system, sovkhozes [state farms], and so on. One must not believe a priori that kolkhozes [collective farms] will "save" the country, or, conversely, that private farmers will. Let the producers in every region decide for themselves which form of land possession is most suitable and which type of agriculture will saturate the market more fully with food. In order to do this, of course, Soviet power at the local level must be strengthened. And third and finally, there is the infrastructure, that is, roads, housing construction in the countryside, and so on. The state (both the center and at regional and oblast level) should bear the costs here. Yes, yes, subsidies. But why do we frequently forget that in the United States and West Europe agriculture is subsidized by the state?

As regards China, considerable experience has already been accumulated there in resolving these problems—both positive and negative. Of course this experience must be used wisely and not copied directly.

[Ganshin] "Rectification" in China, the complex of urgent measures in the Soviet Union... These enforced actions for which the same period of time—two or three years—is allocated in both countries must be again replaced by a period of reform. How do the emergency measures correlate with the idea of deepening economic transformations?

[Li] You are right in saying that "rectification" and "regulation" in China arose as emergency measures in response to difficulties that appeared in the course of the reform. These are quite well known: aggregate demand exceeding supply, imbalance in individual sectors of production, inflation in double figures. It is precisely because of these circumstances that the Chinese leadership resolutely began the "rectification" and "regulation" of the economy while at the same time continuing to pursue a policy of deepening reform. The aim is to achieve stability and balance in the national economy, which will create favorable conditions for completing economic transformations.

Special plans have been drawn up in order to successfully carry out the "regulation" in China. The efforts made to this end over a period of more than a year are having a positive influence on the state of affairs in the economy. So my assessments of what is happening here are entirely optimistic.

[Shatalin] When it comes to the correlation between emergency measures and reforms, I think that the most important thing is to implement these special measures mainly via economic mechanisms and not through an administrative-edict procedure. With such an approach, in two or three years' time, when we broaden and deepen the reform to a considerable extent, it will be easier to carry on what has been started. In this case, in my opinion, it is quite possible and justifiable for emergency measures and economic transformations in the national economy to coexist during this phase.

[Ganshin] What is your attitude to private ownership and its place in the socialist economic system?

[Shatalin] Very positive. It can exist in various forms, for example, joint-stock companies or private farms. It is time to stop frightening people with the idea of exploitation of man by man. Can you tell me in what way exploitation of man by the state is better? China has apparently already understood this and is not as afraid of private owners as we are (this is particularly noticeable in the service sphere and in trade).

You sometimes hear arguemnts that the "shadow economy," if given the chance, will take over all the key posts in the state. But, first, there are people who hide their income from the tax departments in any country and nothing happens; these states have not only not collapsed, but many are even flourishing. Second, the "shadow business" can be conquered and stifled by only economic methods. And as for making sure that it does not get to power, that is the business of the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department. In general, it is time we think seriously about using the "nuclear power" of underground millionaires for "peaceful purposes."

[Li] I believe that total private ownership is impossible in China. It is also not in line with today's realities. The aim of the Chinese economic reform is to create a planned market economy on the basis of the coexistence of various forms of ownership, with social ownership as the predominant form. Against the background of strengthening and improving social ownership we tolerate and stimulate various forms of ownership, including private ownership, which are useful to the national economy and to the people's welfare. Private ownership plays a supplementary and auxiliary role in the Chinese socioeconomic system.

[Ganshin] How do you evaluate the results of the debate at the symposium? Will the ideas expressed by participants in the meeting be put into practice?

[Li] Scientists from both countries delivered a number of interesting reports during the debate. I think this will play a positive role in improving mutual understanding. As we improve the processes of economic reform, we must hold detailed dialogue and strengthen cooperation between the two countries' scientists. Many ideas were put forward during the discussion. Their usefulness and practical worth will be determined by the reform itself and its future progress...

[Shatalin] It must be said that we got off to a good start. As my colleague has already said, there was an extremely interesting and useful exchange of views and experiences. I am absolutely certain that the current symposium is not just a success for the scientists, but also a step toward achieving a real improvement in the state of affairs in our countries' economies. The main thing is that, as a result of meetings like this, the level of a nation's economic thinking rises. And now the economists' task is to convey the symposium's results to the public in suitable forms. For example, on behalf of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economic Department, I intend to present a number of points that arose during our conference to the decisionmaking organs.

Today it is especially important to set ourselves realistic tasks and resolve them together. Both in China and in our country there were periods in history when we tried to "rely only on our own efforts." But we need to join forces, increase them, and take what is best from each other. And the present meeting should assist in this.

Northeast Asia

Japan's Kaifu Comments on Soviet Relations

LD0203104790 Moscow TASS in English 1038 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo March 2 TASS—Japanese Premier Toshiki Kaifu said here today that the importance of normalising Japanese-Soviet relations was growing due to the structural changes lately occurring in the international community.

Delivering his programme speech in parliament, Kaifu, who was reelected as premier on Tuesday, expressed the hope that both sides would exert efforts to promote the Japanese-Soviet dialogue and to radically improve relations between the two countries before President Gorbachev's visit to Japan, scheduled for next year.

"Our country's policy," he said, "will seek to expand, on a balanced basis, the entire complex of Japanese-Soviet relations in keeping with our basic course, which envisages the establishment of stable relations through the settlement of the northern territories problem and the conclusion of a peace treaty."

"The world is now living through historic changes," Kaifu said. "Particularly dramatic events are occurring in the Soviet Union and in East European countries." He pointed out that the Soviet-American Malta summit had "an extremely important symbolic significance for ensuring global peace and stability."

Kaifu hailed the improvement of Soviet-American relations and the progress made by the East and West in armaments and disarmament control. He believes the tendency to overcome East-West power confrontation and the "cold war" and the transition to dialogue and cooperation should not be limited to Europe alone. It should be extended to the Asian-Pacific region, too.

Kaifu implied that Japan intended, relying on its economic potential, to play a more weighty role in world affairs. "When the world order was determined by power confrontation, Japan was unable to make its contribution by power," he said. "Japan must play a positive role now that the first steps have been taken to establish a new world order, characterised by peaceful coexistence based on dialogue and cooperation."

Cooperation Promoted

OW0603062990 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Andreyev commentary]

[Text] At his first press conference held after the new cabinet was formed on 28 February, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu stated that Japan wanted to improve its relations with the Soviet Union in various fields. In this connection, Radio Moscow commentaor Andreyev states as follows:

It was, perhaps, for the first time that the Japanese prime minister attached so much importance to Japanese-Soviet relations at an official press conference and proposed that the task of stabilizing relations with the Soviet Union should be taken as one of the major foreign policies of the new administration. Prime Minister Kaifu stated that the Soviet Union has always occupied an important position in the Japanese policies because it is beyond any doubt that the Soviet Union is one of Japan's major neighboring powers in the world. The prime minister also pointed out that Japan regards the early conclusion of a peace treaty as one of the major bases for implementing its policies toward the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the prime minister spoke highly of the efforts made by both governments in this orientation, and pointed out that a permanent working group on the conclusion of a peace treaty had already been set up and that all the problems concerning this task would be discussed at the sessions of this group. Top-level delegations have exchanged visits and leaders of our two nations have exchanged messages. Prime Minister Kaifu also added that constant contacts between Japan and the Soviet Uniou would lead to good results.

The Soviet Union welcomes such an approach toward the development of the bilateral relations as stated by the Japanese prime minister. And the Soviet side is satisfied with the fact that the dialogues between the Soviet Union and Japan have been developing positively in recent times. A Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo, paid a visit to Japan, and Mr. Shintaro Abe held talks with General Secretary Gorbachev while leading a delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party of Japan, to visit the Soviet Union. Their visits have become the most unprecedented events in this process. Regular foreign ministerial consultations between our two nations have also become an important factor in the Soviet-Japanese dialogues.

As can be noted in statements issued by an official Japanese source, the Japanese people have indicated their understanding regarding the postponement of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan, which was originally scheduled for March. At a recent press conference, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that he would visit Japan and that preparations for his visit were in progress. The Soviet side wants to discuss the issue on lowering the level of military confrontation and the situation in the Pacific region during Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese side seems to understand that the Soviet-Japanese relations have dropped below the level appropriate for the two neighboring powers and that they have fallen behind the dynamic development in the world today.

To overcome this situation, the Soviet Union and Japan have great potentials in promoting cooperation in economic, scientific and technological, and other fields. In this connection, the Soviet Union welcomes Prime Minister Kaifu's call for expanding the bilateral relations in many fields and hopes that his call will be implemented in concrete terms.

President Bush To Meet With Kaifu 2,3 Mar

OW0603044490 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] Listeners: Prime Minister Kaifu and U.S. President Bush are scheduled to hold their second talks in six months in California for two days on 2 and 3 March. In this connection, Radio Moscow commentator Dmitriyev writes as follows.

Concerning the details of the talks, Prime Minister Kaifu said that the talks will be of a general nature and that various issues on cooperation in an extensive field will be brought up for discussion. He added that his talks with President Bush will be similar to the general talks held between the U.S. President and top leaders of European nations.

However, when one takes into account, for example, the fact that the United States does not have such a huge trade deficit with any European nation as it does with Japan, one cannot place much trust in Prime Minister Kaifu's remarks that his talks with President Bush will be similar to the general talks between the United States and European nations.

KYODO NEW SERVICE recently reported on the views of Mr. (Kenneth Curtis), an outstanding economic expert, on the Japan-U.S. summit talks. Mr. (Curtis) stated that President Bush will need something to break the intensifying hard-line position against Japan in Congress. However, if their talks are of general character and centered on discussing issues on promoting extensive cooperation, they will not bring about any results in line with the expectations of the U.S. side.

A similar situation was noted in Japan and the United States prior to the Japan-U.S. summit talks. No accord was reached at the recent Japan-U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative Talks just as no agreement was reached at the talks on the issue of satellites. In fact, the talks have resulted in renewed intensification of the tension caused by economic and trade frictions.

Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, during his recent visit to Japan, stressed that the two governments share a cooperative approach on defense and security issues. Under the situation thus created, it seems that Japan is now called upon to alleviate the U.S. irriation in connection with the trade deficit.

Secretary Cheney himself once stated that increasing Japan's share of the expenditures for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan will serve as a medicine for alleviating

the fever. However, what consideration will U.S. congressmen give to Japan's loyalty in defense matters while detente is being advanced between the East and West?

At any rate, public opinion polls have called attention to the fact that American voters have now come to feel that the Soviet military threat is gradually being replaced by the Japanese economic threat. The Japanese image of the Soviet threat is now different from that in the past. According to Professor Kamiya of Keio University, a political scientist, the argument concerning the Soviet threat has lost its credibility as justification for the Japan-U.S. military alliance. Mr. Takashi Saito of Gakushuin University argues that the security pact is an anachronism, nothing but an attempt to justify the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The cold war itself is becoming something of the past now. However, a serious but realistic problem, namely the economic contradiction between Japan and the United States, has arisen from beneath the scraps of the cold war. The familiar strong framework of the Japan-U.S. relationship, built basically on the confrontation with the East, has now started swaying. This fact seems to have aroused serious apprehensions in the Japanese Government. Such apprehensions can be clearly noticed even when the Japanese Government overemphasized its loyalty to the Japan-U.S. military alliance during Defense Secretary Cheney's visit to Japan. Both Japan and the United States have long been at great pains to separate the issue of military relationship from that of economic ties but it seems that they were unable to do so in the long end.

The talks between Prime Minister Kaifu and President Bush will clarify whether these speculations are correct or not. Should they be proved correct, what consequences will the new situation bring to Japan?

Meeting Accomplishes 'Nothing'

PM0603103190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Gan "View From Washington" under the general heading: "In Other Respects All Is Well. Results of the California Meeting of G. Bush and T. Kaifu"]

[Text] U.S. President G. Bush has held two-day talks with Japanese Prime Minister T. Kaifu in the Californian resort of Palm Springs. They ended on roughly the same note as the well known song about the beautiful marchioness for whom "in other respects all is well...."

Summing up the meeting, local commentators say that it succeeded only as regards handshakes and promises. As for specifics, there simply were none.

On the eve of the visit the impression had been created here that there was almost a crisis atmosphere in U.S.-Japanese relations. The meeting was organized in a matter of days, hastily, and without the usual priming of the mass media. As a result, the U.S. press indulged in speculation and guesses concerning the possible outcome of the talks.

It can now be said that most of the predictions were not borne out. Although there really are a lot of complexities in relations between Washington and Tokyo—this applies, above all, to the trade and economic sphere—the Palm Springs talks gave no grounds for saying that the specter of a rupture between the two countries is looming on the horizon. Taking into account the strength of both countries' economies, you can hardly deny the natural presence of friction created by the struggle for markets and by international expansion as a whole.

However, the United States reacts to this friction in an extremely pained way. For a long time now the Americans have been registering an annual trade deficit with Japan at the level of $49-50 billion. The objective successes of the Japanese are resulting in the U.S. side employing all conceivable means of political and economic pressure. Even diktat. Literally on the eve of Kaifu's arrival the U.S. Congress was readying itself to adopt a series of anti-Japanese measures providing for obligatory trade repression against Tokyo. Only a personal request from Carla Hills, the U.S. President's special representative at international trade talks, to the legislators to delay them saved relations between the two countries from a real crisis. "We give the Japanese one month, and if nothing changes then they will have a tough ride," one congressman said.

However, nothing to satisfy Congress was achieved in Palm Springs. First, by all accounts, the White House had to take account of the shaky political position of Kaifu himself, who is reportedly still unable to overcome the factional squabbling in his own Liberal Democratic Party and cannot ignore demands not to yield to U.S. pressure. Second, mindful of the key role which Washington allocates to Japan in its military-political strategy in the Asia and Pacific region, the administration did not consider it possible to submit the guest from Tokyo to too much of a "trial of strength."

It is significant, therefore, that against the background of declarations about the need for "decisive steps to rectify the present abnormal state of bilateral trade" President G. Bush decided on the first day of the talks to totally bypass economic questions and, in particular, the U.S. demand for the Japanese market to be "opened up" to goods from the United States. What was mainly heard was Bush's assurances that the planned U.S. troop cuts in Asia mean no changes in Washington's "obligations to its Asian allies." According to White House Press Secretary M. Fitzwater, the sides agreed on the need for "a fairer sharing of the cost of maintaining the U.S. security umbrella."

There was practically no progress on trade questions. Although both Bush and Kaifu promised to do everything to balance bilateral trade and the Japanese premier even guaranteed personally to tackle "the structural

reform of Japan's trade as one of my cabinet's chief priorities," skeptics at once expressed their opinion, which is what will determine the public mood. As CBS TV pointed out, "encouraging words have been uttered before, but nothing has changed."

In other words, the Palm Springs meeting might have prepared the ground for further high-level U.S.-Japanese contacts, as White House spokesmen declare, but it produced nothing in terms of settling the potentially dangerously explosive problems of the U.S.-Japanese economic "love-hate" relationship. So right after the end of the talks there was once again talk of a "possible full-scale trade war" and of "U.S. readiness to introduce trade sanctions against Japan."

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on Attempted Coup in Afghanistan

Najibullah Under 'No Threat'

LD0703131490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1223 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] [No dateline as received] At the present moment there is absolutely no threat to either the president or the Government of Afghanistan, Ahmad Sarwar, ambassador of the republic of Afghanistan in India, declared in Delhi. Speaking at a news conference specially convened today, he detailed Tuesday evening's attempted armed overthrow of the legitimate Government of Afghanistan as a conspiracy by a handful of mercenaries, traitors, and enemies of that country, aimed against the policy of national reconciliation.

"About an hour ago I spoke on the telephone to President Najibullah, who declared quite firmly that the situation in the country is now wholly under control," the ambassador reported.

In answer to a question, Ahmad Sarwar said he was "completely convinced" that Pakistani special services were involved in the foiled conspiracy.

Coup 'Fell Through Completely'

LD0703154490 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 7 TASS—The coup attempt in Kabul on Tuesday fell through completely, Plenipotentiary Minister-Councillor of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow Sayed Murtaza told a news conference here today.

Some participants of the putsch were killed and some turned themselves in in the early hours of the morning today, he said.

The leader of the rebellion, former defense minister Shahnawaz Tanay, has escaped.

According to government information, in addition to a small group of officers, the abortive coup involved rebel forces controlled by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Pakistani intelligence.

The Afghan diplomat said that at the moment the situation was fully controlled by government forces and armed clashes in the city have ended. Regular army units did not support the rebels.

The authorities have no exact data as to the number of casualties, he said, but so far no great losses have been reported from Kabul.

The republican leadership has appealed to the population of Afghanistan to assist in capturing Tanay dead or alive, Sayed Murtaza noted. Reports of allegiance to the President Najibullah administration have been flowing in from provinces, army units, Interior Ministry and state security forces.

Murtaza also said that former interior minister Colonel General Muhammad Aslam Watanjar has been appointed defense minister, and Raz Muhammad Paktin has been appointed interior minister.

Murtaza denied allegations that the putsch was prompted by differences between the former Halk and Parcham wings within the National Democratic Party. He said the abortive coup was prompted by Shahnawaz Tanay's individual claims. Tanay's scheme was directed not against the party but against Afghanistan, he said.

Kabul Damage, Casualties Reported

LD0703152890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1347 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Kabul, 7 Mar (TASS)—TASS correspondents Andrey Semenov and Yuriy Tyssovskiy report: Upturned asphalt, huge craters, pavements scattered with the branches of trees mutilated by shrapnel—such was the image of the prospects and streets of Kabul adjoining the residence of the president of Afghanistan that presented itself to our eyes. According to updated figures, on Tuesday fighter-bombers whose pilots took part in the rebellion headed by former minister of defense Shahnawaz Tanay carried out 18 combat sorties from an airfield in Bagram, 70 km to the north of the capital, dropping more than 30 cluster bombs of great destructive power on the town. The main targets of the insurgents were the presidential palace, radio and television buildings, the national guard headquarters, and a number of offices of the Ministry of State Security. If the extensive palace complex did not suffer, then two bombs dropped on the complex inflicted considerable damage on the television and radio complex, all the windows have been smashed, and the window frames broken. Ten state officials were killed. One of the bombs hit Pushtunistan Square next to the buildings of the National Bank, the post office, and the telegraph and telephone office. Nearby houses were also damaged.

One set of the "air-to-ground" missiles hit the premises of the joint Soviet-Afghan joint-stock society "Afsot," which employees had left only minutes before at the end of the working day. Fazel Hadi, chief of a patrol of defenders of the revolution in this district, reported to us that it was only by fortunate coincidence that there were no victims, for the building was completely destroyed. According to eyewitness accounts, air-defense weapons succeeded in bringing down one of the attacking planes, which crashed into the city's poor districts. As yet, there are no complete data on casualties but, by all accounts, there are many.

In the morning, we set off down a virtually deserted Darol-Amman Avenue, accompanied by special vehicles of the security bodies, toward the building of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Afghanistan, which was the scene of fierce battles on Tuesday. Today too, one could hear the sound of an artillery cannonade and the stuttering of automatic gunfire coming from there. We were not allowed right up to the building as government troops were continuing to eliminate isolated centers of resistance nearby. Senior Captain Abdol Fatah Shahin, commander of a sub-unit of troops of the Ministry of State Security guarding the approaches to the ministry, told us that in spite of the intensive combat action in this district, there had been no casualties among his subordinates. About 10 soldiers were slightly wounded but returned to their posts after receiving the necessary aid.

Our tour round the city took about two hours and we returned to the TASS department long after midday. By this time, the city's streets were noticeably livelier, although patrols continue to stand guard at every crossroad, carefully checking documents of passersby and the drivers of vehicles, which were passing through infrequently. Virtually all shops and institutions are closed. Nevertheless, repair teams are already at work on the capital's roads and squares, restoring the electricity supply and telephone links and clearing away the rubble of houses destroyed by blast.

According to reports reaching here, the military airbase at Bagram is still in the hands of the insurgents.

UN Envoy Holds News Conference

LD0703062590 Moscow TASS in English 0611 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] New York UNO March 7 TASS—Nur Ahmad Nur, permanent representative of Afghanistan at the United Nations Organisation, held a press conference at the U.N. Headquarters on Tuesday. He informed journalists of the situation in Kabul after the abortive attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Afghanistan. He said that at present the situation was fully controlled by the Najibullah government. The permanent Afghan mission at the U.N. keeps in touch with the government.

Nur Ahmad Nur said that the conspiracy had been led by Afghan Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanay, supported by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's rebel group.

TASS Reports on Events

LD0603219590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1850 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 Mar (TASS)—We are transmitting the full text of the TASS report on the events in Afghanistan.

"The clashes which flared up in Kabul on 6 March, including those in which aviation was used, between individual units of government troops give rise for serious concern. An attempt to organize an armed conspiracy against the legitimate government of Afganistan was undertaken at a time when the process of national reconciliation is gaining momentum and the prospects for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict have become more apparent. These actions are fraught with a threat to inflict a blow against the hopes for the speedy establishment of peace in Afghanistan.

"Soviet people, who are sincerely, interested in the well-being of the Afghan people and hope that no more people perish in neighboring Afghanistan, which is dear to us, cannot stand aside from the events happening in that country. It is being noted with satisfaction that the government is taking vigorous measures to normalize the situation.

"At this difficult time for the people of Afghanistan what is required first and foremost is the unity of all patriotic forces in defending the national interests of Afghanistan and determination not to permit a development of events which could lead to tragic consequences.

"In the Soviet Union there is confidence that the path to a future peaceful and prosperous Afghan state lies in national reconciliation and the provision of Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty. It is precisely this path which enjoys support both in our country and throughout the world."

'Desperate Action' of Plotters Viewed

LD0703141390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1310 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Mar (TASS)—TASS political commentator Askold Biryukov writes:

In Kabul an attempt at a coup d'etat, in which a group of Afghan officials led by former Minister of Defense Shahnawaz Tanay was involved, has been foiled. Relying on supporters in the Army and on a fairly complex underground network set up in Kabul by the organization led by the well-known Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ["The Islamic Party of Afghanistan"], the organizers of the coup engaged in armed operations in the Afghan capital, attempting to seize a number of military and civilian installations. The armed sally by those involved in the

coup was cut short through decisive action by government troops. The hotbeds of resistance were eliminated, and Tanay himself fled.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan is now undertaking energetic measures to bring normality to the capital. Messages addressed to President Najibullah are coming in from Qandahar, Herat, Helmand, Nangarhar, and other provinces and administrative centres, in which the local leadership and the servicemen of the republican Armed Forces express resolve to defend the motherland's independence to the last drop of blood and to steadfastly uphold the government's policy of national reconciliation.

Let us recall that as early as the end of last year the competent bodies of the republic were able to uncover a considerable part of the irreconcilable opposition's underground network in Kabul. A number of military leaders also turned out to be involved in this network, as were a considerable number of middle-ranking officers. The plotter had detailed plans for overthrowing Najibullah's Government. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar himself has boasted more than once that power in the country is almost in his hands. However, the discovery of a plot fraught with bloody and unpredictable consequences hindered the implementation of these plans at the time, although as is now obvious, it did not make their organizers see reason. Moreover, it is clear that this even prompted them to take the present desperate action.

There is no doubt that Hikmatyar's "irreconcilables" and those who have been supporting him from the wings all these years are behind the current plot. And he himself does not conceal that, having received the plotters' appeal for help on the radio, he informed them that his guerillas and supporters in the army were ready to give them active support. Furthermore, at his press conference in the Pakistani capital Hikmatyar also called on the Pakistani authorities to support the action by the plotters in Kabul.

The armed plot against the legitimate government of Afghanistan was planned by the government's opponents at a time when the process of national reconciliation is gathering force in the country and when the majority of Afghans, tired of the war and mindless rocket attacks being launched by the opposition, are demanding a halt to all kinds of military actions and the initiation of a wide-ranging inter-Afghan dialogue. It is clear that those who are against these aspirations of the people are prepared to bury the hopes of establishing peace in the country.

It is being threatened in the camp of the irreconcileable opposition that in the event of the failure of the current coup attempt they will organise a fresh armed offensive. It must be assumed that, in these conditions, all Afghan patriotic forces will display proper wisdom and ensure unity in defending the national interests of their motherland.

Delegation To Visit Saudi Arabia, North Yemen

LD0603142390 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1233 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 6 Mar (KUNA)—Informed diplomatic sources revealed here today that a Soviet delegation, led by Vladimir Polyakov, director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East and North Africa Department, will pay an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia within the next two days. The sources told KUNA that the visit will aim to explain the Soviet position toward the emigration of Soviet Jews to the occupied Arab territories and developments on the Arab and international arenas relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is likely that the visit by the Soviet diplomatic delegation is a Soviet initiative in reaction to recent Saudi statements concerning Moscow's stance toward the emigration of Soviet Jews to the occupied Arab territories, which were received with satisfaction in official Soviet circles.

The sources said that, after visitiing Riyadh, the Soviet delegation will go on to Sanaa to hold similar talks with the Yemeni leadership. [passage omitted]

Missions On Alert After Palestinian 'Threats'

JN0603165890 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 4 Mar 90 p 26

[Text] Beirut—Arab diplomatic sources have said the Soviet Government has declared a state of alert and emergency at all its embassies and diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Europe for fear of operations by the Palestinian resistance in retaliation for the growing rate of Soviet Jews' immigration to Israel. The sources also said that the Soviet Government issued instructions to its diplomatic missions abroad to increase the number of the well-trained guards and to declare a state of alert among these guards to confront any possible attacks against these missions.

Arab diplomatic sources pointed out that many Soviet embassies in the Middle East have received telephone threats over the past weeks. They said that the calls threatened to strike at Soviet interests if Moscow does not stop the wave of the Soviet Jews' immigration to Israel.

The sources added that these threats reached the Soviet diplomatic missions after the failure of the recent talks held between the PLO and the Soviet Government representative in Tunis to persuade the Soviets of the need to stop the Soviet Jews' immigration to Israel.

Special Soviet envoy Gennadiy Tarasov had met with Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat at the PLO headquarters in Tunis.

East Europe

GDR's Modrow Meets Gorbachev, Concludes Visit

Gorbachev Comments Before Meeting

LD0603203890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Good evening comrades. Today, we start the final edition of the "Vremya" program with report on the working visit to Moscow by Hans Modrow, head of the GDR Government—an event which aroused particular interest as a result of the attention devoted to the German question in the world, and to the processes connected with a possible future unification of the two German states and with the democratic changes taking place in the GDR.

There was a one-to-one conversation in the Kremlin today between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers. [video shows the two men meeting]

Before the start of the conversation, Comrade Gorbachev, replying to questions from journalists on the approach to solving the German problem, said in particular: [video shows Gorbachev speaking to journalists; Modrow sits opposite him]

[Begin Gorbachev recording] From the viewpoint of the principled approach in our country, nothing is being changed. The formula is very capacious. History has seen to it that today there are to German states—that is the reality. But that is not the only reality, there are also the postwar realities, of an external nature, which have been fixed in the Helsinki process.

I have always said that history will also see how things will be in future. And I think that neither the concept of the German question nor the problem of the reunification of Germany are outside the context of those profound changes which are taking place in Europe and in the world. I think that precisely the fact that things are turning out in this way now, is the contribution of many states, including the two German states.

But in this connection the question also arises—we all have to be very attentive and act in such a way that at this very crucial time for the destinies of many peoples and states and of the world as a whole, we should act in such a way as not to destroy what has been created nor what has provided the opportunity for this process to unfold. You can see how complex the dialectics are.

But these are the real dialectics of life. So we have to act in such a way that ultimately both the interests and the aspirations of the Germans living in both states are taken into account and fulfilled in a fit manner, exactly as this should take place in circumstances of taking account—just the same account being taken of the interests of all Europeans and, in the first instance, of those who are particularly involved in this situation; I have in mind the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, this is a problem which, from all points of view, is of a fundamental nature—indeed as it is for all Europeans I think.

So, if we act in this way, then I think that, ultimately, everything will turn out for the better, and if it forms part of the all-European process—and we are moving toward a new Europe, new relations, and a new type of cooperation via the all-European process—then this has to be borne in mind in order that from one side or another, or from a third, fourth, fifth, or sixth side—the list can be continued—there should be understanding of the importance of precisely such an approach.

I think that as far as the postwar realities are concerned, as regards the borders which have taken shape and their inviolability—that is the question of questions. If it is borne in mind that someone in this process of reunification wants to reanimate revanchist plans, then this is an irresponsible policy and is fraught with very serious consequences; and I just think that the peoples will not permit this.

It seems to me that the Germans understand this, both in the GDR and in the FRG, and if there are any politicians who don't understand this or who are speculating about this—then that is their business. But I think that life will put everything into its place. These are fundamental matters, exactly in regard to where a united Germany exists, what role it should play when it comes about. That is also a fundamental question.

I think that my old friend Hans Modrow and I will have a talk now about these questions. [video shows Gorbachev ending talk with journalist] [end recording]

Gorbachev Queried on Unification

PM0703113390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 7 Mar 90 pp 1, 5

[TASS report: "Phased Approach Needed"]

[Text] After the completion of the conversation, which took place in an extended composition with the participation of the ministers accompanying H. Modrow, M.S. Gorbachev gave an interview to correspondents of TASS, and GDR and FRG television.

[Question] What is the USSR's attitude to any form of participation by a united Germany in NATO?

[Gorbachev] We cannot agree to that. It is absolutely out of the question. We consider the unification of the two German states a natural process, within the confines of that very concept which I have always set out in the past: The reality which history has handed down to us will be dealt with by history itself. Now, as we say, history has begun to work at an accelerated pace.

It seems to me that in this case the Germans' interests should without doubt be taken into account, and we are

prepared for this. But both the Germans and all who are involved in this process should take account of the natural interests of the neighbors of the two German states, the interests of all Europeans and, if one recalls that the German question is one of the most important in world politics, then the interests of the whole world community, too. This problem must not be oversimplified. It is impermissible to act in haste or, so to speak, "high-handedly," in major, crucial questions which touch upon the fundamental interests of whole peoples, of the Germans themselves, of Europeans, and of the whole world. Such a method will not do for major political matters. It is essential to have a stage-by-stage approach, and I think the people of the GDR have an interest in this, too. They wish to know what is to happen to them, what is to be their fate, the fate of all those generations which lived and worked in the Republic. This is in the interests of the Germans of the FRG, too. They wish to know what unification requires of them, too. I should think that entrepreneurs and all business people there are giving serious thought to that, for it is a very major problem. Thus, both from the viewpoint of domestic and foreign policy, and from the viewpoint of the real life of the two German states, I think that a stage-by-stage progress toward unification, as a well considered approach, is a good thing. If this process is intertwined with the process of European rapprochement, which, by the way, perhaps we should speed up, this means that both processes will be synchronized and any concern will be removed which might arise if this is not done. And it already exists, many people are talking about frontiers already.

In the past few days, Mr. Chancellor [Helmut Kohl] has made some sort of corrections to his position on this question. I note this, and welcome it. For "maneuvers" and vagueness on such fundamental things are not for serious politics. People should have a clear conception of everything and know everything. That is the first thing. The second thing is: Where is a united Germany to be? I think that if the European and Vienna processes continue, we shall get to Helsinki II, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be transformed from military-political organizations into political organizations—that is one situation. Then there will be no need for this haggling about where a united Germany will be. In a conversation recently, one of the representatives of the FRG leadership said: Well, really, Mr. Gorbachev, why are you worried by this question? For Germans are no longer the same, they are different! Yes. The Germans in both the East and the West are devoted to peace. They have done much. This is all true. But in this case, I replied to him, let us agree to this: Why should they join NATO? Let them join the Warsaw Pact if this is of no significance. This was immediately followed by an objection: Well, no, why? Thus, my counterproposal clarified a lot. Let us consider everything fundamentally, reckon everything up; in brief, conduct matters seriously.

Both now and all the time, if you recall, I keep on stressing that we are going through such alterations in the world, in Europe, which will bring us great changes—a new Europe, new relationships between ordinary people, between states, and between peoples. This means that we must not let slip this chance. But at the same time this requires great responsibility. We must not destroy what we have all put so much effort into. For everything that is happening is the result of joint efforts over decades, not just positive ones, but negative ones, too, from which we have drawn lessons. Now, when the historical opportunity has arisen we must be very responsible. There you are, I would like to give such a broad reply to your short question. For all of this is important for us all.

We will participate actively and constructively in the processes which are taking place, but we will not allow the positive trends which have arisen and which are gaining strength in Europe to be exploded, and the process of renewal of relations among the European countries to be halted. This is the point of departure for us.

[Question] You said that the processes taking place in Germany are very complex and that they demand a responsible approach from everyone. What do you think, is there sufficient responsibility in Germany now in the approach to the elections?

[Gorbachev] You know there are delicate areas; one must not interfere in internal affairs. We have firmly taken up that position: not to interfere in internal affairs. Of course, this does not mean that we are indifferent to everything; on the contrary, we are sympathetic toward some processes, we are in solidarity with them, and others we assess negatively. But in the end each people makes its own choice. Therefore, in observing the election campaign from here, from Moscow, I see that there are some people who are in a hurry, that there are some people who want to impose their own views and their assessments. I see that there are attempts to pressure the Germans of the GDR in the interests of one's own party and one's own political calculations. You asked me this question, provoking my answer. I hope that both in the FRG and in the GDR they will not take it as if I am thereby interfering in the pre-election campaign. On the contrary, I see how many visitors from the FRG there are now in the GDR, and how they are interfering in its affairs, as though the GDR had already lost its sovereignty, as though the GDR was already not an independent state recognized by the world community. All of this is there, this is present. But let the Germans themselves sort this out. I imagine that the people themselves must think well in deciding to whom they should give priority, for at this stage it is particularly important that people who are capable of conducting affairs responsibly, cooperating with all interested governments and peoples, should be in parliament, in the government, in all the bodies of power.

[Question] How do you see future relations between the Soviet Union and a united Germany? Could links arise that are qualitatively different from those formerly with the FRG and the GDR?

[Gorbachev] I think, of course, that relations will change. I have just spoken before members of the H. Modrow government on this subject. I imagine that there are good prospects for these relations. But once again this depends upon how we are going to cooperate. Given one kind of approach, it is possible to add to, even to strengthen and extend, cooperation, but given another kind of approach it is possible to sow suspicions and negatives.

In the interests of our bilateral relations and cooperation, I think both sides must act responsibly. Our greatest and broadest contacts among the socialist countries were and are with the GDR. Our broadest links among the West European states are with the FRG. This of itself is very important. When the process of unification takes place, and it will affect all areas, including the economy, we do not want these interests to suffer, either for a united Germany or for the Germans or for ourselves.

If one turns to relations between Germany and Russia, as you know, they have a long history. There have been elements in the relations from which lessons have to be drawn. We cannot forget what happened when fascism came to power in Germany and how this turned out for our peoples, for the Soviet people and for the Germans. Also the fact that we drew conclusions, we took a peaceful road, we started to restructure relations upon a new basis, to cooperate both in bilateral interests and in the interests of the world—all of this is a very important achievement of our peoples and states. This must be preserved. For our own part we will do everything to preserve this. But, as they say, there are reciprocal interests here, and there has to be reciprocity. The prospects, I believe, are great. I see the interest that is shown by Germans from the FRG, entrepreneurs, in uniting the intellectual and scientific efforts, the technical base and the resources of our states. This could serve both our own peoples and Europe as well. In this sense, I am an optimist.

Further on Interview

LD0603195690 Moscow TASS in English 1932 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The future relations between the Soviet Union and the united Germany have good prospects. This opinion was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet leader gave an interview to correspondents of TASS and of the GDR and the FRG television following a conversation he held today with Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic Hans Modrow who was visiting the Soviet Union.

Questioned about the Soviet attitude to any form of the united Germany's participation in NATO, Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union cannot agree to this. "This is absolutely ruled out," he stressed. All those associated with the process of the unification of Germany, he said, must take into account the natural interests of the two German states' neighbours, of the Europeans and of the world community.

Gorbachev said that, on matters affecting the interests of the peoples of the whole world, it is inadmissible to act hastily. He made it clear that a stage-by-stage approach is necessary in the process of the unification of Germany.

Touching on the question as to where the united Germany will be, the Soviet leader expressed the opinion that, if the European and Vienna processes go on, and then Helsinki-2 is held, and NATO and the Warsaw Treaty will be changing from military-political into political organisations—this will be one situation. "And in this case there will be no need for this bargaining as to where the united Germany must be," he said.

Questioned as to whether now, with the elections coming, there will be enough sense of responsibility shown in Germany, if one considers that the processes under way in it are very complex, Gorbachev said one cannot interfere in the internal affairs of others. "We have firmly taken this position: not to interfere in the internal affa'rs," he stressed. Gorbachev added that some are in a hurry to foist their assessments of the election campaign. "I see," he said, "that attempts are being made to pressure the Germans in the GDR in the interests of some parties and their political designs. But, then, let the Germans themselves get a clear picture as to what is going on."

Gorbachev-Modrow Meeting Detailed

LD0603231790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1732 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 March (TASS)—M.S. Gorbachev received in the Kremlin today H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, who arrived in the Soviet Union on a working visit, and the ministers of the Republic's coalition government accompanying him. Taking part in the meeting were N.I. Ryzhkov, E.A. Shevardnadze, V.M. Falin, R.P. Fedorov and G.I. Gerasimov; from the GDR side—T. Boehm, K. Wolf, K. Wuensche, P. Diederich, W. Meyer, M. Platzeck, G. Poppe, S. Pflugbell, W. Ulimann, M. Flegel, K. Schlueter, P. Eppelmann, W. Fleck, E. Karabatsch, and G. Koenig.

Principle aspects of the German issue and of bilateral cooperation were discussed.

I would like to stress again, M.S. Gorbachev declared, that the Soviet Union respects the right of the Germans of the GDR and the FRG to self-determination. It is understandable that the Soviet Union is, as other states, above all European ones, evidently are, far from indifferent toward the way in which the rapprochement of the two German states is to occur and how their international obligations are to be fulfilled. The German question affects the fundamental interests of the international community, and the Soviet Union, together with other countries, is within its rights to strive for unconditional guarantees that war should never again ensue from German land.

We are firmly convinced, M.S. Gorbachev said, that the rapprochement of the GDR and the FRG will only succeed in preserving the balance of interests on the continent if its stage-by-stage nature, its controlability, and its coordination with the provision of security for all interested states in the course of the pan-European process are guaranteed.

Whipping up a hullabaloo, the striving to annex the GDR and the policy of "faits accomplis" do not correspond to a responsible approach to the resolution of an issue which is of such sensitivity for the fate of Europe and the world as is the German one. This, in our judgement, does not correspond to the interests of the Germans themselves either, who cannot help but be interested in constructive and fruitful relations with all the peoples of Europe on the basis of a solid, mutual trust.

An indispensable condition for the movement toward a single Germany is that full account be taken of the rights and interests of the four powers and of other states, especially neighboring ones, that the current European borders be unreservedly acknowledged, and that revanchist, territorial claims of any kind be renounced.

The unacceptability of the inclusion of the future Germany in NATO, whatever provisos may incidentally be made, was declared with complete certainty.

Actions which would lead to a disturbance in the balance which has taken shape in Europe—the foundations of stability and security and of mutual trust and cooperation—must not be permitted.

The fundamental aspects of German unity, including Germany's military and political status, the Soviet leader noted, may find their ultimate resolution within the framework of a peaceful settlement which will be an important element in the new security structures taking shape on the continent and which, from the point of view of international law, will place Germany in a position equal to other members of the world community.

A lively exchange of opinions showed the closeness or coincidence of the fundamental approaches of the leadership of the GDR and the Soviet Union toward the various aspects of inter-German rapprochement.

H. Modrow came out in favor of the socio-economic, spiritual, and cultural distinctiveness of the GDR and the nature of its international links and obligations toward other states being taken into account during the stage-by-stage movement toward German unification. No one should have any doubts that the GDR and the overwhelming majority of its citizens see the Oder-Neisse border as definitive and as an indispensable proviso of a peaceful future for the German, Polish, and other peoples of Europe.

The process of rapprochement demands mutual responsibility and carefully considered steps. It must not lead to a reduction in the social protection of the inhabitants of the GDR, harm their legal rights, their property or any of the property of the Republic's people which has been created by the labor of several generations over a number of decades. Naturally, the vital interests of the population of the FRG cannot be ignored either.

A positive evaluation of the multifaceted cooperation between the Soviet Union and the GDR and the new nature of relations between them was given by both sides. The mutual interest in preserving and augmenting everything of value which has existed and exists in the economic, scientific and technical, political and cultural links between the two states and in strengthening mutual trust for the benefit of their peoples, was stressed.

The conversation passed in a friendly, business-like, and constructive atmosphere.

'Closeness' on Issue Noted

LD0603222990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Today in the Kremlin, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev received Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, and the ministers of the Republic's coalition government who were accompanying him. The fundamental aspects of the range of German problems and bilateral cooperation were discussed. I would like to confirm again, stated Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, that the Soviet Union respects the right of the GDR and FRG Germans to self-determination. It is understandable that the Soviet Union is, as are also other states and, first and foremost, the European states, far from indifferent to the way in which the rapprochement between both German states will proceed, how their international obligations are going to be discharged.

The German issue affects the fundamental interests of the international community, and the Soviet Union, together with other countries, has a right to secure unconditional guarantees that war will never again originate on German soil.

The lively exchange of views has demonstrated the closeness, or coincidence of the fundamental approaches of the leadership of the GDR and the Soviet Union on various aspects of the inter-German rapprochement.

Hans Modrow spoke in favor of the GDR's socioeconomic, spiritual, cultural identity, the nature of its international ties and obligations toward other states being taken into account during the gradual movement toward German unification. No one ought to harbor any doubts that the GDR and the overwhelming majority of its citizens see the Oder-Neisse border as being the final border, representing the indispensable condition for a peaceful future for the German, Polish, and other peoples of Europe.

Both sides gave a positive assessment of the multilevel cooperation between the Soviet Union and the GDR, and of the new character of the relations between them.

Gerasimov Cited on Talks

LD0603152290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1147 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] (ADN-Corr)—The spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov said that complete agreement of views and positions was prevalent in the talks. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke in favor of a stage-by-stage unification of Germany whereby the proper responsibility should be displayed as Europe and the whole world are affected. He is against the future Germany belonging to NATO. At the same time the necessity of finding a new mechanism for the economic relations between the USSR and the GDR was stressed in the talks. Mikhail Gorbachev recalled that the GDR is the strongest economic partner of the USSR in Eastern Europe and the FRG is the strongest in Western Europe.

GDR Spokesman on Talks

LD0603155190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1418 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow (ADN corr)—The Soviet Union and the GDR are in agreement that the two German states must grow together responsibly and gradually on an equal basis. GDR Government spokesman Wolfgang Meyer told the international press of this after the talks between the government delegation under Prime Minister Hans Modrow and the Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov ended.

In the open and constructive talks there was agreement that there can be no annexation of the GDR to the FRG, as FRG politicians are seeking under Article 23 of the Basic Law.

Meyer said that the two sides share the view that the German-German process must be firmly entrenched in European development. The German unification process cannot be separated from the European one. The Soviet interlocutors approved a memorandum sent recently to all CSCE states. It proposes that the governments of the FRG and the GDR state that the drawing closer and the unification of the two German states will taske place in the framework of the CSCE process and with respect for the interests of all its participatory states, taking into account existing rights and responsibilities of the four powers and in agreement with existing international obligations.

The GDR is also in agreement with the USSR that the incorporation of a unified Germany in NATO is unacceptable. This would affect basic questions of European security and stability. The government spokesman explained that the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, binding under international law, is of foremost importance for both the GDR and the USSR. They take it for granted that no question affecting Poland can be resolved without Poland. This principle also applies to all other neighbors of the two German states.

According to Meyer, both sides expressed their interest in the continuation of economic cooperation. Modrow assured Ryzhkov that the GDR will do all in its power to guarantee strict observation of the various obligations in every phase of the unification process. Soviet raw materials supplies remain vital to the GDR. Modrow submitted ideas on the possibilities for continuing cooperation between the two countries under the new conditions. He also proposed that experts from the GDR and the USSR deal with this as soon as possible. The Soviet side accepted this proposal.

Meyer also said that "very great importance" is attached to the forthcoming "four plus two" talks. The USSR, the United States, Great Britain, and France should play a particular role in this process. On that issue, too, there was full agreement between the GDR and USSR.

The GDR Government spokesman said that talks between experts in preparation of the "four plus two" conference will be held in the next few days. The GDR is interested in seeing that this conference will get underway quickly so that there will be full synchronization of the processes between the two German states and developments in Europe. [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov-Modrow Meeting Reported

PM0703103990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Talks in the Kremlin"]

[Text] Talks were held 6 March between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, who was in the Soviet Union on a working visit together with a number of his cabinet ministers. There was a substantive exchange of opinions on urgent questions of bilateral relations and on some aspects of the European situation associated with the process of the two German states' rapprochement and unification.

Welcoming the GDR's representatives, N.I. Ryzhkov noted the great significance of the work that the GDR Government is doing in the interests of the normal functioning of the national economy and state structures in the republic. These efforts play an important role both in the matter of ensuring the political and socioeconomic rights and interests of GDR citizens and from the viewpoint of maintaining equilibrium and predictability in European affairs as a whole.

The government heads expressed coinciding viewpoints on the fact that the nature of USSR-GDR relations is determined by such important factors as intensive cooperation in the political, economic, and humanitarian spheres and in the international arena and the close interknitting of the national economic complexes. An interest in supporting and developing everything positive that has been accumulated during the more than 40-year history of relations between the two countries was emphasized.

H. Modrow and the GDR ministers who participated in the talks—representatives of the parties and political associations which cooperate in the republic's government—expressed an interest in continuing and developing this cooperation even after the parliamentary elections in the GDR 18 March this year.

Supporting these statements, N.I. Ryzhkov pointed out that the Soviet Government consistently advocates the further development of relations with the GDR. The necessary preconditions exist to deepen cooperation and enhance its efficiency—the ramified legal-treaty basis of mutual relations, obligations as allies, and the established mutually advantageous economic, scientific, and technical ties. The USSR's share in the GDR's foreign trade turnover stands at approximately 40 percent, while the GDR's share in the volume of Soviet foreign trade is more than 10 percent.

At the same time account must be taken of the fact that the restructuring of economic mechanisms in the Soviet Union and the GDR, the switch to market relations, the prospect of creating a German currency and economic union, and other measures in the unification process demand cardinal changes in the practice of USSR-GDR trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, as well as an analysis of the possible economic consequences of the said process. These questions must be the object of careful examination and coordination between the sides. It is important not to lag behind life and to make a realistic assessment of the development of events.

During the talks H. Modrow advocated that the order which took shape after the victory over Hitlerite Germany and which governs questions of ownership on the territory of the former Soviet zone of occupation, now the GDR, should not be abolished in the process of the two German states' rapprochement and unification.

The Soviet side showed understanding of this stand of the GDR Government and declared that the ownership relations established in implementation of the Potsdam and other inter-ally agreements and decisions of the war and postwar times must remain in force. A different approach would do grave harm to the social rights and vital interests of millions of people.

Participating in the talks, which were held in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere, were: on the Soviet side—Yu.D. Maslyukov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee; S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; A.I. Kachanov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign economic relations; and A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister; on the German side—GDR Ministers T. Boehm, P. Diederich, R. Eppelman [name as transliterated], M. Flegel, S. Pflugbayl [name as transliterated], M. Plattsek [name as transliterated], G. Poppe, K. Schlueter, V. Ulman [name as transliterated], K. Wolf, and K. Wuensche; W. Meyer, GDR Government spokesman and leader of the press department; W. Fleck, state secretary and GDR first deputy foreign minister; E. Krabatsch, GDR deputy foreign minister; and G. Koenig, GDR ambassador to the USSR.

H. Modrow left Moscow the same day.

He was seen off at the airport by N..I. Ryzhkov and other officials.

Moscow TV on Modrow-Ryzhkov Talks

LD0603191190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Talks between Comrade Ryzhkov and Hans Modrow took place today. The heads of government expressed points of view which coincide, in that the nature of relations between the USSR and the GDR is determined by such substantial factors as intensive cooperation in the political, economic, and humanitarian spheres in the international arena, and the close interweaving of the national economy complexes. Hans Modrow and the GDR ministers taking part in the talks expressed interest in continuing and developing this cooperation even after the parliamentary elections in the GDR on 18 March this year.

Having lent his support to these statements, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov noted that the Soviet Government consistently favors further development of relations with the GDR. The USSR's part in the GDR's foreign trade turnover amounts to approximately 40 percent, while the GDR's part in the volume of Soviet foreign trade amounts to more than 10 percent.

At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the perestroyka of the economic mechanisms in the Soviet Union and the GDR, the transfer to market relations, the prospect of German currency and economic union and other measures of the unification process require cardinal changes in the USSR's trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation with the GDR and also require an analysis of the possible economic consequences of the process referred to above. These issues should be subject to thorough examination and should be agreed upon between the sides.

Accord Revises Rules for Soviet Units in Poland

PM0603192590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Senior Lieutenant S. Ivanov report: "Agreement in Preparation"]

[Text] In an interview with the PAP agency the Polish Government official responsible for questions concerning the presence of Soviet forces in Poland has said that work is continuing on the redefinition of the rules governing the presence of Soviet units and subunits on the territory of the country. Specifically, it is a question

of the basic rules governing Soviet units' use of various kinds of installations and services, as the current agreement was adopted 34 years ago, in different political and economic conditions. A draft of the new agreement has already been compiled in the office of the said official and its coordination has begun.

Romania's Iliescu Describes Revolution Process

LD2802135390 Moscow TASS in English 1115 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Paris February 28 TASS—"A new generation of Soviet leaders managed to find a way to rejuvenate society, a way to reform, and at that very moment perestroyka began in the USSR," Ion Iliescu, chairman of the Romanian Provisional Council for National Accord, said in an interview with LE MONDE published on Tuesday.

"I regard perestroyka in the USSR as a special process which is to adapt Soviet society to changes in the modern world. Moscow realised that it is impossible for the USSR to achieve a modern level of technological development without profound economic reforms, without the political restructuring of society.

"Both in the USSR and in other East European countries this process began from the inside—in the leadership of the parties which tried in this way to cast aside Stalinist methods.

"In Romania it was impossible. This is why the Romanian people revolted against the Ceausescu regime. In the first place, he created both inside and outside the party such a powerful repression system, that it could suppress any attempts to unite the reform movement.

"Everything degenerated gradually in Romanian society—both the social and the cultural spheres. At the same time, tension was heightening from one day to the next, until the inevitable explosion. This was the characteristic feature of the Romanian revolution."

Iliescu believes that the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which is living through difficult times, should become a political organisation. Romania has never announced its intention to withdraw from this organisation, he pointed out. "However, new conditions on the European continent lead to the growth of cooperation. This is why the disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation would promote the overall improvement of the European situation."

Iliescu Interview in LE MONDE Cited

PM0203111590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Romania": "Reforms Essential"]

[Text] The new generation of the Soviet leadership has been able to find paths for society's renewal, paths of reforms, and it was from this factor that perestroyka began in the USSR. This was stated by I. Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional Council of National Agreement, in an interview with the newspaper LE MONDE published on Tuesday.

For me, he stressed, perestroyka in the Soviet Union is a special process designed to adapt Soviet society to the changes now taking place in the modern world. Moscow has understood that it is impossible to lead the country up to a modern technological standard without implementing in-depth reforms in the economy and without political perestroyka in society. It must be noted that in the USSR, as in other East European states, the process of changes began from within—in the parties' leadership.

In our country, in Romania, this was impossible, the chairman of the Provisional Council of National Agreement noted, so in our country the people's masses rose up primarily against the Ceausescu regime. He created both within and outside the party such a powerful system of repressive influence that it could quash any attempts to bring together a reformist movement.

Romanian Provisional Council Member Interviewed

LD0603223790 Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Bucharest March 6 TASS—"The relations between our countries are deep rooted and have rich traditions," Sergiu Nicolaescu, member of Romania's Provisional Council of National Unity, an actor and film director, told TASS.

Practically in all areas of cooperation, including culture, the former dictatorship isolated the Romanian people from progressive Soviet trends, from the influence of Soviet perestroika.

The revolution has opened boundless prospects for the expansion and deepening of bilateral relations in all areas and for sincere friendship between our two neighbouring peoples, he said.

"We receive from the USSR many goods necessary for the development of our economy. Our economy supplies the Soviet national economy with commodities it needs. It is essential for us to cooperate," Nicolaescu said.

"We are grateful to the Soviet Union which renders us specific, efficient and urgent assistance in energy carriers, and also to other countries of the world which supply the Romanian people with food products, medicines and essentials," Nicolaescu said.

The formation of the Provisional Council, vested with full state powers until the next parliamentary elections to be held on May 20, is a very important and timely political action, he said.

A new political structure has been formed, up to Romania's current socio-political and economic development.

It takes into account the rapid growth and amalgamation of new political parties and forces in the country.

The dictatorship bred chaos in the national economy. The country was hit by a crisis in all areas of activities and full disorganisation, Nicolaescu stressed.

Romania's new leadership has paid priority attention to economic and energy problems to lead the country out of stagnation and ensure stable progress and growth of the people's well-being, Nicolaescu said.

Romanian Envoy Queried on Foreign Policy Changes

PM2802101590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Vasile Sandru, Romanian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USSR, conducted by own correspondent S. Semendyayev: "Lifting of Barriers"; place and date not given]

[Text] [Semendyayev] The transformations being carried out in Romania under the leadership of the Provisional Council of National Unity have touched upon virtually all the spheres of state institutions' activity. The country's Foreign Ministry and its foreign policy, which is becoming more constructive and open, are not unaffected by this process either. How will Romanian-Soviet relations develop now?

[Sandru] The history of our two peoples' relations goes back several centuries. Strong, friendly ties formed during this time, although there were, of course, difficult periods, too. But recent years occupy a special place in the history of our contacts. In the absence of objective reasons, subjective ones appeared for the secret curtailing of Romanian-Soviet relations, and both sides were involved here. However, the revolutionary events of past weeks in Romania, like the processes of perestroyka taking place in the Soviet Union, have removed virtually all the barriers impeding the all-around development of political, economic, cultural, and other ties between our countries.

Of course, a certain time is needed, for example, to set up fully-fledged economic cooperation. After all, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has accounted for 30 percent of our foreign trade turnover, collaboration basically amounted to primitive commodity exchange, and the proportion of production sharing and direct ties has been intolerably low. It is time to substantially step up Romanian-Soviet contacts. I think there is mutual interest here.

[Semendyayev] As of now Romania is alone among the countries of Eastern Europe in not being burdened by foreign debt. However, the debt repayment did cause great damage to the Romanian economy, and new loans could be necessary to get it functioning normally. What is the stance of your country's government on this question?

[Sandru] I cannot say anything definite about whether or not new loans will be taken out in the West—I am not the one who decides this. As far as our government's attitude to foreign credits is concerned, this was formulated in a recently published National Salvation Front Council decree. The law passed under Ceausescu which forbade Romania to resort to financial help from Western banks has now been repealed. I personally can see no grounds for rejecting this very widespread form of international economic cooperation. Of course, loans cannot of themselves put the Romanian economy on its feet. They should be just one part of an integrated program of economic reforms reliant above all on the economy's internal reserves.

[Semendyayev] There is heated discussion now under way about CEMA's future. Problems concerning East European countries' scientific and commercial cooperation were also discussed at the last sitting of the CEMA session, in Sofia. How is this organization viewed in Romania?

[Sandru] The Sofia meeting showed the commitment of all member-countries to maintaining and transforming CEMA. Of course problems—and serious ones—do remain. This was clearly stated at the session. But they can be solved only by joint efforts aimed at bringing CEMA up to the level of the modern requirements of economic integration; at the same time CEMA itself should help the countries of Eastern Europe gain access to the world market. The task is not an easy one, its solution requires a long time. However, we have no other solution. We for our part are ready to play an active and consistent part in the process of transforming our economic alliance.

[Semendyayev] Of late, thanks to improving East-West relations, one hears more and more often opinions voiced that the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact is not advisable. Do you consider the counterposition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to be necessary?

[Sandru] Romania was and is a member of the Warsaw Pact and, as the National Salvation Front program has stressed, will honor all previously assumed international commitments, particularly those associated with the Warsaw Pact. How the organization itself will operate is another matter. Here, as in CEMA, substantial changes and a shift in the emphases of Warsaw Pact activity into the political sphere are required. But that is not within the competence of Romania alone. As people will know, its members have in all Warsaw Pact documents advocated the simultaneous elimination of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But now the political realities in Europe clearly do not yet allow these alliances to be disbanded. We will have to put up with their existence for the time being, they are considered to promote stability on the continent under present-day conditions.

[Semendyayev] In 1975 Romania, along with other CSCE members, signed the Final Act. However, far from

all the paragraphs of the agreement were actually fulfilled, particularly those in the human rights sphere. Moreover, the Romanian representative at the Vienna meeting refused to put his signature to certain provisions of the final document which again concerned human rights. How are the Helsinki and Vienna accords being implemented now, in the new political situation?

[Sandru] The state of affairs has radically changed in this question. Although the final documents of the three conferences on security and cooperation in Europe are not legal in character, the conference participants do bear a moral and political responsibility to carry out the commitments assumed—the current Romanian leadership has by means of a special official statement removed all amendments and provisos concerning the Vienna agreement and thus confirmed its readiness to consistently honor its commitments stemming from this very important international act. Incidentally, the aforementioned statement was published on the day Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnade visited Romania. Romanian citizens are now ensured complete freedom of movement and the decrees of the dictatorship forbidding contacts with foreigners and so forth have been abrogated. The government is now drawing up measures to provide material backup for the Vienna and other accords affecting human rights (for example, the making available of convertible currency to those traveling abroad, and so forth).

PRAVDA Reports Political Struggle in Romania

PM0603100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Vedrashko under the rubric "Romania Today": "Parties Are Waging Struggle"]

[Text] Bucharest, March—The soldier and the general stood next to each other on a hillock next to the fence surrounding the television center. The general read out an appeal to those assembled on the square and the soldier fingered a stale crust of gray bread and smiled as though to say: We shall soon lose all our teeth from such nourishment. Half the demonstrators outside the television center building were draftee privates and sergeants who had come to the capital to protest against the poor conditions of army service. The other half consisted of Bucharest people in solidarity with their army.

At the same time from the opposite side of the television center a crowd was demanding "truly free television." The soldiers and officers of the unit guarding this establishment observed the meeting almost with indifference and even with a trace of annoyance. Street democracy would not give them more food in the cooking pot. And that's what they would like now.

The gradual improvement in the food supply which nearly began in January has not been continued in February. According to one public opinion poll, the proportion of citizens dissatisfied with the state of the food market continues to increase and now comprises the enormous majority of the capital's population.

The population's poor standard of living is in my view the basis of the social background against which political processes are unfolding. The keenest struggle for power is being waged by the most active political parties and movements—the National Salvation Front headed by I. Iliescu, the National Liberal Party headed by R. Campeanu, the National Peasant Party headed by C. Coposu, and the Social Democratic Party of Romania headed by S. Cunescu. It is these political forces which, as a result of the recent public opinion poll, received the largest number of votes from citizens answering the question: Which party most reflects your aspirations? The popularity indicators of the top leaders are constantly changing.

In addition to factual data, the signs of the multiparty culture gradually asserting itself in society are also of interest. Information about the money funds cited at registration figure among the "questionnaire data" published. For instance, the richest party is the National Peasant Party—it has 102,000 lei—while the National Liberal Party has 30,000 lei, the Social Democratic Party of Romania has 20,000 lei, and the National Salvation Front has only 5,000! That is quite a difference. Actually, it should be noted that the richest—the National Peasant Party—is a member of the international democratic christian union. And the poorest—the Romanian Freedom and Democracy Party (Craiova City)—has an initial fund of 500 lei. Many parties have been founded with headquarters in the provinces, in large cities, extending their influence to whole districts. I surmise, however, that some political formations which have hastily emerged in the country's public arena as yet still lack substantial numerical strength and finances and consequently influence.

A characteristic feature is the desire of virtually all political organizations for democracy, pluralism, and a multistructural economy with every encouragement for initiative and enterprise. Differences in approaches toward the basic problems of society are expressed in the parties' names: "independent," "liberal," "radical," "progressive..."

Part of the population has a skeptical attitude toward such an abundance of all kinds of political formations. "It's ridiculous," I was told by the participants in one of the now frequent meetings, "we shall all start engaging in politics, but who will work?" Others believe that it is precisely in the multiplicity of parties that the guarantee of Romania's emancipation lies. "Let there be as many parties as there are opinions in the country," I heard at another meeting, and the next day I read the following in the newspaper: "In Romania there are 23 million parties—the number of the country's inhabitants."

But let us return to the few parties which are the main rivals in the election struggle. The elections are scheduled for 20 May. Each party, counting on obtaining its

place in parliament and government, is trying to attract the voters with slogans and programs proposing ways for the country to emerge from the crisis. Thus the National Salvation Front's aim is "to transform Romanian society on the basis of the values of democracy, freedom, and dignity." The Front considers the fundamental avenue of economic policy to be the improvement of the people's prosperity with a gradual transition to a decentralized market economy. It has stated its intention to increase the profitability of the national economy. The document states that inflation and unemployment will be under control while political and social stability are preserved in the country.

And here are some provisions from the National Liberal Party's program. Liberalism is viewed as the only doctrine capable of ensuring the rapid introduction of a modern and effective economy. The National Liberal Party views the freedom of the individual as the main condition for revealing creative forces in all spheres of public activity. The creation and activity of political organizations at enterprises and in organizations is banned. In the field of agriculture it is planned to abandon collectivization and to switch to private ownership and to labor in free associations of producers. Private enterprise will also be encouraged primarily in the sphere of services within the framework of small and medium industrial enterprises.

The National Peasant Party is attracting great attention. It has proclaimed in its program a struggle for the democratization of society and the exclusion of the possibility of a return to dictatorship. The moral resurrection of the Romanian nation, the improvement of the education system, the decentralization of industry, a gradual transition to a free market, the establishment of peasants as owners, the creation of free trade unions...

The provisions cited from the documents of what are now the three leading parties of course give only some idea of the orientation of the political forces which have emerged on the arena of Romania's public life. It is important to consider that no program could have acquired its final form in such a brief time. Individual provisions are being made more specific. The substantiation of the platforms and programs in scientific theory is still inadequate. The documents of many new parties are sometimes characterized by what the Bucharest newspaper LIBERTATEA describes as an inadequate understanding of the elementary concepts of politics and society and even of the party. The newspaper ironically recommends that these parties' leaders take short courses to study the basics of political science.

The slogan "down with communism" has already become quite commonplace in Romania. Nonetheless, during the now popular sociological polls there appeared a question about the possibility of the existence in the country of a party of "socialist Marxist orientation." It turns out that men are more tolerant of such a prospect than women. And another detail. Negative replies were given by mental labor workers while the proportion of those who did not specify their attitude was greatest among young people and pensioners.

Many contradictory assessments were generated by the draft law on elections published in early February. Of course, no one doubts that as a whole it is a guarantee of the building of a democratic society in Romania. In particular the draft provides for the separation of legislative, executive, and legal power and the election of the country's political leaders to one or at the most two posts. The Romanian parliament, which consists of a deputies' assembly and a senate, the Romanian president, and also the provincial, municipal, city, and commune councils will be elected by universal equal and free, direct, and secret ballot. This extensive document is now being discussed.

Actually, the word "discussed" would be suitable now to characterize the sociopolitical situation in the country in general.

... The unsettled chronicle of recent weeks shows that the government is not having time to answer all questions of public life. And then people seek them themselves—at workers' gatherings, at street demonstrations and meetings, in the lines at the newspaper kiosks, store shelves, and theater box offices... Public consciousness is being rapidly politicized and serves as one of the factors of the country's incipient movement toward democracy.

Bucharest Commits Outrage Against Bronze Lenin

PM0503160590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent V. Volodin dispatch: "Romania: This Was an Outrage"]

[Text] Bucharest—The monument to V.I. Lenin erected in 1960 on Bucharest's Free Press Square (formerly SCINTEIA Square) has been taken down.

Following a decision adopted by the Provisional Council of National Accord, workers arrived on the square Saturday afternoon headed by Bucharest's Mayor Dan Predescu and began to tear down the statue in front of a large crowd. However, it by no means proved easy to remove it from its pedestal. Workers spent more than ten hours, first sawing at the mounting bolts, then using pneumatic drills, then trying to wrench the statue from its pedestal using a crane.

According to the official story, the removal of the monument was motivated by an intention to protect it from possible desecration. However, in my view, the statue was subjected to a true outrage. Having unsuccessfully employed all methods, workers tried to dislodge it from its pedestal with blows from a metallic block suspended from the crane jib. Moreover, every blow was accompanied by catcalls and yells of "Hit him on the head," "Let him clear off back to the Russians!" The outrageous spectacle lasted until darkness fell. Only

many hours later did they succeed in getting V.I. Lenin's statue down from the pedestal.

"It is a good thing that he's 'gone,'" D. Predescu, the mayor of the Romanian capital, said. "We will put another monument on this stand. It will possibly be a monument to the December Revolution."

"What do you propose doing with the bronze Lenin," I asked Bucharest's mayor.

"We will put it in storage," he answered.

Further on Lenin Statue Dismantling

LD0403171790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Mar 90

[From the "Seven Days" newscast]

[Text] Romania's National Salvation Front put forward the proposal to dismantle the monument to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in Bucharest. The situation that has developed over the past week concerning the monument has turned the Free Press Square into yet another seat of disorder and tension in the capital. Unquestionably, the people of any town have a right to decide for themselves which historical figures to immortalize in bronze and where to set them up. But in the difficult process of reappraising ideals and values it does no harm to exercise tact so as to avoid offending the sensibilities of many people, not least in neighboring countries. Among those present were people who were against such a step, and who stressed that neither Lenin nor socialism is to blame for what occurred in Romania under the Ceausescu dictatorship. [Video shows a crowd gathered round the statue as a crane is swung into position and a pneumatic drill is applied to the concrete at Lenin's boots]

Anticommunist Sentiments Voiced in Bucharest

LD0503003890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Mar 90

[From the "Seven Days" newscast]

[Text] Today, Bucharest has once again become a place where mass demonstrations are being held. Among the slogans are: "We do not want land-leasing" and "Give the land over to the personal property of the peasants!" There have been slogans against the Securitate personnel who, in the opinion of the demonstrators, continue to hold leading positions. And there are also slogans against communists.

[Zheleznyak] The candles are still burning in memory of those who died. The mourning is not yet over and the pain is still acute. The fruits of the revolution have not yet matured and here some Romanians are being incited more and more to hate others.

Look! Here is an instance of this. [Video shows crowds gathered in square] Down with Communists! [Video shows people holding placards and waving Romanian flag.] (?Execute) communists! The only solution is a second revolution. Anticommunism. It is blossoming here on the soil which was left by the dictatorship. For decades it mercilessly exploited the idea of communism. And for many Romanians, the idea itself has become indissolubly linked with the (?golden era) of Ceausescu. Speculating on the hatred of the people for the overthrown regime, right-wing forces have made anticommunism a banner of the preelection battle. Every Sunday they seek a new reason for anticommunist speeches. The monument to Lenin is the cause of today's demonstration. [Video shows monument being hooked up to a crane] Executed by well-known Romanian sculptor, (Boris Karadja), it was erected by Romanians in Bucharest on 22 April 1960. Passions were whipped up in advance. Demands to take down the monument appeared first of all in the pages of the newspapers and then on the pedestal of the monument. [Video shows priest holding up a cross in front of monument] Well, we have photographed that priest at every anticommunsit action. Today, too, he is in the front ranks. At the (?bedaubbed) monument is (Georgy Sayil) from the Church of Saint Iliya. He will stay on a hunger strike for as long as the monument stands. The Council of National Accord of the provisional parliament of Romania made the decision on Friday to dismantle the monument. This was announced on radio, on television, and in the press. But a rally which had been prepared for weeks was not to be cancelled. And of what significance is that for those who want to capitalize on anticommunism? If there is no monument, another reason will be found. Accusations are already being heard, and even threatening sounds toward our country. The mouthpiece of the struggle against communism: These words have become the second name of the national (?democratic) party.

Fascists 'Trying to Revive' Movement in Romania

PM0103142590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[V. Volodin dispatch under the "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment" rubric: "Romania: Right-Wingers Rear Their Heads"]

[Text] Bucharest—A small group of young people gathered last Sunday at the foot of the V.I. Lenin monument in Bucharest. The aim of the demonstration was eloquently reflected by a banner bearing the words "If communism no longer exists in Romania, why keep its symbol?"

"Demolish it. What is Lenin doing on Romanian soil? We have our own historical heroes," was the cry heard amid the mob, which was continually approached by people strolling in neighboring Herastrau Park. Some people shrugged their shoulders in indifference. Many people disagreed with the demonstrators. But there were also those who supported them.

The provisional government, which announced the creation of a multiparty democracy in the country, generally does not interfere in these kinds of events. Now as soon

as the demonstration began a police patrol drove off elsewhere to observe the demonstration from afar. It confirmed once again that communist ideals are finished in Romania for a long time.

The fact that a parliamentary republic based on a system of party pluralism is replacing the personal dictatorship, which was identified in the people's eyes with the Romanian Communist Party, is not in doubt. The last session of the "small parliament," which adopted a law on safeguarding public order and defending state, party, and public establishments, is evidence of that.

"We armed the soldiers guarding government establishments. The police have been given back their nightsticks. Mounted police patrols and patrols with dogs have been set up," National Defense Minister B.A. Stanculescu explained.

I believe that the demonstration in Victory Square, which degenerated into an outright assault on the government residence and the devastation of the offices of the country's leaders, was the last straw which compelled the Provisional Council of National Accord to renounce its indecisiveness and display its authority. It is still not clear as yet who organized the assault, paid the militants, and incited the mob to violence.

Apart from the parliamentary opposition there are clearly some covert forces in the country who intend to change the course of Romanian history. Some facts particularly attest to their existence. Thus, DESTEPTAREA (Awakening), Bacau Judet's independent newspaper, received a letter announcing the revival of the "Iron Guard" and its desire to fight communists and all left-wing forces. The swastika and "Heil Hitler" are used in place of a signature.

I must explain that a nationalist fascist Iron Guard party existed in Romania in the thirties and early forties. Relying mainly on armed terror—it had the assassination of two prime ministers to its credit—it was even the ruling party for a time. Its former leader Horia Sima is still living safely in Spain.

The appearance of the report of the "Iron Guard's" revival in the Judet newspaper provoked considerable rumor. Some people, mainly members of the Provisional Council of National Accord, say that someone is indeed trying to revive the legionary movement. Others believe this letter to be a forgery. R. Campeanu, chairman of the National Liberal Party, who spent several years as an emigre and met former legionnaires there, also does not think that the letter should be taken seriously. "Any member of the 'Iron Guard' would be at least 70 years old now," he said.

Well, his argument is not unfounded. However someone is nonetheless not only behind the attempts to overthrow the provisional government but is also behind the pogroms in the Arad synagogue and the attacks on people and housing in Bacau Judet. If it is a question of anticommunism and an increase in nationalist sentiments, there is quite enough of that without the revival of outlawed fascist organizations in Romania.

IZVESTIYA on Romania's Economic Problems

PM0603100790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Volodin dispatch: "'Mertisor,' an Amulet That Symbolizes Spring"]

[Excerpt] Bucharest—[Passage omitted] The provisional government's attempt to make the people conscious of the fruits of revolution by raising wages and pensions immediately generated serious inflationary processes. It is not impossible that the government will have to start up on full power the printing press which has been idle for the last two years. As a result, ROMANIA LIBERA writes, "a situation like that in 1944-1947 may arise whereby all Romanians without exception were 'millionaires' while the real purchasing power of the lei was extremely low."

Alas, the newspaper's misgivings are not built on sand. The economy has indeed found itself unable to "soak up" the population's increased monetary income. By and large industrial production only totals 70 percent of last year's level, the chairman of the Provisional Council of National Accord acknowledged, citing among the reasons hampering an increase in production enterprises' worn-out, outmoded equipment and the shortage of raw materials and fuel, along with political instability in the country, which is affecting the overall state of the Romanian economy.

Members of the Provisional Council of National Accord themselves point out that the provisional government is not daring to start to resolve the wide-ranging tasks of radical economic restructuring and renewal. A cabinet is necessary for this, backed up not by a "small" but by a genuine parliament elected by the people. However some steps are being taken which are making it possible to counter inflation. I am talking about the decision to raise the interest payments on citizens' personal deposits in savings banks. It is assumed that this measure will make it possible to remove some of the money that ordinary people have "stashed away" and thus weaken inflationary pressure. There is also talk of liberalizing prices for some types of output, granting industrial enterprises independence, and providing incentives for trade in means of production. In many respects Romania is pinning its hopes on foreign aid. [passage omitted]

TASS Notes Land Reform Rally in Bucharest

LD0403172690 Moscow TASS in English 1716 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] Bucharest March 4 TASS—After a two-week break, a massive rally was held in the Victoria Square, in the centre of Bucharest, at 12:00, local time, today. Bucharest workers and peasants of nearby agricultural

regions took part in it. They joined a demonstration of peasants of the Calarasi District announced previously by the Peasants' Party. Some 1,000 participants in the protest actions put forward the following slogans: "Give land to peasants as individual property" and "we do not want the leasing of land."

Participants in the rally told TASS that the Law on Leasing Land to peasants proposed by the provisional National Salvation Council and the limitation of individual plots of land to 0.5 hectares fall short of the expectations of peasants. They believe that the land should belong to those who cultivate it. They demanded the dissolution of agricultural cooperatives, because this form of land management is not effective. It was stressed that the acute food problem in the country should be resolved through giving to peasants a possibility to choose freely a form of land management and business activities in conditions of the private property of land and the means of production.

The demonstrators chanted slogans directed against former communists and securitate officers who, in their opinion, continue to hold managerial posts. They demanded the publication of the lists of state security officers at enterprises and institutions which continue their secret anti-democratic activities.

The rally was held in a calm atmosphere. Law enforcement forces controlled the situation.

Romania To Send Diplomatic Delegation to Seoul

SK2502064690 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From "Focus on Asia"]

[Text] Romania plans to send a delegation to the ROK to discuss the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Seoul. This was reported by REUTER News Agency. On 23 February, the Executive Committee of Romania's Interim National Assembly Council decided to establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with the ROK. One of the vice foreign ministers of Romania will go to Seoul as head of the delegation.

NEW TIMES Examines East European Changes

PM2803190890 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 8, 20-26 Feb 90 pp 11-12

[Valeriy Musatov article: "The 'Doomsday of Socialism' Or of Its Stalinist Model?"]

[Text] Changes in Eastern Europe have raised many questions in various sections of Soviet society. Reactions range from approval (that's an example to follow!) to misunderstanding and panic: socialism is going to pieces and the results of postwar development are being reduced to nothing.

Changes in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were not unexpected by any means. The need for them had been growing long ago to become felt most sharply in the past few years. The mass of contradictions grew to a critical point. Although each of our six allies had their own specific traits, there was one fundamental reason for change - the collapse of the administrative-command model of socialism planted in Eastern Europe after the Communist parties came to power there in 1947-48.

That model, largely alien and ignoring specific historical and ethnic traits, was inefficient from the outset, which became evident in the course of industrialization and collectivization, cultural revolutions, outbreaks of popular discontent and the attempts of preemptive domestic reforms. These attempts were frustrated either by force (in some cases with the Soviet Union's assistance), or by hard-line ideological campaigns against "revisionism." The tide waves of destalinization and the Soviet leadership's negative attitude to the "Prague spring" were indications of a growing crisis. Administrative-command system and centralized economy, which to a certain extent allowed for mobilizing resources in the context of the cold war and power confrontation of the two blocs, exhausted themselves in the late 1960s. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other socialist country managed to ensure a stable and balanced growth of the economy and to come close to living standards of the industrialized countries, although there were more or less successful five-year-plan periods. The lagging behind the West in the civilian sphere worsened and military parity was ever more difficult to maintain. People's estrangement from politics and from running the nation, as well as human rights abuses aggravated the contradictions and increased popular discontent.

The functions of ruling parties, which merged with the state and became part and parcel of bureaucracy, were distorted. These parties proved a brake on progress and stuck to conservative views. Their leaders, who stayed in office for decades, opposed any change in their bid to retain monopoly on power. People's confidence in the policy of the Communist parties was shattered. They began to be regarded as the culprits of the social crisis.

Could have all this been avoided? There were atempts of reforms in Hungary and Yugoslavia. The prolonged cycle of crises in Poland gave much food for thought. Economic reforms and changes in policies in China were a good lesson.

However, none of those signals drew an adequate reaction; they were misunderstood and rejected. The leaders of most East European countries failed to rise to the need for the fundamental renewal of society. Some of them looked in arrogance at the problems encountered by perestroika in the Soviet Union. They have had to pay dearly for the loss of initiative, for ignoring the realities and for neglecting the interests of the people.

Fundamental changes in East European countries, achieved either in the classical way, that of evolution, or in a revolutionary explosion, are an objective outcome of

the postwar period. They highlighted the limited potential of a socialist society run by command and of the "party state."

But has socialism proved bankrupt? I believe that we have witnessed the defeat of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist model of socialism, its dogmatic and distorted version. Heavy-handed administrative methods, which seemed immutable, have failed. They have given way to the idea that development options may differ, including those in a socialist society. Socialism as an idea, as a pattern of social organization, has survived and it has millions of supporters. The issue of the day is building a humane, democratic socialism, matching the results of civilization's development and universal values. In that sense, the potential of socialism is still to be tapped.

The customary line-up of political forces in Eastern Europe no longer exists. Multipaty systems are emerging everywhere. An important, if not decisive, role is played by new public movements and associations, such as Solidarnosc in Poland, the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the Union of Democratic Horces in Bulgaria and others. The army and agencies in charge of law and order are being depoliticized.

The Communist parties are in the most difficult position. The Romanian Communist Party has fallen apart. In most other countries the Communists are either partners in a government coalition or have found themselves in opposition. An exodus from the party, the change of programmes and names, the emergence of competing platforms and even splits have been accompanied by the expulsion of officials, who have discredited themselves, and by the search for a new concept of democratic centralism or its rejection. In a word, the ex-ruling parties are experiencing a painful process of overcoming the crisis. Needless to say, proclaiming socialist ideals today requires a great deal of courage. the renewed Communist Parties and the left-wing parties of socialist or social-democratic orientation are faced with a prolonged struggle for survival and greater influence, irrespective of whether they gain a representation in parliament or government or not.

This is a transitional phase. The forthcoming free parliamentary elections (in Poland - elections to local government bodies) will give a cross section of the public's feeling and clear up the balance of political forces. At the same time, society has departed far away from the ideas of state socialism. The trend towards a bourgeois democracy is obvious. Yet, I believe that despite the natural allergy to all notions connected with the forms and methods of building socialism and all the failures on that way, the ethical ideas of socialism and the ideas of social protection and justice have taken root. Neither should one forget that in the postwar years an enormous production potential of state and cooperative sectors of the economy has been created and that it gives employment to millions of people.

Unlike the authors of an article published in New Times recently, I do not think that attempts to introduce capitalist elements to the economy and privitization started by the governments of some countries of the region spell a quick return. The transition to a market economy is inevitable, but it will be difficult and controversial. There are no national capitals. The West, although it has promised credits, is in no hurry to take the burden of debts and buy out industrial plants. Besides, many leading Western economists are quite right when they say that in the economy there can be no miracles. Yet, some reformers in Eastern Europe want to achieve what the West has built over many decades of hard work.

Relations between the Soviet Union and East European countries will undergo further change irrespective of the social choice their people will make. already now they are being rid of ideological stereotypes and dogmas. The socialist community we used to have is no more. But our cooperation with Eastern Europe contains stable elements, everlasting values, if you wish. I refer to the historical traditions of cooperation between our peoples that have stood the test of time, the identity of national interests, embodied in the affiliation to one alliance and the desire for good-neighbourliness, and the common interest in the success of democratic changes underway in the Soviet Union and East European countries. Besides, it is not really important who is first and who is second; each country has its own specific traite.

We have remained allies, members of one military-political organization, which is an important instrument of peace and stability in Europe and a means to coordinate foreign policy interests. The Soviet Union and East European countries are connected by diversified economic relations and it would be naive to break them to look for benefit in the West alone.

Lastly, our neighbours and we believe that structural reforms in the policies and economies of our countries can open up more favourable opportunities for implementing the Helsinki and Vienna accords, for disarmament and the idea of a common European home. They can also make economic and humanitarian cooperation more productive.

Democratic changes in Eastern Europe have had their impact on Western Europe and other industrialized capitalist countries. One should not forget about the paradoxes and contradictions of the current capitalist society. Alexander Dubcek recalled that just in time, when he was speaking in Strasbourg. However, the radicalism, anarchy and quick pace of changes have increased domestic instability in Eastern Europe, which may have a negative effect on the general situation in Europe. Everybody is interested in stability. Trust in Europe is established with great difficulty. One would like to hope that now, when the split of Europe is being overcome, nobody would yield to time-serving political and ideological temptations to complicate the search for the new in Eastern Europe, to try to influence it from

outside, for instance, by speeding up the reunification of the two German states. That would run counter to the Helsinki process, upset equal relations and bring back the past we just began to overcome.

West Europe

PRAVDA Interviews French Defense Minister

PM0103114590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with French Defense Minister J.-P. Chevenement by own correspondent V. Bolshakov: "Not Quarrelling but Cooperating"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; last paragraph is editorial conclusion]

[Text] Paris, February—Jean-Pierre Chevenement's ministerial office is furnished modestly. Its occupant's post can only be surmised from the large globe standing on the floor (historians claim that no military leader can do without this accessory) while his party membership can be guessed from the portrait of socialist president F. Mitterrand. The last fact also prompted the initial question.

[Bolshakov] You are the third socialist in the history of the Fifth Republic to be defense minister. All the others were right-wingers like your immediate predecessor. What difference is there between a right-wing and a left-wing defense minister?

[Chevenement] One must first take into consideration that, according to our constitution, the president of the republic is the commander of the country's armed forces. He plays a crucial role in determining and implementing our defense policy. I say this so that you can have a better idea of our political realities. In France moreover there is quite broad consensus regarding security policy founded on national independence and the concept of strict sufficiency. This does not constitute unanimity, but rather the considerable proximity of right-wing and left-wing parties' positions.

[Bolshakov] In 1989 France's military budget totaled 221.81 billion francs [Fr]. It is planned to increase it to Fr230.77 billion in 1990, that is, by 4.04 percent. How do you explain this increase in military spending?

[Chevenement] The figures that you have cited do not take inflation-induced price increases into consideration. One must also distinguish between expenditure on combat equipment and on servicemen's pay.

If we are talking about combat equipment, in 1990 expenditure on this will total Fr102.1 billion in 1990. In other words it will increase by 1.55 percent in relation to 1989 in real terms. As for personnel, we will try not to increase their numbers this year but increase their wages. Some Fr87,343 billion have been allocated for these purposes, that is an increase of 0.92 percent on last year. I would remind you that this amounts to 3.5 percent of our country's GNP, 4.5 percent and 7 percent in Britain and the United States respectively, and, according to my current information, more than 10 percent in the USSR.

[Bolshakov] Before 1997 France intends to implement seven major military programs. Are they really all necessary for the country's entry into the 21st century?

[Chevenement] We have no territorial claims on anyone. We do not want to fight anyone. We want peace and stability in Europe and friendship with all peoples. However, balance of power is needed to ensure peace. European history illustrates that violation of the equilibrium, particularly military equilibrium, between the powers never benefited anyone. That is why we want to promote a definite balance of security between the East and West of the continent. But our deterrence is based on the concept of strict sufficiency.

France is also an independent power. That is why the country's defense is a matter for the French themselves. It does not come cheap but we prefer to pay this price to remain free. After all if the country is unable to independently ensure its own defense, it is not free when taking its own political steps.

Lastly, France is a world power. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It has interests throughout the world, in all four oceans and on all five continents. It must have an opportunity to protect these legitimate interests.

[Bolshakov] You adhere to the concept of strict sufficiency in arms. But where is the limit, the boundary beyond which a state's necessary concern to improve its military arsenal becomes a process of amassing excessive levels of arms?

[Chevenement] Sufficiency is the level of arms necessary to prevent a war and rule it out of governments' plans if they are tempted to use it as a means of solving conflicts. Sufficiency must enable any aggression to be deterred in advance whoever initiates it and from whatever quarter and also, I would add, to deter any—even friendly—pressure.

When France became the owner of several hundred nuclear warheads, it had an opportunity to deter any "candidate" aggressors by threatening to inflict disproportionately large damage on them in comparison with the potential advantages of aggression.

President Gorbachev, incidentally, spoke approvingly of the concept of minimum deterrence in his speech 6 July 1989 at the European Council in Strasbourg.

[Bolshakov] Does France intend to stop nuclear tests?

[chevenement] France will stop them when they are no longer necessary. We have now been able to reduce our experiments to six or eight a year. The USSR and the United States, I would note, carry out up to 15 explosions every year.

We believe that nuclear states, primarily the great powers, are continuing to enhance the quality of their nuclear systems and their ability to reach the target [proryv k tseli] and are also implementing antimissile programs. To ensure that our defenses remain effective under these conditions, we must also keep pace with technical progress. That is why our nuclear tests are still necessary.

[Bolshakov] The USSR and the United States are currently holding talks on reducing their strategic arsenals by 50 percent. When this reduction is implemented, will France join in the nuclear disarmament process.

[Chevenement] France is delighted by the progress of the so-called START talks and wants them to result in a 50-percent reduction in USSR and U.S. strategic arms. But even after this reduction the USSR and the United States will still have 6,000 warheads each, while France will only have, I would remind you, a few hundred. These quantities are simply incommensurate. As President Mitterrand said, France will only take part in nuclear disarmament talks when the USSR and the United States have reduced their arsenals to a level comparable to ours. There is also a second condition. The stockpiling of antiballistic missiles and antisubmarine warfare systems must be stopped.

It would be useful for the USSR and the United States to think now about new talks directed not merely at reducing strategic nuclear arsenals to a minimum but also guaranteeing stability in the world, in particular on our continent.

[Bolshakov] In this connection let us talk about "European defense." What is this—considering the changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe—a myth, a dream, or a reality? How, for instance, can we talk about "deterrence' within the framework of President Mitterrand's proposed "European confederation"?

[Chevenement] Alliances are the current reality. As represented by the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic alliance, within which there is a country with a special status—France—whose armed forces are not part of the NATO organization. There are also neutral states.

As for the "European confederation," I find it hard to imagine a lengthy period of peace in this association—which people are also urging the Soviet Union to join—without the minimum balance of forces on the continent. Even if it enters this confederation, the Soviet Union will still be a great power, including militarily. This is a reality of which we are well aware. It exists irrespective of the Soviet leaders' intentions and irrespective of their sincere desire to act for the good of peace. That is why there will have to be a kind of "dam" in the west of the European confederation" in the form of minimum deterrence forces of a defensive nature. France and Britain could contribute to their creation. That would be the best guarantee of peace, confiding dialogue, and successful cooperation between our peoples, who know and value one another.

[Bolshakov] I would venture to note that a bloc approach to Europe's future is nonetheless enshrined in the "dam" that you mentioned. From your viewpoint, is the disbandment of Europe's current military blocs possible?

[Chevenement] Of course, it is possible that the military blocs may disband. This must be discussed at the coming meeting between the heads of the CSCE states, which Gorbachev proposed convening in 1990. But while military blocs exist they can be used to resolve security and arms control problems. The bloc system is not of course flawless but we must not abolish one security system without having an opportunity to replace it with another.

[Bolshakov] You said recently that it is premature to reduce the level of French military spending. However many people in the Socialist Party itself are now talking of the need to embark on this in view of the changes in Eastern Europe, particularly in the USSR.

[Chevenement] I do not consider the Soviet Union to be France's enemy at all. But the country's defense policy is not only determined by our stance toward the USSR but also by the overall situation in Europe, in the Mediterranean, and throughout the world. Nevertheless I am doing my utmost to ensure that a good agreement is concluded in 1990 in Vienna on conventional arms and in Geneva on chemical weapons and USSR and U.S. strategic nuclear arms.

[Bolshakov] What is your attitude to "star wars"? After all, while speaking of its readiness for an agreement on strategic systems, the United States is at the same time announcing new appropriations for space weapons...

[Chevenement] We always reacted in an extremely restrained way to this project. Of course, we believe that there may be observation satellites in space but we opposed mounting weapons on satellites. We think that the desire to reduce strategic arsenals and to develop the arms race in space are clearly at variance with one another.

[Bolshakov] How active are contacts between representatives of our two countries' armed forces?

[Chevenement] There has been a program of military exchanges since my official visit to the USSR in April 1989, which was defininitively agreed during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to France in July of the same year. This year USSR Defense Minister General Yazov is to come to France and we are delighted by that. General Schmitt, chief of the general staff of the French Armed Forces, will in turn visit the USSR. There will be exchange visits by warships and military aircraft. Contacts may also be established between our strategic research organizations. We are interested in getting to know and understand one another better.

[Bolshakov] Could the USSR and France cooperate in conversion?

[Chevenement] We are open to discussion on this issue.

[Bolshakov,] As a prominent member of the French Socialist Party and as France's defense minister do you believe in a weapons-free world?

[Chevenement] Of course, I hold the commonly held belief that the state will fade away, the belief in a classless society, in other words, the commonly held belief in a wonderful utopia. This notwithstanding, this belief is necessary since we must all devote the maximum effort to cutting back the level of arms and establishing respect and legal norms between nations that will enable us to resolve conflicts that may arise by means of discussion.

We by no means find all of J.-P. Chevenement's views acceptable. But we cannot, I believe, reject them out of hand. It is indeed important now for both West and East to understand one another and render the incipient dialogue the norm rather than a special event. France can play a tremendous role here. So let us seek the grain of reason here together which will germinate into mankind's future wisdom, which alone is capable of rescuing mankind from self-destruction.

Yakovlev Receives French Trade Union Officials

LD2002161190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—A delegation of the General Confederation of Labor of France [CGT], led by Henri Krasucki, secretary general of the CGT, which is in the USSR at the invitation of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, was received today by Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In the course of their conversation, the representatives of the French trade union center were informed about the development of the perestroyka processes in the USSR and about the specific features of the current phase of transformations. There was also an exchange of opinions on problems of the international workers' movement while taking the new political realities in Europe into account.

Shalayev Meets Labor Delegation

904F0094A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "At AUCCTU Invitation"]

[Text] Negotiations were conducted on 19 February at the Palace of Labor in Moscow between a delegation of France's General Labor Confederation (CGT), headed by the organization's general secretary, A. Krazyuki, and a delegation of Soviet trade unions, headed by AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] chairman, S.A. Shalayev. The French delegation was in Moscow at the invitation of the AUCCTU.

Members of the CGT delegation included J. Gallan, confederation secretary; M. Decouin, executive commission member; J.-C. Pouatou, editor-in-chief of the CGT magazine LA VIE OUVRIERE; M. de Almeida, CGT representative in the "Renault" plant administrative council; and M. Daveau, CGT secretariat official.

Taking part in negotiations on the Soviet side were G.I. Yanayev, AUCCTU deputy chairman; V.P. Shcherbakov, Moscow City Council of Trade Unions chairman; A.S. Potapov, editor-in-chief of the newspaper TRUD; and A.N. Zharikov, chief of the AUCCTU international department.

During the negotiations the delegations exchanged information regarding trade union activity in their countries, and discussed matters dealing with the further development of cooperation between the French CGT and Soviet trade unions.

Members of the CGT delegation were apprised of new trends in the functioning of Soviet trade unions, and their role in the current stage of perestroyka in Soviet society.

Also examined were basic problems of today's international situation and the trade union movement in connection with preparations for the 12th World Congress of Trade Unions.

The negotiations proceeded in an environment of friendship and complete mutual understanding.

During its stay in the Soviet Union the CGT delegation will visit Donetsk Oblast, become acquainted with the activity of military production conversion enterprises, and hold meetings with trade union leaders, the active trade union membership, and labor collectives.

Sitaryan Receives Group of French Senators

LD0503230990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1707 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—Stepan Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, today received a group of senators from France led by J. Francois-Poncet, chairman of the Economic Committee.

The further development of French-Soviet trade and economic relations were discussed. Stepan Sitaryan answered many quesitons connected with perestroyka of the national economy and the USSR's foreign economic activity.

Finnish SKP Congress Views Renewal Prospects

PM0103105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "22d Finnish Communist Party (SKP) Congress Opens"]

[Text] Helsinki, 23 Feb—The prospects for the political and organizational renewal of the country's left-wing forces and Communists' role and place in this process are at the center of attention of the 22d SKP Congress which opened here today. The main political question on which the party forum is to adopt a decision concerns the

proposal put forward about 1 year ago to unite the SKP, the Finnish People's Democratic League, and the Finnish Women's Democratic League into a new political party—the Left Alliance.

Delegates of the Finnish Communist Party (Unity) are also attending the congress. This is the first time that they are taking part in the work of the SKP congress since the split in the country's communist movement which was institutionalized in 1985-1987. To give the forum the most businesslike and working character possible, it was decided not to invite foreign guests to it.

Jarmo Wahlstrom, chairman of the SKP, who delivered the Central Committee report, noted that great changes have occurred in the country's societal life in recent years in the face of which the SKP, unfortunately, was unable to restructure its activity in good time and lost the political initiative. As a result, rightist tendencies have intensified in society and the people's democratic movement has begun to lose support among the population. In part this was also connected with the complication of the situation in the socialist countries. The ideas of socialism and communism formed back in Stalinist times have become completely obsolete. It is now obvious that there is no return to them, Jarmo Wahlstrom said.

The present congress, the report stresses, must adopt important decisions. The vigorous discussion has led to a realization of the need to create a new party—the Left Alliance. This was our own decision, and the changes now taking place in the East European countries convince us increasingly that this is right.

SKP Congress Advocates Creation of New Party

PM0603095990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

["Own information" report: "Questions Remain. On the Results of the 22d Finnish Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] The 22d SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Congress concluded its work in Helsinki a few days ago. As already reported, the chief question at the congress was the proposal, advanced last year and widely discussed in party organizations and in the press, to unite the SKP, the Finnish People's Democratic League, and the Finnish Women's Democratic League in a new political party—the Left Alliance.

It is significant that delegates from the Finnish Communist Party (Unity) also participated in the work of the congress following the split that occurred in the Communist movement three years ago.

The 22d SKP Congress unanimously advocated the creation of a new political party—the Left Alliance—which is to unite within its ranks Communists and the country's national left-wing, democratic organizations and will be open to all citizens who share its aims and operating methods. The alliance's constituent congress is scheduled for the end of April this year.

The congress political resolution states, in particular, that the creation of the Left Alliance does not mean that the SKP will cease its activity forthwith. SKP membership and its primary and district organizations will continue at least through the next, 23d SKP Congress. But it is proposed to stop collecting SKP membership dues as of 1991. In the opinion of the congress delegates, the Left Alliance must oppose the injustices inherent in capitalism.

An important place in the document is allocated to international questions. It points out, in particular, that Finnish Communists support all proposals to ensure progress in the disarmament sphere and to disband military-political blocs.

The congress elected the party's new leadership. Thirty people were elected to the SKP Central Committee. Helja-Maria Tammisola became party chairman and A. Maki general secretary.

Now that the congress is over, many of the questions of concern to Finnish Communists still remain open: What will the SKP be like in the future? To what will the merger lead? How will the Left Alliance operate?

It has to be said that various opinions were aired in the pages of the Finnish democratic press during the precongress period. It was pointed out, in particular, that the crisis in the party could not be resolved by abandoning Marxism and the aims of building socialism. Emphasis was placed on the need to unite Communists for the renewal of the party and the creation of a new democratic SKP with broad international ties.

As for the Left Alliance, many people have drawn attention to the fact that within its framework all radical left-wing forces must advocate the realization of their goals and act as equal members, without renouncing their own ideas and organizations or being deprived of their independence. The Communist Party and the broad Left Alliance must not oppose but complement each other.

Swedish Army Commander Completes USSR Visit

PM0503160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Visit Over"]

[Text] A Swedish military delegation headed by Lieutenant General E. Bengtsson, commander of the Ground Forces, visited the USSR 25 February through 2 March this year at the invitation of the USSR Defense Ministry.

During the visit the delegation head had meetings and conversations with Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; and Army General V.I. Varennikov, commander in chief of the Ground Forces and

USSR deputy defense minister, which took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere. The sides discussed the state of relations and outlined the prospects for Soviet-Swedish military ties and voiced wishes regarding the need to establish good relations between the USSR and Swedish Armed Forces.

During its stay in our country the delegation visited Moscow, Volgograd, and Kiev, where it visited the Armored Troops Military Academy, the Kiev Higher Air Defense Missile Engineering School, a Kiev Military District troop unit, and Zvezdnyy Gorodok.

Latin America & Caribbean

Daniel Ortega Cited on 'Civil War' Threat

PM0603214190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[M. Kozhukhov commentary: "Nicaragua: Again the Threat of War"]

[Text] The integration of the Contras in the ranks of the Sandinist People's Army "will become a signal for civil war," President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua has warned, addressing a rally in Managua.

Violeta Barrios de Chamorro must retain the army and Ministry of Interior units as they are, otherwise serious and unpredictable consequences are in store for her, he noted. According to a REUTER correspondent's report from the Nicaraguan capital, the rally participants greeted the president's words with applause. The newspaper BARRICADA has published an interview on similar lines with Luis Carrion, one of the leaders of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front] in which he warns that instability and chaos will befall the country if the new government tries to disband the army.

According to REUTER, the statements of the FSLN leaders are intended to assuage those supporters of the Front who are dissatisfied with the readiness of the FSNL to cede power. Observers do not rule out the possibility of a tacit compromise between the current president and the president-elect of Nicaragua on the question of the army. A recent statement by Barrios de Chamorro to the effect that there will be no job for the Contras either in the army or in the Government of Nicaragua has attracted attention.

The demobilization of the Contras and the difficulties which may arise in connection with the political reorientation and reduction of the army remain among the most sensitive and intractable problems facing the country's new government.

The solution of one of these problems is meanwhile moving into the realm of practical actions: Tuesday representatives of the National Opposition Union (UNO) and the Nicaraguan Church are embarking on consultations with Contra leaders in the capital of Honduras on the question of the demobilization of the armed detachments.

It is also reported from Managua that the UNO political council has decided to send a delegation to the United States which is hoping to get aid totaling up to $600 million from the Bush administration—the minimum necessary to rebuild the country. Meanwhile Barrios de Chamorro has said in an interview to a TASS correspondent: "I want relations between the USSR and Nicaragua to be excellent, I want them to be the same as in the past. I hope that the Soviet Union's humanitarian aid to Nicaragua will continue because the republic needs it right now to restore the economy."

FSLN Still a Political Force in Nicaragua

PM0203115190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[Yuriy Stroyev "Viewpoint": "Drastic Turnaround"]

[Text] Could the United States have expected the many millions of dollars it spent on removing the Sandinist Front from office to pay off so unexpectedly? Their 10-years of attempts to overthrow the Sandinist government by armed means using Contra gangs and to stifle the revolution via a trade and economic blockade failed. Nicaragua was able to survive this struggle but emerged from it an exhausted country with a population worn out by the long bloodshed and devastation. The burden was also aggravated by the economic mistakes made by the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN]. Many observers share the opinion that most Nicaraguans voted not against the Sandinists but for a hope of peace and an improvement in their position.

The results of the election in which Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, National Opposition Union [UNO] candidate, was victorious had hardly become known when the White House rushed to announce that it would lift its economic sanctions in the near future and grant Nicaragua aid. However, Nicaraguans still harbor tremendous anti-U.S. sentiments. ABC TV presenters note that "Chamorro cannot change this overnight."

While having ceded the election, the FSLN is still nevertheless an influential political force in the country without which no problems can be resolved. UNO will have at best 15 more seats in the parliament than the FSLN but that is not enough to implement its program by constitutional means. Any constitutional amendments require a 60-percent majority in parliament. This means that the ruling coalition will have to seek compromises with the Sandinists, in particular on questions of army cuts, control over the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the denationalization of the banks. "In taking the post of president Chamorro will encounter great difficulties," an ABC correspondent noted. "First, the victorious coalition may collapse since it includes 14 parties—ranging from left-wing to extreme right-wing—which are united by one thing alone—their

opposition to the Sandinists. Second, the Sandinists have been relegated to the background but have not been eliminated."

"I will give the orders," V. Barrios de Chamorro said at her first press conference following her victory. The Sandinists should not expect a single seat in the future government. Other UNO leaders back her up by saying that "civilians" who enjoy universal trust will hold the posts of defense minister and minister of internal affairs. However, whether the future president and her patrons in Washington like it or not, these and other problems cannot be resolved without the FSLN.

This was also confirmed by the national leadership's conference with FSLN activists which was attended by more than 1,400 people at the Olaf Palme Palace of Congresses in Managua. The Sandinist Front, the resolution says, held free, just, and honest elections; this is the people's gain. As the country's largest, most cohesive, and organized party, the FSLN bears responsibility for guaranteeing that the revolutionary process continues and all the achievements and transformations are preserved.

The Front will have to resolve these tasks under fundamentally new conditions, in opposition. The main thing is that the FSLN has not been routed despite having lost the election. Even the Sandinists' opponents agree with that.

Vitaliy Kobysh Ponders Nicaraguan Elections

PM0603120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Vitaliy Kobysh "Political Observer's Opinion on Elections in Nicaragua": "Anything But Defeat"]

[Text] The results of the elections that have just been held in Nicaragua inspired a substantial section of the Western media to come up with the unconditional verdict that the Sandinistas (FSLN) had unexpectedly suffered a crushing defeat. The National Opposition Union had just as unexpectedly won a resounding victory.

It appears that neither claim is exactly right. Certainly, the opposition people did not expect such a success, despite generous financial subsidies from the United States. It is also true that the Sandinistas, confident of nationwide support, had no doubt that they would win. The fact that it evaded them stunned many people: Had they not fought heroically for nearly half a century against the Somoza clan, the dictatorship of Washington's criminal henchmen? Following the 1979 revolution had they not courageously repulsed the attacks by former Somoza guardsmen—the contras, who, using Washington money again, were doing their utmost to ruin peaceful construction in the country? The bitterness is understandable. But there is no resentment against an "ungrateful people."

The Nicaraguan people have not forgotten anything; one does not forget such things: the way the Somoza family and its hirelings scoffed at them—starved them, trampled on their human dignity, killed them. In the 1978-1979 period alone, the last of the clan, Anastasio Somoza Jr., already in his death throes, killed 45,000 of his fellow citizens before the overthrow of his dictatorship. But even after a genuine people's victory, a revolution several generations of Nicaraguans had suffered for, peace did not come to the country. Former Somocista killers, not merely encouraged but armed to the teeth by the United States and instructed by experts from U.S. special services, fought a veritable war, mainly from Honduran territory, against their own people and the new regime. The result, after 10 years, was material damage running to $12 billion, tens of thousands of orphans, 50,000 Nicaraguans killed. If you add these 50,000 to Somoza's 45,000 victims in the last two years of his bloodbath, you get nearly 100,000 victims in a small country. Let us explain what this figure means: It would be equivalent to killing 8 million people in the United States.

What is the problem then, the reader might well ask, should not the Sandinistas have gotten the vote after all this? They should have, according to political logic. But this logic has certain human nuances. In the 10 years and more of the war against the Contras, which accounted for half of the budget, the Nicaraguan economy totally collapsed and people were poverty-stricken, not knowing what tomorrow would bring. The FSLN leadership's promises to deal swiftly with the bandits, feed the country, and provide people with housing, hospitals, and schools came to nothing. There were objective reasons, of course—the war, the American blockade; but there were other reasons as well: serious economic mistakes, rally democracy (somewhat reminiscent of what is happening in our country at the moment), which was consuming a considerable amount of working time, a tendency, when tackling day-to-day problems, to depend not on well-thought-out measures and hard work but on bureaucratic contortions or the very simple method of using "Kalashnikovs." War was a way of life, convenient as well as normal for some.

Indeed, the Sandinistas enjoyed enormous popularity, and they have not lost it even now. But people are tired, of everything—of the waiting lines (also familiar) and the mass infant mortality, of the constant calls of "gid-dap" and less and less hope that a better life will ever come. They voted not so much against the Sandinistas, who are their sons, fathers, and brothers, as for peace, for changes, imbuing their modest votes with an indelible longing for a normal human life, a life without threats and gunfire.

So there you have it. It would be nice, of course, if the Sandinistas were to get another victory out of this, particularly as the election struggle was not against, for example, those Contras, but an entire alliance of 14 opposition parties—from communists and socialists to ultrarightists. I see nothing tragic in the fact that they,

headed by the universally respected Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of a Nicaraguan national hero killed in January 1978 by Somoza's secret police (yet another reason, as far as many Nicaraguans were concerned, for voting for Dona Violeta, as the new president is known in the country), will now have a turn at trying to solve Nicaragua's difficult problems. The Sandinistas say that they will make every effort to help the new government: establishing order in the country and healing the wounds of war. When Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, in the presence of thousands of people, in the full glare of the television lights, embraced Dona Violeta after the announcement of the election results, not in the routine Latin American way, but ardently and sincerely, it was a moving and very significant spectacle.

So was the alliance of opposition parties victorious over the Sandinistas during the elections? Strictly speaking, yes: The counting of votes was scrupulously carried out; the election campaign and the actual elections were observed by the most competent expert observers.

All the same... I will say something you may find strange, something that belongs more to the category of purely personal impressions. There is little doubt that had the Sandinistas won the election, there would have been such a universal howl of indignation ("vote rigging," "dirty tricks," "voting under coercion"), that an even harsher economic blockade, and resumption of combat actions by the Contras would have been practically inevitable. I do not think I am wrong when I suggest, if only for that reason, that U.S. President G. Bush would have found himself in a difficult situation and, under pressure from the right, he would have had to become even more deeply involved in an interminable, futile, unnecessary war. Hence my conclusion that the coming to power in the country of the National Opposition Union, including both communists and socialists and headed by a politician such as Violeta Barrios de Chamorro is no worst-case scenario.

Now we come to the crux of the matter. The decades of struggle against the Somoza dictatorship and 10 long years of battles against Somoza's guardsmen—the Contras—have resulted in countless sacrifices on the part of the Nicaraguan people. But the sacrifices were not in vain. The country's soil, drenched with human blood, is not putting forth the first shoots of democracy. Ten years ago, under Somoza, the honest, free elections that have now taken place in this country, small in size but big in terms of its people's love of freedom, would have been unthinkable. Washington would say different, of course. But it would never have agreed to hold such elections: With Somoza everything was fine and dandy—a few handouts, and you could tug the puppet strings as much as you liked.

The enlightened, very well-informed U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST described what has happened in Nicaragua as a "miracle." Yes, perhaps. Although had it not been for 50 years of Somoza dictators ruling Nicaragua on Washington's behalf and had it not been for the Contras' bloody actions, sponsored by the United States again, the "miracle" might have happened far sooner.

But it happened. The "miracle" also undoubtedly has echoes of the events in the USSR and East European countries and the general change in the world climate, in which dialogue is taking the place of confrontation and violence and killings are becoming more and more a monstrous anachronism.

One more thing of no mean significance. Latin America greeted the results of the Nicaraguan election with particular enthusiasm, if not to say delight, calling them a victory for democracy that has great significance for the entire continent. For Latin America democracy is not just free elections, but daily bread, redistribution of wealth, and release from the foreign debts that have established a vise-like grip on the continent.

Cuba's Castro on Threat of 'Foreign Aggression'

PM0603214990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "F. Castro Statement"]

[Text] Havana, 6 Mar—Among the dangers threatening Cuba, the possibility of foreign aggression against the republic has never been disregarded, Cuban leader Fidel Castro has said, closing an enlarged session of the National Council of the Cuban Federation of University Students.

While we do not want such an aggression to occur, it would not create a desperate situation for us because, ultimately, the aggressor "will be forced to admit his mistake," Castro noted. An invasion can be avoided, he said, if our enemies appreciate the strength, unity, and readiness of the Cuban people. Those who are trying to split our society from within are dangerous enemies of the people because the defeat of socialism in Cuba would mean the end of the Cuban nation.

The revolution must be defended even if we end up in the minority, the Cuban leader said. No one forced it on us—we ourselves staged it and defended it. Our ideas are shared by the majority of the people, and we are prepared to discuss any problem, we have sufficient arguments for this. We have nothing to hide, and should it become necessary to rectify any mistakes, we will be the first to analyze and rectify them.

In view of the threat of foreign aggression, there are two options for the country's further development, Castro said. He described them respectively as the economic and the socioeconomic options. If, in order to save the revolution, it should become necessary to suspend the implementation of social programs, we will do it. In any case, we will preserve what we already have, and that is much more than many others in the world possess, the Cuban leader stressed.

IZVESTIYA Reports Cuban Congress Set

PM2302100390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Kamorin dispatch: "Congress Convening"]

[Text] Havana—An extraordinary plenum of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] Central Committee has adopted a resolution to convene the fourth party congress in the first half of 1991.

The communique issued on the results of the plenum held behind closed doors in Havana at the end of last week notes that the exact starting date for the Communists' forum will be announced in a Politburo appeal to be published 15 March.

As for the subjects to be covered by the forthcoming congress, these are set out in the communique in a highly generalized form. It seems that the plenum examined the results of the process begun by the Third PCC Congress of "rectifying mistakes and eliminating negative phenomena" in the sphere of the economy and ideological work and called those results "fruitful and highly promising."

Specifically it is proposed to examine the "improvement of the country's political system and its organs of power, which means mass social organs and the PCC itself, aside from the actual organs of state administration.

Why has this question been brought to the fore today, at a time when the country is encountering considerable problems both in the economic sphere and in the foreign policy arena? In this sense it is curious that the communique cites an article from the newspaper GRANMA relating to the period of the "Ochoa Affair." We recall that last summer a group of ranking officers from the Cuban Armed Forces and Interior Ministry were convicted for involvement in international drugs trafficking, and four of the accused were shot. Following this many leaders of the internal affairs ministry accused of corruption and other work-related crimes were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. This dramatic experience could not fail to force the republic's leadership to consider creating guarantees against any possible repetition.

Moreover, although the document stresses that the problem "will be examined in the light of our principles, under no circumstances responding to outside pressure," political processes in the European socialist countries are naturally influencing Cuba too. Clearly, the process of change that has now been begun is designed to reinforce the specific Cuban path of socialist development, unlike the experience of states where, to use F. Castro's expression, "socialism was established as a result of the arrival of victorious Red Army divisions."

On the whole, the thrust of change is intended to be so general that there is no scope for commentaries. Insofar as we can judge, it will be a question above all of eradicating the mistakes caused by "copying foreign experience," an example of which is given as the introduction of formalism into the revolutionary process. We must assume that this means the Soviet experience of the stagnation era.

As for intraparty life, in this area the plenum put forward fundamental "limitations" on possible change. First, the PCC will continue to be united and based on a platform of democratic centralism. Second, its main tasks have again been proclaimed as the country's socioeconomic development and political education work.

The working groups set up by the Central Committee and designed to work out specific recommendations on changing working methods and styles "beginning with the Central Committee apparatus itself" will operate within this framework too.

It must be said that to all intents and purposes this activity has already begun. The extraordinary plenum produced a whole series of substantive cadre reshuffles. Thus, the Council of Ministers Executive Committee—which is an important organ in the centralized administration of the country and sees itself as a kind of "government within the government"—has been strengthened by two Central Committee secretaries who will fill the posts of vice presidents of the Executive Committee. The Secretariat will thus be reduced, since yet another of its members, Jose Ramon Balaguer Cabrera, has been appointed ambassador to the USSR, and, despite the fact that there are three vacant positions, only Brigadier General Sergio Perez Lezcano—who will become chief of the Central Committee Military Department—has been chosen as a new secretary.

The subject of reshuffles and appointments is crowned by the report that the president of the Cuban parliament—the National Assembly of People's Power—will be elected Tuesday 20 February. This post has been vacant since last February, when Flavio Bravo, an outstanding statesman of the republic, died. Since then the assembly has met for sessions several times, but the question of a president had not been raised. After an extraordinary session convened Tuesday by the Council of State for this purpose, the Cuban parliament will restore the integrity of its leading organs.

NEW TIMES Commentary Views Cuban Scene

PM1602160090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 5, 30 Jan-5 Feb 90 pp 16-20

[Vitaliy Ignatenko and Vitaliy Sobolev dispatch: "Like Real Friends Should..."]

[Text] Havana, Jan—

Notes on our long-time friends' words and deeds

The temptation to look upon one's conclusions and the track one is on as exclusively right is among all the temptations believed to beset man. We know from historical record that this particular temptation overcomes professional socialist politicians, for the most

part. These worthies are particularly given to monopolizing the truth, absolutizing dogmas and brushing away all criticism levelled against them. If not quite true to type, such a politician causes a lot of eyebrow raising even among his "comrades-in-arms," but still it is him who "makes history" and restructures society for society's own sake. Incidentally, Marxism does have one immutable dogma which says that this teaching is "eternally alive." Meaning that it keeps changing and developing, and never fossilizes.

And now, let us come to the point.

While touring Cuba, talking with our Cuban friends, old and new, and scanning Havana papers, we got the impression that Cubans are somewhat concerned about the developments in our country and in the rest of the socialist world. During his visit to Cuba almost a year ago, Mikhail Gorbachev discussed Soviet perestroika with Fidel Castro in connection with general fundamental problems of international relations. We know that the discussion was a frank and friendly one. Since then, perestroika made impressive progress, and the principles underlying it became more clearly defined. The Cuban leaders had occasion to publicly comment on certain perestroika-related phenomena. The comment was far from favourable.

Cubans' reaction to the recent developments in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe was that of "utter confusion," we were told in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. In our high-ranking host's opinion, these developments had further impeded Cuba's progress along its chosen path which it was going to stick to at all costs. We were given to understand that the other side was not too optimistic about our perestroika and that, consequently, Cuba might come up against more difficulties.

Changes, transformations

We shall refrain from assessments and forecasts. All we can go by are our own impressions, which we jotted down, taped, and deposited in our memory. At times we felt like sparing our readers what we had heard till later; after a while, we reasoned, polemic passions would subside, misunderstandings would be cleared up, and everything would fall into place... If you are going to write about Cuban affairs, you have to rely on first-hand impressions only. At a recent consultative meeting of socialist countries' journalists, Julio Garcia, the Cuban delegate, reminded those present of it being impermissible to make exclusive or excessive use of Western sources in describing the situation in fraternal states. In its articles on Cuba our magazine invariably abides by this ethical principle, although we cannot always find in the Cuban press all the information we need. It looks as if things may change for the better, though. Julio Garcia informed the consultative meeting that his colleagues contemplated a radical change of approach which, against the background of coming social transformations, would "serve to improve the Cuban press, to raise the level of criticism and self-criticism." As a matter of fact, it was changes and transformations that we concentrated upon. Socialist Cuba is on the march. We always take a well-wishing and sincere interest in it. We rejoice in Cubans' successes, and are vexed by their setbacks. For quite a while we spared our friends any, even mild criticism, even if they deserved it, and made up for it by ruthless self-flagellation.

Let's fact it, Cubans have every reason to follow our perestroika closely. However, they maintain foreign trade, technological and ideological links with other socialist countries as well as ours. Reports coming in from there vary, many of them are disappointing. We realize, of course, that the state of affairs in the Cuban economy is far from ideal, either. National income is dwindling, and hard currency is extremely short. Hence the forced reductions in government spending.

Speaking of Cuba's problems, we should like to make one thing clear. We did not specially ferret about for information on that score. But you can't possibly fail to see and hear what is very much in evidence. The reason why we took note of the fact, for instance, that onions, carrots, beetroots and other vegetables had disappeared from state-run groceries (there are no private ones) half a year before was to confirm the conclusion about the food problem having reached the proportions which may give rise to social tension. We noticed some other things, too. For instance, some of our compatriots look down their noses at the choice of goods offered by shops in and around Havana, and you can tell by the facial expressions that they wonder how Cubans manage to get by at all. There is nothing to buy, and any tinned product sells like hot cakes. What surprised us was not shortages, but our fellow-citizens' reaction to them. The Soviet cities and towns for that matter can hardly be held as an example for Cuba to follow. Nevertheless, some of the Soviet shoppers have a condescending air.

As a matter of fact, Cubans by no means live from hand to mouth. They have to do without delicacies, it is true, but no one is left without a lunch, a breakfast or a dinner. As you stroll along a Havana street, you see charming and neat schoolchildren, curvacious brunettes and fine specimens of young manhood whose glances turn the heads of even those ladies whose prime fell on prerevolutionary times. Apparently, the cheerful disposition and prosperous looks of the local people are not affected by rationing and by what kind of rations they draw. Although a permanent factor of life in Cuba, and certainly a nuisance, rationing does not tell on the overall atmosphere.

No one will kick up a row about inadequate food supply, and it will never occur to anyone to hold meetings of protest against this or that product being not available.

Cubans may feel strongly indignant with queues, but they never make scenes while standing in a queue.

The other day the Executive Committee of Cuba's Council of Ministers announced a bread and egg price

rise. The forced measures is explained by a shortage of flour and chicken feed due to irregular supplies from abroad, the U.S.S.R. above all. It has also been decided to cut back on bread rations in most provinces. The Executive Committee's report also mentions citrus fruit export problems caused by the failure of Poland, the G.D.R. and the Soviet Union to provide enough cargo ships...

The golden sand

Sunflooded beaches are as attractive to businessmen today a they are to holidaymakers. The Cubans are profit-minded today, hence the ever more conspicuous presence of enterprising businessmen at all of the country's seaside resorts. The Cuban Government has decided to promote the tourist industry at such a rate as to increase the influx of foreign guests tenfold by the year 2000. So, resort service and the tourist industry are to take the lead in the Cuban economy.

Indeed, what we have seen at the world famous resort of Varadero testifies to our friends' serious intentions. One cannot help admiring the wealth which nature has endowed Cuba with and which remains largely untapped so far. Nowadays when hundreds of millions of people spend their yearly vacations travelling, the golden sand of Cuba's beaches can be converted into pure gold, so to speak, only this "al-chemical operation operation" cannot proceed of its own accord.

"We get complaints so far," Josefina de la Rosa of the Cubanacan tourist organization admitted. "The standard of the service we offer needs cardinal improvement." As she dwelt on the hotel construction projects with Cuba's own and mixed capital invested, Josefina mentioned the problems related to the bottlenecks of the Cuban economy. The discomforts foreign guests complain about would have probably been passed unnoticed by Soviet tourists (who, along with those from other socialist countries, constitute one tenth of the total body of tourists Cuba plays host to). But a situation where putting through a long-distance call to an hotel reserved for foreign tourists becomes a problem just because switchboard operators are too lazy to pick up a receiver is hardly favourable to the promotion of foreign travel. It is not easy for a foreigner to follow world developments, either. The Soviet press, whose circulation in Cuba has been halved this year, will be of little help to him, and hotels get no newspapers or magazines from other countries. In a word, making foreign tourists feel at home her isn't going to be an easy matter. Even the prosaic shortages of onions and beetroots may prove a problem considering the expected influx of two million of "pampered" eaters. Nevertheless, some progress has already been made. Pedro Rodriguez, the Cubanacan manager in Varadero, who had learned the hotel-running business in Western Europe, told us that the Cactus Hotel, built slightly over a year ago, had already returned a profit of three and a half million dollars.

Self-abandonment

A Cuban Airline's Tu-154 jet brings a Municher or a Parisian in from the January cold to the tropical paradise of Varadero, incredibly, the international airport has taken only about a year to build, and is now being expanded by a work collective which calls itself a "contingent." This is a special form of work organization which is eventually to prevail in Cuba. About two years old, it has emerged as part of "rectification"—the process of correcting mistakes and overcoming negative tendencies. There are now over sixty such "contingents" employing a total of nearly 35,000. In the long run they are to take over the country's entire construction effort. What's more, "Work in the Contingent Spirit" is a popular slogan of rectification, which is put into practice by Communist Labour Teams in industry and agriculture. One can judge about the scale of the movement by the fact, for example, that Havana University professors and teachers have set up a "contingent" of their own, which is to build a 17- story hostel and to repair the University building.

What is the "contingent spirit"?

We were told that it was opposed to laxity and slovenliness. "Lenient laws," as Cubans describe them, have weakened production discipline, encouraged idlers and shirkers, increased expenditures and reduced work efficiency. "What the staffers of the Ministry of Construction excel at," Fidel Castro told the builders of the Varadero Airport, "is asking. There are two arts: the art of asking, and the art of giving. The builders have become experts in the art of asking, and, in dispensing centralized reserves, I have been compelled to learn the art of giving a little. And each time I see a list of their requests, I know in advance what they really need—because I've come to specialize in this kind of thing—for the dam, for the motor road, and for many other construction jobs.

"I've just looked through such a list today sent in by the team of Jose Antonio Echeverria of Matanzas.

"They ask for extra equipment, specifically five KamAZ-5511 trucks in addition to the twenty they have. I know rightaway they don't really need them. So they get five scrapers which they do need."

We saw the "contingents" in action in Varadero. They operate on the principle that a construction project should be carried out without undue delay (which, unfortunately, isn't as yet common in Cuba—and in the Soviet Union, for that matter). Therefore, construction workers, rather than doing regular hours (from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., with a lunch break) stay on the building site for as long as they have to. If necessary, they work for days or even weeks on end, without any days off. Yalepsi Ruiz told us, for instance, that she got up at 4 a.m. and returned to her hostel by midnight. Sometimes she even spent nights at the construction site, sleeping in a truck cabin. At 24, all she thinks about is work. Candido

Palmero, her team leader, said he was going to stay in the "contingent" till pension ago...

The Cuban leaders think that Cuba will need this form of work organization till the year 2000.

Yalepsi Ruiz told us that Cuban workers got the best bonus of all—the sense of Fidel Castro's systematic care for and attention to the "contingent."

The front-ranking workers of the "contingents" are awarded foreign tour tickets and cars. Good hostels and good food are prime conditions for the "contingent" status. Cubans take pride in "contingent" members getting six meals a day. They believe, however, the moral incentives must take precedence of material ones. One's own moral satisfaction and social recognition—these are, among others, the cornerstones of rectification.

It was explained to us at the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party that rectification had been put in the order of the day by the very process of the country's historical development. Following the correction of the mistakes of the initial, "idealistic" period, the nation lapsed into "still worse delusions." There came the "technocratic" period, that of overestimating the importance of material stimuli. It was then that the following conclusion was made: "If you let capitalism in, even through a tiny crack, it will bush out like a weed.

Therefore, we were told at the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, Cubans are puzzled by the current developments in the Soviet Union. They are not sure that the market, free competition, private enterprise and foreign capital investments will solve the problems of socialism. Neither are they convinced that family forming will help fulfil the food programme. "Such experiments may look good on paper, but an attempt to conduct them on the scale of entire society may come up against unpredictable diffculties." The Cubans, we were told, ephasized ideological work, the mobilization of the masses and labour enthuasiam.

While in the "contingents" we marvelled at the over-intensive rate of work which people devote all their energies and practically all time to. "So what?" our hosts told us. "After all, internationalist fighters also sacrificed all to the lofty cause. This is the basis of truly socialist morality.

Indeed, we met former internationalists at the tourist construction sites.

Cuban troops have been fully withdrawn from Ethiopia, while thir withdrawal from Angola continues. Many of the internationalists volunteered to the continents" regarding them as another fighting line...

This is a substantial reinforcement more than 400,000 men have taken part in the internationalist mission. They are glad of coming back home and convinced they have done their duty. Angola's sovereignty has been unheld, and Namibia is getting its independence. Internationalists showed mass heroism on the far-off African soil, although their combat action wasn't victorious all along. This is only natural —a war is a war. However the fact that the fightingmen have fulfill their mission in Africa is expected to contribute to the consolidation of Cuban society, and their joining the "contingents" has added dynamism to economic projects.

Strategic forest plantations

While on a visit in a country one is not indifferent to, one cannot help matching the situation there against that at home. In the political and spiritual spheres we are divided by almost five years of perestroika, of course. This is neither boasting, nor belittling the friends' achievements. We are aware of the special circumstances which put Cuba in a position less advantageous than ours.

Take, for instance, the environment which is a matter of universal concern. Environmental problems have not passed Cuba by. The Havana bay is heavily polluted, and overcrowded decrepit buses hardly make the air any purer. Other bays also get more than their share of pollutants, and other smokey dischargers are in evidence. As you enter Varadero, you are greeted not only by picturesque lagoons and snow-white hotels set in lush verdure, but also by ugly oil derricks and drilling rigs...

When resources are short, their deficiency is often made up for at the expense of the environment. Cuba is poor in oil, so the deposits found by Cuban and Soviet experts right under the resort's sandy beaches, after long quests, are not to be ignored. Lest Varadero be lost, oil wells are drilled directionally and extraordinary precautions are taken against leaks.

On the whole, the ecological situation in Cuba appears more or less normal. But the problem does exist, and is dealt with Cuban-style. One of the objectives of the Cuban revolution was to restore the woods burnt in the furnaces of sugar refineries, and to plant trees over one fifth of the country's territory. Each work collective and each committee for the protection of the revolution has been set its own target figures as part of the project. The figures are not too high. An instructor of the provincial party committee told us he had to plant and grow 14 trees near his place of work and a few more near his home. Forest plantation has been organized on a large scale. Special forestries have been set up for the purpose. As he showed New Times correspondents around, Gonzalez Rodriguez, the director of one of them, said it had been assigned two missions: water conservation, and defence.

The woods are to play a very important role in the strategy of the nationwide war against an aggressor. So important, in fact, that mass tree plantings are done on Defence Days, and no institution or territorial unit is pronounced "Ready for first-stage defence" unless it fulfills its afforestation plan.

Strange as it may seem at a first glance, the current developments in the world at large and in socialist

countries in particular only go to confirm Cubans in their determination to "keep their powder dry." This position was set forth by Fideal Castro in his December 7, 1989, speech. "We are told about peace," he said. "But what kind of peace? Peace between superpowers, leaving imperialism free to commit aggressions in the open against Third World Countries? Examples abound."

The Cuban press elaborated on this thought in its comments on the American troops' invasion of Panama. As if putting themselves in the Panamanians' shoes, Cubans analyzed the progress of combat actions, the behavior of fighting men and their commanders. It was stated that Cubans could have countered the aggressor with a fire power 200 to 300 times higher. Besides, they put themselves questions about the fighting capacity of the troops, their morale, and their commanders' combat experince. Such a practical approach to the prospect of defence action is nothing new to Cubans. the aggression against Panama only furnished a new pretext for it.

Cuban think that the present international situation gives them cause for anxiety. Press commentaries boil down to the assertion that the current changes in socialist countries, and some of the latters drawing closer to the West reveal a tendency towards a unipolar world; Cuba's Foreign ministry is of the opinion that in such a world the U.S. will acquire the prerogatives of the supreme arbiter not only of international issues but of the small states' destinies as well. Cubans were disappointed at Poland having abstained from voting, in the United Nations, for a resolution condemning the American intervention in Panama. A high-ranking Cuban Foreign Ministry official told us that "internationalist motives have been eraseú from socialist countries' foreign policies, and the developing world is left facing imperialism single-handed." As far as we could gather, Cubans are worried by the construction of a common European home, too. "Europe will concentrate on its own problems, leaving the Third World countries to shift for themselves." It seems to them that the tearing down of the Berlin Wall paves the way for pan-Germanism...

"The capitalist powers are convinced, with good reason," Fidel Castro remarked, "that the socialist camp actually does not exist any longer... They are convinced, not without reason, that the Warsaw Pact doesn't exist any longer either, that it is now nothing but fiction, that undemined societies, with explosives planted inside them, are incapable of resistance."

"No more slovenliness!"

As we tried to get the feel of the country's tone, we could't but feel that Cuba was set on selfless work, "Iron discipline without which there is no socialism," and prepared to make sacrifices.

"No more slovenliness!" Raul Castro announced. However, making higher demands of every individual and of society as a whole is just one aspect of rectification. It is stressed in numerous public statements that ordinary citizens realize their responsibility for the fulture of their country and socialism, and make extraordinary efforts to overcome the present difficulties. Nevertheless, they have complaints to make, which often find their way into the papers. Uniformity (so well familiar to us), peace and quiet in the conference halls annoy Cubans, as is evidenced by a review of readers' letters carried by the youth paper Juventud Rebelde. These letters compel one to probe deeper into the public attitudes in that country.

A look through Che Guevara's works will show that Cuban democracy and economy have changed directions sharply at the leadership's decisions. "The first steps of the revolutionary state," Guevara wrote, "smacked strongly of guerrilla tactics as a form of government-...Any executive was free to choose his own methods of dealing with specific problems." The centralization of power gave rise to more mistakes, but of a different kind. According to Guevara, "the political machinery gradually subsided into bureaucratic complacency, becoming a kind of springboard for its members to leap to bureaucratic ranks of various levels, and entirely breaking away from the masses."

The consequences of this "Bureaucratic centralism," as Juventud Rebelde calls it, have shown in the economic sphere as well. "We have reiterated to the point of exhaustion," the paper pointed out, "the words about the need to step up the working masses' governing and controlling role in production but bureaucratism and technocratic concepts, reigning supreme in our economic control system, prevented these words from becoming reality for years."

Judging by what we read in the reviews of readers" letters, most readers are displeased with formalism on the part of the people's government bodies, with the fact that differences of public opinion do not find their due reflection in the press, and with the institutions' allergy to open criticism.

"Unfortunately," a journalist commented on these letters, "Those who, being representatives of the masses, wield real power have a mistaken notion of respect for the leadership and obey those who are supposed to be subordinated to them, often becoming their mouthpieces." "Another unfortunate thing is," he goes on, "that formalism emanates from our very parliament which is too short of time to give matters a profound discussion, and whose legislative activity lacks consistency. Unanimous votes are common, and discussions rare there."

As for the press, local journalists are of the opinion that it must "uproot the deadly sprouts of apologetics" and to transfer the discussion of serious subjects from private parties and corridors to the "open arenas of the Revolution." The paper wonders, however, "how polemics are to be conducted considering the fact that most experts are unwilling to share their views with readers and, if they ever do so, they come under fire from their institutions." Over a whole year, "more than 90 percent of the

Council of Ministers members never reported in the press on the state of affairs in their respective fields despite the example set by Fidel who has made regular practice of doing so..."

The articles quoted above obviously express official views rather than those of an individual journalist. While calling for polemics, they repeatedly and firmly stress that Cuban newspapers "will never allow space either for the propaganda of ideas having to do so with the restoration of capitalism in whatever form and denying the cause of the revolution, or for the slightest attempts to denigrate our symbols and our glorious past." Quite a few caustic remarks are made about sundry "reformists", charlatans, "free thinking enthusiasts," "pseudo-intellectual pedants," and the like. Addressing a formal meeting late last year, Roberto Robaina, first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League, mentioned "certain groupings and super-critics worshipping foreign models who parrot other people's ideas so as to find fault with the revolution and its leaders."

The ideas reiterated by the Cuban "parrots" have probably originated in far-off socialist countries, and their authors also get thier share of sharp criticism.

Ensuring Stability

It gradually dawned upon us that the reason why Cubans have entered into open polemics with the advocates of perestroika and reforms in Eastern Europe was not only to uphold the purity of the theory or to challenge the truth of alternative ideas. The methods used in fraternal countries to improve socialism came under fire also because they "peturb" Cubans. Cubans fear lest new political thinking—not shared by the U.S. leadership, in their opinion—should only go to enhance the military threat to the republic in the end. As for the new trends in the spheres of economy and foreign trade, they are believed here to threaten the Cuban national economy with losses.

In his December 7, 1989, speech, Fidel Castro touched upon all these three points. For the first time ever, he did not ad-lib but read from prepared notes - i.e., supposedly aired a common position worked out by the country's entire leadership. The questions he put were most unambiguous: what is meant by the improvement of socialism which refutes its elementary principles, and what kind of peace is promised?

"It was without any hesitation that we banned certain Soviet publications spitting venom at the U.S.S.R. itself and socialism. They obviously play into the hands of imperialism, reaction and counterrevolution. Some of these publications are already demanding an end to the kind of equal and fair trade relations that has taken shape between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba in the course of the Cuban revolutionary process. In a word, they insist that the U.S.S.R. should change over to an unequal trade with Cuba, i.e., charge ever higher prices for its wares and beat down the prices of our farm products and raw materials - exactly what the U.S. is doing to the Third World countries - and that the U.S.S.R. should eventually join the American blockade of Cuba.

These words will probably perplex the NEW TIMES readers as much as the events in Eastern Europe do Cubans.

While writing about socialist countries, we are still somehow shy of giving them a piece of our mind. By understatements we hope to preserve friendship which we all value so much, and to give the enemies of this friendship no chance of gloating over our differences. That the Cuban leader has been the first to come out in the open certainly does him credit. Confusion will pass, straightforwardness will become habitual and indispensable. Even on the purely practical plane, it is certain to pay politically.

Time alone will tell whether Cuba is right in criticizing the road of renovating and humanizing socialism we have embarked upon, and of revising our relations with the United States. We regard it as a positive fact, however, that those on the Island of Freedom have opted for frankness. The Cuban leader's straightforwardness testifies, among other things, to his self-assurance and to his confidence that his position will be supported by the Cuban public. He has repeatedly stressed that the country is very well off politically.

It's great, of course, that friends no longer mince their words in assessing any events, including accidental and transient or those to be sorted out by history.

Indeed, we all remember the situation—the aftermaths of which still make themselves felt now and again—where the socialist truth, binding upon all, used to come from one and only source. An end has now been put to this abnormal situation forever, one would like to hope. The principles of new thinking, one of the fundamental characteristics of which being any nation's inalienable right of choice, are firmly establishing themselves in socialist societies proper and in the interrelationships between them. In its turn, this right is unthinkable without the pluralism of opinions, views and positions. We, all of us, are still to learn to respect the views of others, the very right of each of us to have an alternative view.

The only thing that matters is that this right should be equally accepted and observed by all the participants of the socialist transformation process without exception, that none of them should try and usurp the monopoly on the absolute truth, that any opinion, even those one disagrees with should be reacted to adequately and sober-mindedly, without any attitudes struck about them. It is only natural for those of like mind to say "no" to one another under certain circumstances. After all, it is not "blind" and "unreasoning," but strict and conscious love that makes a healthy and closely-knit family, let alone a union of nations.

For thirty-one years now nothing of importance has been happening in the world without Cuba being involved in some way or other. Tiny as it is, the island is quite prominent on the world scene. The republic's voice is not shy but, as ever, confident and inspired. It has not become a mere echo of Moncada with years. On the contrary, the clarion call of Moncada and the Revolutdion itself sounds as loud and clear as ever a phenomenon unprecedented in history. Whatever Cubans undertake to do, their deeds are hallowed by revolutionary slogans Yesterday it was "Motherland or Death," today it is "Socialism or Death." These two calls are separated by years of hard trials, accomplishments, and self-assertion.

Cubans are giving the society they have created its due. In assessing the stability of the situation in Cuba, we should obviously take into account Fidel Castro's words to the effect that Cuba is not among "the countries where socialism arrived in the wake of the victorious Red Army divisions." No one puts this newCuban idiom in question. The trouble with simplicistic statements is, however, that they are not always understandable and precise.

Finding one's own way to revolution is a great achievement, but the delusions many revolutionaries have in common are to be regretted.

While sharing our impressions as journalists, we have tried to assess the republic's words and deeds like loving and well-wishing friends should, without any hard feeling or prejudice, and we hope we have made ourselves perfectly clear.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Proceedings For 7 Mar Previewed

LD0703084890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Session will continue its work today. The deputies will examine various issues related to lawmaking and to the country's political, economic, and social life in the committees of the Supreme Soviet and the commissions of its chambers.

It is planned to hold sessions of the commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities on issues of the social and economic development of union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs; on consumer goods, trade, everyday communal and other services to the population; on issues of the development of culture, language, national and international traditions and preservation of the historical inheritance; and a session of the Committee on Science, People's Education, Culture, and Upbringing.

There will also be a joint session of the Committee on Issues of Defence and State Security and also of the Committee on Issues of Ecology and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources.

Discuss Defense Industry Conversion

LD0703120190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet... Over to the All-Union Radio correspondent's office in the Kremlin. Aleksandr Ruvinskiy is at the microphone:

[Ruvinskiy] As our listeners evidently know, today the committees and commissions are working at the Supreme Soviet. The state program for conversion is being examined at the sitting of the Committee for Defense and State Security. Many deputies who are not members of the committee are also taking part in the debate. Comrade Smyslov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, made a report, in which he analyzed the current state of conversion in the defense industry and examined the prospects for conversion up to 1995. The end goal—or rather one of the goals—is to achieve by 1995 a reduction of one-third in the proportionate share of expenditures on defense in the national income.

Conversion not only embraces the defense field, but also involves a considerable number of civilian enterprises which work for defense. Dozens of plants are switching to exclusive production of civilian output. Forty billion rubles will be needed additionally in the immediate future, according to the estimates of experts, to achieve these tasks. This is money for the technical re-equipment of production processes and for the creation of new capacities. Well, it is also necessary to train a large number of workers for new professions. They will retain for time the level of wages which they have attained to date. Other measures for social protection are also envisaged.

Ten priority civilian profiles for the defense industry have been determined. Here are some of them: the production of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and of equipment for light industry and the food industry and trade; and the production of computer technology, communications systems, medical equipment, and civil aircraft, and shipbuilding and much else. The Ministry of Atomic Power has a large amount of work to do in the autonomous towns, which come under it, to create a civilian infrastructure there.

Unfortunately, the main speaker was unable to give exhaustive replies to the deputies' questions on this matter, and there were many questions. The issue of nuclear tess at Semipalatinsk will also be examined today at the sitting of the committee. That sitting will take place jointly with the Committee for Ecology.

Supreme Soviet Session Activities 6 Mar Reviewed

LD0603174690 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 6 Mar 90

[BY TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The Soviet parliament adopted a bill on property in the USSR today. The bill aims at establishing a multistructure planned market economy.

Formalising various forms of property and equal conditions for their development, the law creates conditions to end the state's monopoly in the economy. The law will enter into force on July 1, 1990.

Later in the day the Supreme Soviet also decided to divide the parliamentary committee on legislation, legality and law and order into two independent committees.

One, headed by Yuriy Kalmykov of Saratov, will be busy with drafting all kinds of legislative acts, and the other will concentrate on ensuring law and order and on combatting crime. It is headed by lawyer Yuriy Golik of Kemerovo.

After a joint sitting of the chambers, two Supreme Soviet committees—on international affairs and defence and state security—met today for a hearing on progress at the Vienna talks on cutting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe and the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

Legislators will work in committees and commissions on Wednesday.

There will then be a long interval in the Supreme Soviet's work for the celebrations of International Women's Day (March 8-10). The special Congress of People's Deputies will begin deliberations on March 12.

It will consider the establishment of an executive presidency in the USSR and make several amendments to the Soviet Constitution.

After the congress, the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will resume its work until the end of April.

Moscow TV Carries 6 March Supreme Soviet Session

Ownership Law Discussed in Sections

LD0603181590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 6 March begins carrying a recording of the joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 6 March in the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is chaired by A.I. Lukyanov.

At 1601 GMT Lukyanov greets the deputies and asks them to register. The electronic display shows 370 registered; Lukyanov says that there is a quorum and declares the joint sitting of the two chambers open. He refers to documents in the hands of the deputies and suggests discussion of the Law on Ownership by articles. First: The committee suggests the law should be called the Law on Ownership in the USSR. But there are other views, and Lukyanov invites contributions to the debate.

At 1605 GMT Deputy Burlatskiy takes the floor. The law under discussion represents a great step forward—but it won't ensure our successful advance. We must leave the way open for individual republics to act in their own way.

At 1607 GMT Deputy Sobchak takes the floor and says that in all countries issues of ownership are resolved within a civil code. Union republics should be given the opportunity to devise the mechanism by which the code is to be implemented. Why are we today adopting a law on ownership instead of foundations for legislation in the field of ownership? We are putting down the first stone. Imagine that we agree with Burlatskiy and decide to call it the foundations for legislation: The result will be confusion—there won't be any logic. It's our duty to adopt the law.

At 1612 GMT Deputy Golik takes the floor and disagrees with Burlatskiy. Let's not tie the hands of the republican legislators—let it be up to them to pass the laws they want and pass this law now.

At 1614 GMT Lukyanov sums up the debate: No one wants to tie the hands of the republics. We have to trust the comrades who drew up the bill and gave it this title. He puts the matter of the title of the bill to the vote. The deputies are again asked to register; 378 deputies register this time.

At 1616 GMT the voting shown on the display is 317 in favor of the original title of the bill; 37 against that title; and 16 abstentions. The original title is accepted.

At 1617 GMT Lukyanov introduces discussion of the first section of the draft bill. He hopes that everyone has received the draft amendments in written form. He says that there is a proposal from the Council of Ministers that a preamble be added to this section and he asks Comrade Abalkin to outline it.

At 1619 GMT Abalkin takes the floor. The intention is that the preamble should reflect three essential points: The socialist character of the political system of our state; the fact that the use of any of the forms of ownership should exclude exploitation of one person by another and the alienation of the working people from the forces of production; and we have to state clearly that the state guarantees the inviolability of all forms of ownership. This is why the government would like to include a preamble along these lines or an article worded along these lines.

At 1623 GMT Lukyanov invites Konstantin Dmitriyevich [surname not given] to take the floor.

This deputy speaks on the need for the legal provision to be purely legal provisions and not tainted by thoughts of ideology: Let's therefore reject the proposed preamble and stick to purely juridical considerations.

At 1625 GMT Lukyanov agrees generally with this thought. He puts it to the vote: That the proposed preamble of the USSR Council of Ministers should be included in the law.

At 1628 GMT 212 deputies vote in favor; 127 vote against; 31 abstain. The preamble is not accepted by the two houses. [voting figures and declared result as heard] Lukyanov goes over to the first section of the bill. He puts the first section to the vote in the form in which it was proposed by the committee; 352 vote in favor, three vote against and 14 abstain.

At 1632 GMT an unidentified deputy takes the floor; he talks about municipal property.

Deputies Discuss Amendments

LD0603181890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 6 March at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1634 GMT Lukyanov quotes Article 19 to this unidentified speaker and suggests that that deals with his point.

At 1635 GMT Lukyanov invites Kalmykov to take the floor. Kalmykov explains that municipal property is a lower level of state property.

At 1636 GMT Lukyanov puts to the vote the issue of adding the words: Municipal property. But before doing so he gives the floor to an unnamed deputy who says that many deputies do not clearly understand the differences of principle upon which they are voting. They have no

conception of local self-government. Municipal property should be included as a separate category from that of state property.

At 1639 GMT Lukyanov says it's wrong to say that deputies don't understand what they're voting on. He puts to the vote the amendment on local self-government which has been suggested by the committees which drew up the draft bill: 157 deputies votes in favor; 174 vote against; and 34 abstain in both houses. Both houses turn down the amendment.

At 1642 GMT Lukyanov goes over to an amendment and gives the floor to Kalmykov. Kalmykov sets out his personal point of view in support of an amendment suggested by a group of deputies.

At 1644 GMT Deputy Khadzhiyev speaks against the adoption of the amendment.

At 1646 GMT the amendment is voted out: 134 in favor; 199 against; 32 abstentions.

At 1647 GMT Deputy Gritsenko takes the floor and says that the interests of the working man has to be defended as well as those of the owner of property. The first section must contain a norm governing the exclusion of exploitation, the deputy says, and the nonalienation of the working man from the means of production.

At 1648 GMT Lukyanov reads out a proposed addition to Section 1 which would cover the point—and puts the matter to the vote.

At 1650 GMT they vote: 251 in favor; 53 against; and 33 abstentions—this is the vote on whether or not to have by name on the incorporation of additional wording in Section 1 which would exclude the exploitation and alienation of the working man from the means of production.

At 1652 GMT the vote is held: 301 vote in favor; 37 vote against; and 30 abstain. The amendment is accepted by the chambers.

At 1653 GMT Deputy Khadzhiyev takes the floor to protest against the way in which the voting has been carried out.

An unidentified woman deputy takes the floor and asks for a definition of the terms exploitation and alienation of the working man from the means of production.

At 1654 GMT Lukyanov asks Gritsenko to spell out what he means by exploitation.

Gritsenko gives a brief explanation of what he means by exploitation.

At 1655 GMT Deputy Tsplayev takes the floor and says that acceptance of this amendment means that all the country's savings banks will have to be closed.

At 1656 GMT another deputy—Bocharov—says that the state is a prime exploiter.

At 1657 GMT Lukyanov says that there will soon be a break—let all those interested gather and discuss matters further in the interval.

Another unidentified deputy rises to make a procedural proposal.

Lukyanov goes on to the second section—citizens' property. He puts the whole section to the vote prior to discussion of amendments. The property of citizens of the USSR. Who is in favor of adopting this section in the form proposed by the commissions and committees?

At 1659 GMT 354 deputies vote in favor; zero vote against; and 13 abstain. Both chambers have confirmed the second section.

At 1700 GMT Lukyanov announces a short break. Moscow television carries a children's program in this interval.

Votes Taken on Amendments

LD0603194290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 6 March at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1715 GMT the relay resumes. Deputy Doga suggests a different wording on a point about creative and professional abilities and a person's right to dispose of them as he sees fit.

At 1718 GMT Kalmykov comments on this proposal and explains why it has been rejected so far.

At 1719 GMT Doga explains why it is necessary. The creative intelligentsia has insisted that intellectual property be protected.

At 1720 GMT Burlatskiy says this concerns not just the creative elite but also the 20 percent of workers who are inventors: The creative work of inventors and rationalizers must be protected.

At 1721 GMT Khadzhiyev comments briefly.

At 1722 GMT Sobchak says that current legislation provides legalized robbery of authors etc.

At 1724 GMT Deputy Ivashko says that the idea of intellectual capacities could be put more simply as capacity to work.

At 1725 GMT Lukyanov suggests putting the amendment to the vote.

At 1726 GMT an unnamed deputy comments briefly.

At 1727 GMT another unnamed deputy says that intellectual property should be defined by different legislation. This law could include the concept briefly.

At 1728 GMT Lukyanov asks Kalmykov to work up the amendment during the next interval.

At 1729 GMT Deputy Sazonov suggests an amendment on a different point; pointing out a possible contradiction with union republican legislation.

At 1730 GMT Kalmykov explains why this suggestion has been rejected in committee.

At 1731 GMT Lukyanov puts Sazonov's amendment to the vote: 89 for; 232 against; 28 abstain. It is rejected.

At 1732 GMT Deputy Tsplayev raises the issue of labor incomes. He quotes Marx on the definition of this. The law should define it clearly. He says it should be just "incomes," or possibly "legal incomes."

At 1734 GMT Boykov explains the official position on the wording.

At 1736 GMT Lukyanov puts to the vote the proposal to exclude the word "labor": 81 for, 249 against; 25 abstain.

At 1737 GMT a deputy asks if interest on bank accounts is labor income.

At 1738 GMT Deputy Doga proposes another amendment on property resulting from intellectual activity.

At 1740 GMT Kalmykov says there must be different legislation on this matter.

Lukyanov says that laws last a long time and should be prepared carefully.

At 1741 GMT Deputy Andreyeva says that property is not just income.

At 1742 GMT Doga says that he disagrees with the committee on a matter of principle and that it should be put to the vote.

At 1743 GMT a deputy speaks in support of Sazonov's suggestion as it applies to irrigation in Central Asia. Lukyanov says it has already been voted on.

At 1744 GMT Lukyanov goes on to collective property—Section 3. The committee has already included an amendment proposed yesterday. He puts the section to the vote: 351 for; zero against; 10 abstain. It is approved.

At 1746 GMT Deputy Tsybukh says that his proposal has been included but not in full; he would like securities to be included. Kalmykov says that the committee discussed it all very carefully. Not everything can be listed.

At 1748 GMT Tsybukh clarifies his point.

At 1749 GMT Deputy Engver supports the amendment.

At 1750 GMT Lukyanov puts the proposal to the vote: 300 for; 25 against; 26 abstain.

At 1752 GMT Deputy Grib proposes an amendment which would exclude the "shadow economy" from holding shares.

At 1753 GMT Deputy Kim suggests an alternative formula which would liberalize the concept of those able to hold shares if they are legally entitled to.

At 1755 GMT Deputy Boldyrev says that citizens will not be able to hold shares under this formulation. The shadow economy should be combatted by other means.

At 1757 GMT Lukyanov puts the amendment to the vote: 226 for; 111 against; 19 abstain. It does not receive the required majority in both chambers.

At 1758 GMT Burlatskiy talks about intellectual property and ownership of scientific and cultural works.

At 1801 GMT Kalmykov suggests that such proposals should be submitted in advance, rather than at the session. He is tired of constantly being called to explain the committee's view.

Afternoon Session Begins

LD0603195990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 6 March at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1803 GMT Deputy Bisers expresses views on implications for charitable organizations.

At 1804 GMT Lukyanov explains technicalities differentiating public formations and public organizations, and charitable funds, referring specifically to the peace fund.

At 1805 GMT unidentified deputies voice opinions on this point. One supports Doga's view of intellectual ownership, while criticizing Bisers' stance.

At 1809 GMT Deputy Savitskaya proposes a form of words covering public organizations and public funds.

At 1810 GMT Deputy Yablokov expresses his opinion of the matter.

Lukyanov then annoucnes a 30-minute interval.

At 1811 GMT the afternoon session opens, with Lukyanov still in the chair, assisted by Nishanov. The composition of a committee for the fight against crime is to be decided. Lukyanov invites deputies to register. There are 372 deputies present. Deputies are invited to vote on the composition of the committee: 343 for; zero against; 1 abstention. The committee is approved, with Golik as its chairman.

At 1816 GMT the floor is offered to Kalmykov, who explains what was sorted out in the interval. Agreement was reached on intellectual ownership, and that laws on rights of authors and inventors will soon be submitted. On the alienation and exploitation issue, the committee

did not reach a common conclusion. As for Article 17, its title was agreed as "Ownership of Public Organizations and Funds."

At 1819 GMT Boldyrev comments on Kalmykov's remarks on alienation and exploitation. He urges a revote on this issue. Another, unidentified, deputy expresses a view on the ownership of intellectual labor and rejects the call for a revote.

At 1823 GMT another deputy wants the vote rerun. Other deputies express views on the issue. Lukyanov asks for a vote on whether to have another vote on this matter, with the result: 68 for; 234 against; 18 abstentions.

At 1825 GMT Lukyanov goes on to vote on the new wording of Article 17, first inviting Savitskaya to explain her view of the matter. She exchanges views with another deputy. Lukyanov urges them to calm down. Deputy Semukha raises the case of the Red Cross and its status.

At 1830 GMT Lukyanov sums up the committee's proposal; "public organizations, including public funds." Kalmykov reads out the wording: "Including charitable and other public funds." Lukyanov puts the proposal to a vote: 328 for; four against; 222 abstentions.

At 1832 GMT Lukyanov tries to pass on to Section 4, on state ownership, and succeeds, after an intervention. He calls for a vote on the section as a whole, to be followed by discussion of alternatives. The voting is: 340 for; two against; 16 abstentions. Lukyanov invites amendments on Article 20.

At 1835 GMT a deputy from Kazakhstan cites an article referring to ownership of land by the peoples living there. Sazonov objects that his view might be in order to Kazakhstan, but it would not work for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]; he refers specifically to the position of autonomous formations. Another deputy makes a proposal on dividing a particular paragraph into two. Another speaker explains how he will vote on certain provisions and why. Salykov considers rights over stretches of water spread over more than one republic. Other deputies voice opinions on the article.

At 1848 GMT Deputy Khadzhiyev says that problems are arising because the issues of the federation have not been resolved yet. The position of the Autonomous Republics in this law needs to be clarified.

At 1852 GMT Deputy Kugultinov says that the law should be adopted as it stands.

At 1854 GMT Deputy (Zhuravlev) points out how important the law is.

At 1855 GMT a deputy from Kazakhstan says that new laws should be adopted before the new Constitution is adopted.

At 1857 GMT a deputy from Turkmenia says that the position in the lower reaches of the Syr-Darya Amu-Darya has been very complicated in recent years and proposes an amendment on distribution of water between republics and nationalities. This has led to conflict in the past and may do so again.

At 1859 GMT a deputy calls for the original wording to be adopted as the suggested changes are to the detriment of Autonomous Republics. The opinion of the people should be studied.

Votes, Discussions Continue

LD0603204890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 6 March at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1901 GMT Lukyanov says the committee should recommend one of the two proposed versions or else try to combine them. They should confer during the next interval.

At 1902 GMT Kalmykov says that the problem can be resolved. The points should be voted on individually together with the proposed amendments. He suggests compromise version of some amendments. Others can be discussed in the interval. He invites all interested parties to assemble in the interval.

At 1906 GMT Lukyanov suggests putting to the vote the compromise version of one point—bringing in USSR participation on water distribution.

At 1908 GMT a deputy insists on his wording on distribution of water resources among republics. Kalmykov says that the deputy's point is already covered.

At 1909 GMT Lukyanov puts one point to the vote: 323 for; 11 against; 20 abstain. It is adopted. Lukyanov insists that there is a quorum despite objections from the floor.

At 1912 GMT Deputy Boldyrev proposes an amendment to Article 19, clearly defining state and communal property. Deputy Prokushev says that no "owner" is mentioned under the "state property" concept. His amendment would make the local soviets the owner.

At 1916 GMT Deputy Boyko replies on behalf of the committee. The people are the owner of state property and they act through the soviets.

At 1919 GMT Lukyanov puts to the vote the wording suggested by the committee: 314 for; 11 against; 18 abstain. It is adopted. Lukyanov asks Boldyrev if he now wants his amendment put to the vote. He does.

At 1921 GMT a deputy comments on Boldyrev's wording. Boldyrev clarifies his position. Lukyanov says that there really is no problem here.

At 1924 GMT Sobchak speaks indistinctly from the body of the hall.

At 1924 GMT Boldyrev says that although he knows the majority will vote against, he insists on a vote, on principle.

At 1925 GMT Lukyanov puts Boldyrev's proposal to the vote: 67 for; 234 against; 41 abstain.

At 1926 GMT Lukyanov puts an alternative wording to the vote: 298 for; 19 against; 19 abstain.

At 1927 GMT a deputy says it must be clearly defined who is the owner of state property.

At 1930 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote on Prokushev's proposal on defining the owner of state property: 76 for, 229 against, 37 abstentions.

At 1932 GMT Ubaydullayeva calls for a vote on the provision that land belongs to the people living on the given territory. Lukyanov takes a vote on her proposal: 93 for, 211 against, 29 abstentions. He goes on to discuss puties to remember that the law ought to be ready in time for next week's congress.

At 1936 GMT Lukyanov suggests an hour's interval, but voices from the hall urge a continuous sitting. Deputy Blayev calls for a vote now, after a 15-minute interval, on the whole law, with the right of subsequent amendment to individual articles. Lukyanov takes a vote on this proposal: 246 are in favor, no other figures are shown.

At 1939 gmt Nishanov makes a few procedural announcements on the time and venue of committee meetings.

Deputies Vote on Profits Issue

LD0603213590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 6 March at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1941 GMT a screen caption indicates that a continuation of the afternoon session is now being shown. Registration is seen in progress: 375 deputies are present. Lyukyanov invites further comments on Section four, on state ownership, with specific reference to Article 21, on all-union ownership.

At 1943 GMT Deputy Yablokov calls for higher educational establishments to be included in a list of facilities comprising all-union property.

At 1946 GMT Lukyanov calls a vote on Article 21 as worded by the committee: 328 for; three against; 20 abstentions. Lyukyanov says that Article 22 is also covered by this and goes on to Article 25. He invites deputies to consider the form of words elaborated by the committee, concerning enterprises' profits.

At 1948 GMT Deputy Ivashko make a proposal on the wording of one part of the article. Deputy Stadnik considers the distribution of enterprises' profits and backs a proposal made by the industry committee yesterday.

At 1952 GMT Deputy Vologzhin observes that the law will put all forms of ownership on an equal footing. He makes a proposal on the relationship between profits and ownership.

At 1955 GMT Deputy Koryugin of the economic reform committee explains what taxes and profits are and asks deputies to consider the dividing line between state and enterprise ownership of those profits. He says that the article contains many contradictions in this area, and urges that profits should be recognized as the property of the labor collective.

At 2001 GMT another deputy agrees with Ivashko, but takes issue over the difference between "legislative acts" and "legislation." He also supports Vologzhin's views. Other speakers come to microphones in the hall to express opinions on the article. Another, unidentified, deputy, speaking for the committee, lambasts the command and administrative system in this area and describes the law as a first step away from it.

At 2010 GMT Abalkin comes to the floor to express the government's view. He outlines provisions governing the rights of enterprises over their profits and facilities. The law gives the collective full control over the profits that remain after tax bills have been met. The amendment agreed to yesterday by the commission reflects such realities and should be passed.

At 2015 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote on the proposed amendment, but an unidentified deputy comes to the floor first to express opinions on Abalkin's remarks, concerning enterprises' rights over their profits.

At 2019 GMT Lukyanov reminds deputies of the importance of the matter under discussion and calls Deputy Blayev to the floor. Blayev, who belongs to the industry commission, urges support for the view that state enterprises remain state enterprises, but with the collectives obtaining the right to 49 percent ownership of them.

At 2024 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote on the amendment which provides for profits to become the property of the collective at the given enterprise, as outlined by Abalkin: 308 for; 34 against; 15 abstentions. The amendment is adopted.

At 2026 GMT Koryugin proposes a supplementary amendment to the wording of the article, to which Kalmykov objects.

At 2027 GMT Lukyanov moves on to the next section of the law, Section 5, covering the ownership of joint enterprises with foreign citizens, organizations and states. He calls for a vote on that section: 345 for; three against; 10 abstentions.

Ownership Law Approved

LD0603214790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 6 March at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 2028 GMT Lukyanov goes on to Section 6, guarantees and protection for the right of ownership, and puts it to the vote: 348 for; one against; seven abstentions.

At 2030 GMT Kalmykov is called to the floor to comment on an alternative proposal which has been made on Article 20. He reads out the proposal, concerning facilities which are considered all-union property by agreement with the union or autonomous republic on whose territory it is situated. The proposal is put to the vote: 333 for; eight against. The proposal is adopted.

At 2035 GMT several deputies make alternative proposals of their own on this point, with comments from Kalmykov on them.

At 2038 GMT Lukyanov suggests putting the whole law, with amendments, to the vote, but a deputy makes a point of his own on the law first.

At 2040 GMT Lukyanov succeeds in securing a vote on the whole law: 350 for; three against; 11 abstentions. The law is adopted. There is applause in the hall.

At 2041 GMT Lukyanov announces that a Supreme Soviet decision on procedure for putting the law into practice has to be adopted. An unidentified deputy comes to the floor, returning to the issue of the ownership of intellectual labor and making several proposals relating to that matter.

At 2042 GMT Kalmykov and another unnamed deputy make points from the floor about intellectual property, the former saying that a start has to be made somewhere, given the enormous amount of work involved. Lukyanov urges that amendments are passed to the committee.

At 2052 GMT Lukyanov asks deputies to welcome a delegation from the French parliament. The deputies applaud.

At 2055 GMT Lukyanov says that he is putting the draft decision with the corrections passed to the vote. The decision is adopted by a simple majority. At this point reception of moscow television deteriorates to worthless for approximately six minutes.

At 2102 GMT a number of deputies complain about colleagues who fail to appear for work in committees and ask for the names of such transgressors to be published so that voters know what their deputies have been doing, or not doing.

At 2106 GMT Lukyanov says that on behalf of all the male delegates, he wishes women deputies all the best for 8 March—Women's Day. Male deputies stand and applaud. Lukyanov says he looks forward to seeing everybody at the Congress of People's Deputies.

New Law on Ownership Viewed

LD0603154790 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 6 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The Soviet parliament today adopted a law on ownership in the USSR, the main plank of future economic reforms in the Soviet Union.

The law recognises the diversity of the forms of ownership and creates conditions for their equal development, thus dismantling the monopoly on state property.

The parliament voted 350 to 3 in favour of the law on ownership with 11 abstentions.

The law, which enters into force on July 1, 1990, says that ownership in the USSR exists in the form of citizens' property, public (collective) and state property.

The law does not contain the notion of private property, but allows citizens to own some means of production in order to conduct individual economic activity. Simultaneously, it extends to the republics the right to establish kinds of property, the acquisition of which by individuals is not allowed or limited.

The question of whom the land and natural resources belong to—the union of the Soviet Socialist Republics or union and autonomous republics—sparked off heated debates during the lengthy discussion of the bill.

The law, which was adopted today, defines that this wealth is the inalienable asset of the peoples living on the given territory. Soviet republics and autonomous entities "own, use and dispose of them" in their own interests and in the interests of the union.

The union owns and uses land and other resources, which are extended to it by republics under agreements and are used for defence needs and for implementing other national programmes in the field of power-engineering, transport, communications, etc.

Although this legal act was thoroughly prepared (the bill passed two parliamentary readings, with the second reading taking into account the bill's nationwide discussion) over a lengthy period of time starting from last autumn, today's voting on the bill likewise triggered debates.

For instance, some deputies proposed to cancel the preamble to the law, describing it as excessively ideological. Following heated debates, legislators decided to annul the preamble but to include in the text of the law the provision that the use of any form of ownership should rule out a worker's alienation from the means of production and exploitation of man by man.

As the law adopted today calls for making amendments to the USSR Constitution, the parliament sent its proposals to the forthcoming Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Land Legislation Fundamentals Published

LD0603161490 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The fundamentals of federal and republican legislation on land, approved by the Soviet parliament on February 28, were published today. The text will provide the basis for the union republics to work out their own law on land, taking into account local specifics.

The fundamentals of legislation on land will come into force on March 15. It is one of the basic documents of Soviet reconomic reform. Land is proclaimed to be the property of peoples residing on the given territory. The local authorities are empowered to dispose of the land at their discretion, overruling the former central departments' jurisdiction.

The fundamentals envisage the possibility of the transfer of plots of land to individual life-long inheritable possession, thus giving the individual peasant freedom to choose between work on a collective farm and the management of his own farm.

This spells out the actual right to possess land, with one restriction—it cannot be sold, mortgaged or given away as a gift.

Nevertheless, it is widely supposed that the new law will not prompt the demise of collective and state farms in most republics. Collective farm work has developed strong traditions and the country has many viable and prosperous collective farms. The new legislation envisages the transfer of land into "perpetual possession" by collective and state farms, while previously they enjoyed the narrower rights of land users. The new provision creates additional conditions for the growth of profit.

The enactment of new legislation on land enables peasants to benefit from new opportunities already this year.

Supreme Soviet Debates Draft Law on Ownership

LD0603102590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] The third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is continuing its work. We are switching to the all-union radio correspondent at the Kremlin. The journalist Marina Novitskaya. We are listening to you, Marina.

[Novitskaya] Perhaps the most difficult thing is to recount a discussion when voting paragraph by paragraph of a draft law is going on, and it is in fact paragraph-by-paragraph voting on the draft law on ownership which is on the agenda of a joint sitting of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet. I will remind you that this law is not only a fundamental law of economic reform, it also is of a constitutional nature, and its adoption will involve amendments to our Constitution.

This is why the government—it was represented today by Academician Abalkin—has insisted on the inclusion of a preamble in the text of the law. This is what it says:

The USSR economic system is based on socialist ownership in the form of various types of ownership by Soviet citizens and public ownership—collective and state. The use of any type of ownership must exclude the alienation of the worker from the means of production and exploitation of one person by another. However, the legal experts—Deputy Lyubenchenko spoke in their name—objected to this text.

According to the majority, the law must consist of legal formulas regulating legal relations. The deputies agreed with the legal experts. This was demonstrated by the results of the voting. However, the fate of the clauses formulated in the preamble was not fully decided by this. After the adoption of the first section of the draft law, Nikolay Nikolayevich Gritsenko unexpectedly proposed reincorporating a part of the formula concerning the exploitation of labor in the text of the law. There was a vote by name, the amendment was adopted, and new arguments arose. What is actually the exploitation of one person by another? What is alienation of a worker from the means of production? After all, it is well known that it is precisely under the predominance of state ownership that the alienation of the worker from the means of production is particularly seriously felt by the economy.

This is what has been decided: The committee will deal with these questions during the break—it has just been announced. What other points of discussion were there? Well, for instance, the Committee for the Work of Soviets [of people's deputies, development of government and self-government] insisted on emphasizing the concept of communal ownership—abroad it is still called municipal—which is included in the current text of the draft law in the concept of state ownership. The arguments of representatives of the committee seemed convincing to me. You see, according to the conception of the future law on local economic operation and local self-government—this law will be adopted in the near future—the organs of the soviet will become primarily organs of self-government, and, consequently, the property belonging to them is a far from idle issue.

Well, nonetheless, the deputies did not support this proposal. In a word, things are moving slowly. So far only three sections have been adopted. But I do not think that we can rebuke the deputies here. After all, the law is being taken very seriously. It is essentially revolutionary, concerning the introduction of multiple structures in our economy and the recognition of the equal rights of various types of ownership and healthy competition in the future. So, this is good causticity. The causticity of deputies is justified here and dictated by a sense of

responsibility. After the break, discussion will continue and I will close my report from the USSR Supreme Soviet here.

Supreme Soviet Begins Voting on Property Bill

LD0603125190 Moscow TASS in English 1240 GMT 6 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The USSR Supreme Soviet began the voting on the property bill this morning at a joint session of both chambers. The parliament, its committees and commissions worked for six months on the principal legal act of the Soviet economic reform, and now this work is coming to a close. The purpose of the bill is to overcome the state monopoly in the economic sphere and to create an economy combining various types of property and operating both on the planned and market basis.

From the very beginning of the work on the bill the discussion focused on private property. Many deputies believe that the direct legalisation of private property is the only thing that could help overcome the crisis in the economy. Their opponents said that private property would undermine the principles of socialism, lead to massive unemployment and the deterioration of people's living standards and would be used to their advantage by black-market dealers seeking to launder their money.

This confrontation was evident during the nationwide discussion of the draft bill and during the discussion of its second reading in parliament. The final discussion on Monday revealed that not so many deputies accept the idea of private property without reservations.

It is, perhaps, for this reason that some legislators called for a debate on the issue without ideological overtones. Aleksander Zhuravlyov, a professor from Minsk, believes that private property should be regulated with the help of taxes and not driven underground, as had been done before.

Leonid Sukhov, a driver from Minsk and an opponent of this idea, made an eloquent speech at Monday's sitting. He said that working people opposed the legislation of private property and favoured the giving of full economic independence to industrial enterprises. Sukhov proposed a referendum to confirm the negative attitude of most Soviet people to private property.

The final wording of the bill on which voting is now going on does not mention private property. However, it permits individual property of some means of production for individual economic activities.

Supreme Soviet Adopts Ownership Law

LD0603131890 Moscow TASS in English 1302 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent: The USSR Supreme Soviet (Parliament) today adopted an ownership law—the pivot of the economic reform.

Supreme Soviet Decides To Form Crime Committee

LD0603115490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Summary] A decision of the Supreme Soviet to form a committee on the issues of law and order and the battle against crime annulling the Provisional Committee for Fighting Crime in the Country was adopted today. Yuriy Vladimirovich Golik, a lawyer from Kemerovo, was elected its chairman.

The Committee for Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order has been renamed as the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation.

Commissions, Committees Discuss Presidency

PM0703092590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report under the rubric "USSR Supreme Soviet: In Committees and Commissions" based on TASS correspondents' reports: "Presidency Issue Under Discussion"]

[Text] The draft USSR Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR and Making the Relevant Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution was carefully discussed by people's deputies at 2 March sessions of committees and commissions.

At the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations the most heated debate was about the president's role in the life of the federation. Will it not restrict the already limited rights of republics and other national-state formations? There were arguments about the creation of a Federative Council under the president and the role of the republic's top officials in this Council's work. The commission members reached the conclusion that the relationship between the president and the USSR Supreme Soviet is not adequately delineated in the draft law.

"The purpose behind the establishment of the post of USSR President is to combine the legislative and executive structures of power," commission chairman G.S. Tarazevich believes. "Life shows that their views have rarely coincided. It is no secret that our executive organs are hesitant in their actions and for a number of reasons they are unable to implement USSR laws. These questions must be taken in hand by a specific individual—the USSR president."

The commission members also discussed the draft USSR Law on the Procedure for Resolving Issues Connected With a Union Republic's Secession from the USSR.

At the Youth Affairs Committee the tone of the debate was businesslike and constructive. The deputies tried to imagine the effect of the law in specific practical situations that might arise. B.M.Lazarev, deputy chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, who was invited to the session, provided assistance.

For instance, it was suggested that when he takes the oath the president will have to relinquish all other state and public posts. Boris Mikhaylovich provided the information that there is no provision for this in the laws of any country in the world, that the leader of one of the parties normally becomes president. He also explained that, for example, in France there is a tradition whereby a party leader, once elected president, does not attend his party's meetings.

Perhaps the common opinion was expressed by one of the contributors to the debate, who called for the draft law to be examined in conjunction with the country's other laws. Moreover, the deputies defined it as a document that has determined certain future laws.

A package of proposals and amendments was elaborated at the session and submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"But we do not consider the discussion of this topic finished," committee deputy chairman V.M. Manin said. "We want to return to this document on the eve of the congress. Then we will have the final version and it will be clear which of our amendments has gotten into it."

The atmosphere of the session at the Commission for Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, and Protection of the Historical Heritage was characterized by rare unanimity. All the commission members unequivocally supported the introduction of the presidency.

There were various arguments, but each was convincing in its way. The critical, explosive situation that exists in the country demands an intensification of executive power, deputy Yu.B. Solovyev said. World experience shows that no better model than the presidency has been found, when it comes to leadership of the state, said commission chairman deputy Ch.T. Aytmatov, joining the discussion. For such a vast collection of peoples as our country, it is the most sensible and rational path.

The first thing the president must do is present an absolutely clear and well reasoned prospectus to the entire Soviet people, deputy V.I. Stelmashonok developed the principal idea of the debate. Of course, the president cannot be alone. That is clear. He must have with him a group of capable, knowledgeable, thinking people. What the commission members insisted on was that the presidential council must include a cultural figure, one of the best representatives of the creative intelligentsia.

Presidential power must not encroach on the sovereignty of union and autonomous entities, deputy D.N. Kugultinov stressed. The USSR Supreme Soviet must have the right to convene a Congress of People's Deputies if there is disagreeemnt with the president on fundamental issues.

An opinion was also expressed on an age qualification for the president—it should not really be limited to the 30-65 age range. But it is necessary to clarify the mechanism for nominating candidates for the post of USSR president in view of the potential prospect of a multiparty system, the commission members believe.

Political & Social

CPSU Proposals for Lenin's Birth Jubilee Noted

PM0703001990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "In Connection With the 120th Anniversary of the Birth of V.I. Lenin"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has approved the proposals of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission in connection with the 120th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin, which falls on 22 April 1990.

Even today Lenin's life and work is an example of service to a great cause and of an innovative approach to the solution of complex social problems. In every nation throughout history there have been figures of this caliber who have enjoyed merited recognition and respect. Lenin's name is associated above all with the Great October Socialist Revolution—an event which exerted a decisive influence on the destiny of the country and the world.

Lenin was neither a social prophet nor a dreamer. His strength lay in the ability to recognize the needs of the working class and of all the working people and to express them in the strategy and tactics of the party. To Lenin, a consistent Marxist dialectician, both the stagnant prejudices of the dogmatists and the strident slogans of the pseuderevolutionaries were equally alien. As a genuine innovator in science and a scientist in politics, he demonstrated in practice how it is possible and necessary, without deviating from socialist principles, to find approaches to their implementation in a complex and contradictory reality.

V.I. Lenin had the courage to admit that the first attempts of the period of "war communism" to instantly establish socialism by means of a transition to direct product exchange were a mistake. Brushing aside all

manner of predictions about the collapse of the "Bolshevik experiment," and rejecting ultrarevolutionary slogans and outwardly effective but rectilinear and simplistic solutions, Lenin conducted a creative quest for new ideas about socialism and elaborated the fundamental provisions of the proletarian state's realistic policy.

Drawing on the experience of the first social transformations, Lenin reached the conclusion that the new social system could not be built on extraeconomic coercion, disregard for the diversity of social and national interests, prohibitions, and regimented leveling. He came to understand the need for material incentives, and the economic mechanisms of commodity production and commodity turnover connected with them, and for the utilization of the potential of the various socioeconomic structures for the development of society's productive forces. In the light of this, the New Economic Policy was proclaimed with a view to building the material foundation of socialism. It was this policy which made it possible to break out of the vicious circle of highly acute problems and contradictions which it seemed the revolution would not be able to overcome.

V.I. Lenin formulated the thesis of socialism as the "system of civilized cooperators," closely linking the idea of a cultural revolution with the cooperative organization of small producers and the transformation of all the conditions of life. The passage of time has highlighted the correctness of the Leninist nationalities policy and of the idea of the Soviet federation. Pointing out the danger of the bureaucratic distortion of the essence of Soviet power, Lenin sought the firm establishment in sociopolitical life of the principles of democracy, civic responsibility, discipline, and strict rule of law. He did not conceive of socialism without the utilization of everything progressive in mankind's historical experience.

In his search for a way out of the intricate situations presented by life Lenin boldly discarded obsolete postulates, demonstrating in practice that a "Marxist must take account of life such as it is, of the exact facts of reality, rather than clinging to yesterday's theory which, just like any theory, at best only outlines the main, general features and conveys only an approximate picture of the complexity of life." (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 31, p 134). Hence both the unexpected change of tactics which frequently stunned his comrades, and the at times sharp criticism leveled at their obsolete positions.

As is known, the success of the revolution in Russia was directly linked by the leadership of the Bolshevik party with the prospects of a world socialist revolution. However, the actual course of events did not bear out these expectations. And, contrary to those who began to forecast inevitable defeat for Soviet Russia, Lenin was the first in the Bolshevik party to embark on the elaboration of a new strategy based on an objective and comprehensive analysis of the changed external and internal conditions in which the young Soviet republic found itself.

Lenin did not bequeath us an extensive program of socialist transformations. However, even what he managed to generalize leaves no room for any doubt that he recognized the diversity of the paths leading to socialism, stemming from the specific natural and historical characteristics of various countries and the peoples' traditions. The radical change of the view of socialism meant that the socialist system does not represent an absolute negation of the old but of necessity must incorporate the highest achievements of civilization.

However, many of the innovative ideas of the founder of the Soviet state were not destined to be translated into practice. His fears connected with the possible bureaucratic distortion of the essence of the new power were confirmed. The establishment of the Stalinist regime and of the administrative-edict system led to the forcible standardization of social life, the growing alienation of the people from politics, ownership, and power, and the tragic deformation of the party and the discrediting of socialism. The Stalinist notion of man as a "cog" in the party and state mechanism was instilled in society. The spirit of creativity, democracy and humanism, receptiveness to universal human values, and the perception of man as the highest aim rather than a means of progress were forcibly expunged from Lenin's legacy. The flower of the Bolshevik party was mercilessly destroyed and all strata of Soviet society were bled white. Stalinism meant not simply a break with Leninism but a monstrous distortion of the very idea of socialism in the consciousness of millions of people. The paradox of history lies in the fact that all this was wrought under the banner of "loyalty" to Lenin's ideas. As a result society was for many years fettered by rigid dogmas and prejudices which deprived it of internal dynamism and the potential for self-development and renewal.

One of the main conditions of the implementation of the radical transformations initiated in our country in the process of perestroyka has been the revival of realistic thinking, the liberation of social consciousness from the false notions and myths instilled over decades. Lenin's ideological and theoretical legacy and the methodology of Leninism served as the starting point for an all-embracing analysis of the fundamental problems of the past and the present and for gaining an understanding of the complexity and contradictoriness of socialist development and its motive forces.

Lenin made a major contribution to the development of the philosophical foundations of Marxism in the radically changed conditions of the 20th century; he comprehensively elaborated and skillfully applied the dialectic method not just in the sphere of political action but also in the analysis of the laws that propel society and nature. Lenin's idea of the alliance of philosphers and natural scientists as the unfading formula of the unity of the

natural, social, and technical sciences, the body of sciences to do with man, is topical to this day. An important task remains the restoration of the true spiritual image of Lenin as thinker, and the firm establishment of a truly scientific attitude toward his theoretical legacy which has been considerably distorted and simplified by numerous vulgarizers.

Today, two extremes with which it is impossible to agree are manifesting themselves in relation to Lenin's ideological-theoretical legacy. Those people who assert that we have nothing to learn from Lenin, that both he and his deeds have receded into the past, are profoundly mistaken. Naturally, there are things in Lenin's legacy which do belong to history; however, his key ideas, the very spirit of Leninism continue to live in our day too. Also unlawful is the aspiration to explain all the diversity and the contradictory processes of modern times merely by references to Lenin, by quotations from his works. Intellectual timidity verging on or directly developing into intellectual dependence was always alien to Lenin.

Lenin himself would have considered it absurd for the tenets voiced by him relating to a specific sociopolitical situation to be automatically transposed to contemporary life, like a truth of the highest instance. Neither theoreticians nor politicians are capable of predicting beforehand the course of events in all its detail, to calculate it down to the smallest trifles for decades ahead. To irresponsible prophecies Lenin counterposed scientific prognosis based on an analysis of the specific reality. He always gave preference to people's common sense over the chimerical constructions of ideology's preachers.

Since Lenin, changes have taken place in the world—in our country, too—which it was impossible to imagine at the start of the 20th century. These changes have not simply affected all spheres of social life but have also fundamentally transformed the face of the world. Capitalism has demonstrated unforeseen capabilities. The new system has become a reality, but, along with its advantages, it has also revealed the negative aspects of those forms in which it was created historically. The question of the coexistence of the social systems has acquired qualitatively new content. The global problems and dangers which have risen up before mankind have demanded a transition from confrontation to cooperation by peoples and states irrespective of their social system. Direct confrontation in the world arena is being overcome, the principles of mutual respect and sovereignty are asserting themselves, and the idea of the priority of general human values is gaining increasing recognition. The new political thinking is encountering growing understanding throughout the world.

In the face of these historical realities Lenin's views on the nature of the modern epoch, naturally, must not be canonized; they require creative development with consideration given to the total experience of social transformations on the planet and the new phenomena in the world of socialism. The new look of socialism which is outlining itself in the process of its qualitative renewal is a humane, democratic socialism. The socialist idea incorporates the moral demand for a respectful attitude toward the peoples' sovereignty and their way of life, their language, and their culture. It calls for social cooperation, good-neighborliness, and peace, and it resolutely rejects any forms of violence and lawlessness.

In freeing Lenin's legacy from dogmatic accretions, distortions, and falsifications the party sees in it one of the most important sources of its own ideological and political renewal, a scientific method and effective means of the cognition and transformation of objective reality.

Of course, turning today to Lenin's ideas is not a mere reversion to Lenin, it is movement forward together with Lenin. It is a question, on the one hand, of returning Lenin's ideas to the category of real ideas, for in the past they have to a considerable extent only been proclaimed. On the other hand there is an acute need for a profound analysis of the contemporary processes of the life of our society, for new theoretical assessments and conclusions, and for substantiated recommendations for the implementation of the perestroyka policy. Ultimately, the success of the cause will depend on the extent to which the current generation of Marxists is able to independently resolve the problems confronting them by relying on Lenin's legacy and everything progressive in world social thought, science, and culture.

The 120th anniversary of the birth of the great thinker and revolutionary Lenin is not an occasion for staging pompous measures. Lenin believed that jubilees must spur us to interpret the path traveled, to concentrate attention on the unresolved tasks. It is not loud phrases, assurances, and promises that the country expects from Communists, not the ritual vows to follow Leninist principles, but above all specific actions and practical results from the proclaimed policy. The fate of perestroyka depends to an enormous, if not decisive, degree on the activity of the CPSU—which means achieving a new look for socialism. On the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress the Lenin jubilee must stimulate the qualitative renewal of the party, the genuine perestroyka of the activity of all its links. In the rebirth and development of broad intraparty democracy the party sees the guarantee against conservatism and dogmatism.

In connection with the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth it is proposed mounting the appropriate political and organizational work in organic linkage with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and with the partywide and nationwide discussion of the party's draft political platform.

In theoretical work it is proposed to concentrate chief attention on the further elaboration of the ideology of renewal with consideration for Lenin's theoretical legacy, and on the creative interpretation of the historical experience of socialism and modern social practice. In ideological, mass political work among the working

people, young people in particular, it is proposed to make the elucidation of the ideas of humane, democratic socialism and of the tasks of revolutionary perestroyka the cornerstone of our efforts, and to conduct a broad constructive party dialogue with the various democratic social groups and movements.

It has been decided to hold a ceremonial meeting in Moscow at which M.S. Gorbachev will deliver the report.

The chief measures devoted to the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth have been designated.

Politburo Endorses Theses for Lenin's Birthday

LD0603210790 Moscow TASS in English 2041 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Politburo has endorsed the theses of the ideological commission of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth that falls due on April 22, 1990.

The document says that relying on the experience of first social transformations Lenin drew the conclusion that a new social system cannot be built on the basis of non-economic coercion, through ignoring multiformity of social and national interests, through bans and barrack-style levelling.

He came to realise the need for material interest and related economic mechanisms of commodity production and circulation and the need to draw on the potential of various socio-economic modes for the development of society's productive forces.

Lenin summed up socialism as a system of civilised cooperators and closely linked the idea of the cultural revolution with cooperation of small producers and with the change of all living conditions.

But many of innovatory ideas of the founder of the Soviet state were not destined to become reality. Lenin's fears that bureaucrats may distort the essence of new power proved justified.

The establishment of the Stalinist regime, of the administrative-edict system led to forcible unification of social life, to the increasing alienation of the people from policy, property and power, to the tragic deformation of the party and the discreditation of socialism. The cream of the Bolshevik Party was mercilessly destroyed, all sections of the Soviet society were bled white.

One of the main conditions for radical changes started in the Soviet Union with perestroyka is the revival of realistic thinking and ridding social conscience of false notions and myths that were implanted for decades.

There are two extremities in the attitude to Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage to which one cannot agree.

Mistaken are those who assert that they can learn nothing from Lenin, that Lenin and his undertakings are things of the past. Certainly, there are things in Lenin's heritage that already belong to history, but his fundamental ideas, the very spirit of Leninism are living.

It is also unjustifiable to strive to explain all the multiformity and contradictory processes of the present by references to Lenin and quotations from his works.

Changes that were impossible to imagine at the turn of the century have taken place in the world and also in our country since Lenin passed away. Coexistence of social systems acquired new contents.

Global problems and dangers encountered by humanity required the transition from confrontation to cooperation of nations and states regardless of their social system.

Outright confrontation in the world arena is being overcome. Principles of mutual respect and sovereignty are asserted. The idea of the primacy of universal human values is ever widely recognised. New political thinking meets with growing understanding in the world.

The new look of socialism shaping during its renewal is a humane and democratic socialism.

The socialist idea comprises a moral requirement of a respectful attitude to the sovereignty of peoples, their way of life, language and culture.

It calls for social cooperation, goodneighbourliness and peace and rejects any forms of violence and lawlessness.

In the run-up to the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party Lenin's birth anniversary should stimulate the party's renewal and real restructuring of the activity of all its links. The party regards the revival and development of broad intraparty democracy as a guarantee against conservatism and dogmatism, the document says.

Political Popularity Poll Results

90UN1026A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 8 24 Feb 90-2 Mar 90 p 8

[Untitled article by L. Byzov and G. Gurevich, candidates of economic sciences]

[Text] *Public opinion polls are conducted in virtually all Western countries to discover the popularity index of the most active political figures. Where aren't similar polls conducted in our country? S. Anisin, Lytkarino, Moscow Oblast* **Now many sociological services are bringing to light the rating (popularity index) of the country's political figures. In particular, we offer the results of a poll conducted in Moscow by the "Nauka" Center of Applied Sociological Sciences.**

There are various methods to determine the popularity of political figures. We consider the most acceptable one to be a rating on a 5-point scale in which the points are

interpreted in the usual manner: from 5 ("excellent") to 1 ("extremely unsatisfactory"). Popularity consists of two components—the notoriety of the figure and attitudes toward him. Thus, when calculating the rating, the average mark received in the poll decreases depending on the number of individuals who do not know a given figure or who find it difficult to answer. The data cited were obtained based on a random, multistage telephone sampling. Well-known political figures whose rating in a survey conducted correlated to "types of political consciousness" were entered on the list (see ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 7).

Average Ratings in Groups as of January 1990

Name	CPSU Members	Youth (under 30)	Middle Age (30-50)	Older Age (over 50)	Workers	Non-production Intelligentsia	Rating at End of January 1990	Rating at Beginning of December 1989
V.I. Lenin	4.6	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.25	4.37
I.V. Stalin	2.1	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.0	1.7	2.13	2.20
M.S. Gorbachev	4.0	3.7	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.87	3.84
Ye.K. Ligachev	1.9	1.6	1.8	2.2	1.9	1.4	2.03	2.26
N.I. Ryzhkov	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.8	3.2	3.55	3.85
A.N. Yakovlev	3.3	3.0	..3	3.4	2.8	3.4	3.22	3.31
L.I. Abalkin	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.17	3.58
Yu.N. Afanasyev	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.8	3.51	3.45
V.I. Belov	2.9	2.6	3.0	2.8	3.7	2.5	3.12	3.06
T.Kh. Gdlyan	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.16	3.56
B.N. Yeltsin	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.36	3.57
G.Kh. Popov	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.4	4.1	3.64	3.60
A.D. Sakharov*	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.6	4.27	3.84
A.A. Sobchak	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.7	4.1	3.82	3.84

*Posthumous rating

Poll Expert on People's Attitudes to CPSU

LD2302220590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Interview with Yevgeniy Yegorovich Livanov, head of CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Academy Sociological Research Center Department for Study of Public Opinion, by correspondent Vladimir Korablev—date and place not given; recorded]

[Text] [Korablev] Yevgeniy Yegorovich, the political situation continues to become more acute and is assuming a critical nature for the party.

[Livanov] Yes, if the question is asked straight out, then one also has to give a straight answer to it.

For the first time during the years of perestroyka the proportion of those who have lost faith in the party's progressive role has exceeded the proportion of those believing in it. The halo of the last instance in the search for justice is disappearing.

Replying to the question as to who today can defend the interests of the ordinary man, only 12 percent of working people mentioned party bodies. Preference was given to the mass media.

[Korablev] Now people are more and more frequently inclined to think that political pluralism in the country is possible and even necessary.

[Livanov] That is indeed so. Even communists—some 40 percent—advocate a multiparty political system, and throughout the regions the differences are even stronger and more serious: in Vilnius, Moscow, and Khabarovsk the majority of party members favor such action. New centers of socio-political influence are emerging: popular fronts and the organized workers' movement. Regional socio-political organizations of working people are, for all intents and purposes, regional parties, in the Kuzbass, for instance.

An unstable balance has emerged between socio-political forces and their influence on the political process. At the present moment it is being maintained only because, in the opinion of the mass of people, forces capable of heading perestroyka instead of the party are lacking in the political arena, and only because of this. But this balance could be shortlived. To date, only half the working people believe that such a force is truly lacking; the others either doubt it or mention soviets, unofficial associations, national popular fronts, etc.

[Korablev] In your view, if full power is indeed handed over to the soviets, will they be able to resolve the problems which our country has now come up against?

[Livanov] Of course, I don't think that this will happen all at once. Our studies and also observations show that those soviets which exist now and their apparatus, their executive bodies, are not ready to fulfill the role which perestroyka assigns to them.

[Korablev] And how do you explain such unpreparedness on the part of the soviets?

[Livanov] They have always been implementers, whereas restructuring is fairly complicated and quick. And even entirely new people appear on the scene; this will also be difficult at first.

[Korablev] Well, probably in order to get out of the situation which has arisen, consolidation is needed, that is to say, more correctly, it is necessary to pool in actual fact the party's efforts with socio-political forces which sincerely desire our society's renewal.

[Livanov] Evidently, the time has come when it is necessary not only to think but also to assemble a kind of roundtable for social consultation, for achieving a social consensus on all problems of our life.

The drawing up of an even more, perhaps, radical specific action program than was adopted at the plenum to restructure the party and the party's role in society for the immediate future is still very necessary. The possibility of this needing to be done prior to the congress, and possibly without fail prior to the congress, cannot be ruled out.

Moscow Socioeconomic Development Report Published

LD0603131790 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] The results of socioeconomic development in Moscow last year have been published today. The committee on statistics reports that industrial production rose by 3.7 percent and labor productivity by 6.8 percent. The revenues and retail turnover increased. Nevertheless, many consumer goods and foods were in short supply. More than 10,000 apartments were not built. At the beginning of this year the number of people residing in Moscow surpassed 9 million.

Government Commission Meets Karaanda Miners

LD0603183990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In Karaganda, a government commission has completed its investigation of how the miners' demands made last July during the strike are being fulfilled.

[G. Sytykh] Shchadov, minister of the coal industry, his deputies, representatives of many ministries and departments, and republican and oblast leaders have come to the miners of Karaganda. The commission was headed by Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Decisions on many issues were adopted on the spot, urgently. The guests worked in two directions—checking and assistance. The commission members visited all the towns around Karaganda. They met with many miners' collectives. There was nothing easy about the discussion. For the miners, too, many problems have accumulated. People are very concerned about the tardy solution of the issue of closing the nuclear testing ground at Semipalatinsk.

[Begin recording] [L.D. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers] There is an instruction from the government that in March the Ministry of Defense, together with the Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry [as heard], the Ministry of Health, and other departments should put forward a proposal on the fate of that testing ground. It is a question of stopping the explosions. The term in which the explosions will be stopped is to be determined in the near future.

[Sytykh] An especially large number of pointed questions were asked of Minister Mikhail Ivanovich Shchadov. One of them was about the transition of mines to economic autonomy.

[G. Azarovskiy, co-chairman of the oblast workers' committee] The issue has not been resolved in practice. Formally they have ostensibly provided the opportunity for independence, but they have not created the necessary conditions for that. We intended, let's say, to resolve the problem like this: We proposed a stage-by-stage solution of this issue. To begin with, independence within the composition of the association, then the enterprise should be given independence, but this time outside of the association, having left the association. But while the issues of prices and the market are unresolved on a state level, this issue is insoluble in practice.

[Ryabev] But naturally, in order to resolve the problem of independence, it is not sufficient to have the right to be independent. One must create certain economic conditions. At present, new draft wholesale prices are being worked out. Existing wholesale prices will be increased approximately 1.7-1.9 times.

[Sytykh] What do you think about the dialogue with the miners?

[Ryabev] Although the conversations are sometimes heated, on the whole they are going all right and are constructive. [end recording]

[Sytykh] As a result, the commission, together with the workers' committee, discussed the program for social and economic development for the coal areas of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic for 1991-1995. It will be submitted to the government in the immediate future.

[Video shows scenes outside of the mine and at meetings of the miners with the commission, and interviews with Ryabev and Azarovskiy]

Concern Over Proposed Press Law Expressed

LD0603190490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The USSR Supreme Soviet is to consider a law on the press. In fact, consideration of this law has not been included in the 20 points, the basic points of the agenda for the current session. Nevertheless, we hope that the law on the press, which has already been considered in the first reading will be passed and confirmed. Nevertheless, there are a number of questions, and questions for which no final answer has been found, and, in particular, our correspondent in Omsk proposes to draw particular attention to the last, the 43d article. This was prompted by the following circumstances: [video shows female correspondent speaking to a man outside an official building]

[Correspondent Vera Morozova] I unexpectedly met my colleague Nikolay Kutorgin, a correspondent of the central newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, outside the building of the rayon people's court today. What brought you here?

[Kutorgin] A suit has been filed by a militia staffer who feels that we have besmirched his person, and that we have infringed his honor and standing.

[Morovoza] Vasiliy Dmitriyevich Petrosenko, a militia college teacher and formerly a staffer of the investigating bodies, disagrees with the interpretation of his role in an account described in an article entitled "A Devilish Affair" [Dyavoliada] by Kutorgin. [video shows copy of newspaper and of the article concerned]

In the title of the critical material, an appraisal is given of an incident of vandalism, the seizure from a worker, Shestakov, of 53 rare books including memoirs and works by Bulgakov, Gumilev, Severyanin, Mandelshtam, and Akhmatova.

Having been deemed ideologically detrimental, all of them were taken to the city dump and burned. Now, three years after this somber event, the bibliophile has won a trial at the procuracy. He is claiming more than R1,000 from the procuracy for the material and moral damage inflicted on him.

So far as the case of Petrosenko and Kutorgin is concerned, then, in his case, as the draft law states, the fine for moral damage alone may reach R50,000, a figure so large that even the plaintiff who considers himself to have been offended by an organ of the press, was surprised by the harshness of the law which is being prepared for adoptioin. [video shows Kutorgin seated in an office with a man and a woman, presumably officials of the court, and then speaking with Morozova outside the court building]

[Kutorgin] Well, this article about liability as to property of R50,000 is a continuation of Article 11 (1) which has mercifully been laid to rest, but which has sprung up in this form, that is, when they say to us, or try now to explain to us that on paper this is democracy then we will immediately work out who will pay these fines. After all, it has to be taken into account that in our country there are thousands of rayon newspapers and tens of thousands of large edition lesser newspapers who will never be able to pay such money.

And there is one conclusion from this: If this law and this article comes into force, then not a single correspondent or editorial office will risk publishing critical material. The point is that it is very important now for those who will make this decision to take a careful look at this article, to think and to remember the thousands of correspondents, or, more accurately, to think about democracy, about glasnost and the freedom of the press.

[Announcer] I have already had occasion to express my point of view on the problem raised by our correspondent in the reportage you have just seen. All the same, I will repeat it. I am convinced that the future law on the press must envision the legal mechanism of responsibility of citizens for the unjustified filing of suits against journalists or organs of the press, and to envision a possible large fine. Then a person will think ten times before turning to the court with unjustified claims against those who criticize him in this or that media organ.

Deputy KGB Chief Meets Moscow Workers

LD0703125290 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Leonid Shebarshin, chief of the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service and deputy head of the KGB, has had a meeting with the workers of one of Moscow's factories. The questions that were put to the Chekists were not dictated by idle curiosity. One can judge, by the nature of the replies, that the intelligence gathering operatives are no less interested in uncovering the truth about their department. So, what is the role and what are the tasks of the Soviet Intelligence Service in modern conditions, at a period when radical changes are under way in the international situation?

The main thing for the Intelligence Service, replied Leonid Shebarshin, is to possess an objective picture of the processes taking place in the world, so as to know them and understand them. The task of ensuring that the Soviet leadership has reliable and accurate information of the real plans and designs of the leading Western countries with regard to our country and about the most important international problems has been entrusted to the Intelligence Service.

This information is needed so that correct decisions can be made. The Intelligence Service is striving to bring to the fore everything that is positive in the world practice, all the reserves whereby international relations can be improved and whereby mutually acceptable solutions are arrived at.

But its distinguished features also consist in focusing particular attention on factors that pose a threat to the Soviet Union's security, its positions, and interests. In other words, its task is to ensure our country against unpleasant and unexpected events.

Leonid Shebarshin was asked this question: aren't the Transcaucasus and Central Asia events inspired from a single foreign or domestic center?

According to our information, no such entity exists—neither in the USSR, nor abroad—says the Soviet Intelligence chief. At the same time, we are aware of the facts of handing over of arms, money, propaganda literature, and photocopying equipment from various foreign sources to extremists. The same events and facts are, for instance, interpreted by foreign radio stations in their broadcasts to Armenia and Azerbaijan in what is a diametrically contradictory sense.

The coverage given to the life in our country—beamed in other languages of the peoples of the USSR—Is similar, too. National strife is being skilfully kept simmering.

How many spies and anti-Soviets are kept in the special camps—this was a question put to Leonid Shebarshin.

There are no special camps whatsoever, assured the deputy KGB chief. Approximately 10 spies are now being kept in places of deprivation of freedom. In all, about 30 agents of the Western special services have been unmasked over the past few years. In 1987, when the amnesty decree was passed, there were about 250 people sentenced for anti-Soviet activity. Now there are no people in the camps sentenced on the strength of articles dealing with anti-Soviet activities and the articles themselves have been repealed.

Who works in the Intelligence Service and how do you select cadres—this question was put to Leonid Shebarshin.

We have special educational establishments which take in people with higher education. As a rule, we find them ourselves, replies leonid Sherbarshin. What is, of course, desirable, is robust health and an ability to learn foreign languages. Each employee of our committee speaks two languages; many speak three or more. There are also people who choose themselves to work for the Intelligence Service. However, the main requirement for all future intelligence gathering operatives, without exception, is to be absolutely reliable and devoted to the cause.

People who used to persecute Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and dissidents—now rehabilitated—continue to work in the State Security bodies. Is there a guarantee that they will not again go over to the banner of stagnation if calls of "Down with Perestroyka!" are made?

Serious changes, including cadre changes, have taken place within the USSR's KGB, replied Leonid Shebarshin. In particular, the directorate dealing with dissidents has been dissolved. It must be said that the initiative to persecute Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and other dissidents did not come from the State Security. The KGB's history is, of course, not unequivocal, but it is inseparable from the history of the whole Soviet state and society. It has quite a great deal of story and heroism. Unfortunately, it also does have tragic pages. Tens of thousands of our employees have themselves undergone the terrible mincing machine of Stalin's repressions. Work is currently under way on a Draft Law on State Security. We did not have it before, and it is very necessary. The removal of the superfluous curtain of secrecy from the KGB will, undoubtedly, be positively received by society. The main, fundamental principles on which the work of the State Security bodies is based do not form any sort of secret at all; it is only the specific professional technology that is a secret, stated the chief of the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service Leonid Shebarshin.

KGB Official on Counterintelligence Work

PM0603151590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Sergeyev, member of the USSR KGB Collegium, by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Military Counterintelligence"—place and date not given, first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] All of us are witnessing the revolutionary and, at the same time, very difficult and sometimes dramatic events taking place in our society. From a unitary society fenced off from the outside world by an "iron curtain," it is now moving along the path of democratic transformations and change. There is more openness and glasnost in the work of such services traditionally closed to the general public as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the Prosecutor's Office... Recently the mass media have been featuring items on military counterintelligence organs. And yet by no means all our readers know what these organs are, what they do, and what their contribution to perestroyka is.

These and other questions were raised in the conversation between our correspondent and Lieutenant General V. Sergeyev, member of the USSR KGB Collegium.

[Falichev] Vasiliy Stepanovich, it would clearly be appropriate at the start of our talk to recall when military counterintelligence first appeared.

[Sergeyev] Of course. Soviet military counterintelligence has existed since 19 December 1918. Currently it is a component of the USSR KGB. In the Armed Forces military counterintelligence organs are represented by special USSR KGB departments, which exist in districts, fleets, and in groups of forces.

[Falichev] Today the procedure for foreign citizens to enter the USSR and move around the country, and the procedure for Soviet people to travel abroad has been considerably simplified. People's diplomacy has started

to work. Will it not be the case that, in carrying out their tasks, military intelligence officers will impede contacts between people and slow the development of economic ties? In short, should amendments be made as we see fit to the democratization process, not least of all in the Armed Forces?

[Sergeyev] We proceed on the basis of the following fundamental thesis—that organs of state security should unswervingly subordinate their activity to the interests of the state and society and act strictly within the framework of socialist legality. As is well known, the actual structure of the KGB and its military counterintelligence subunits is being improved. The working relationships between all our staffers and Armed Forces personnel are being filled with new content. These relationships are increasingly typified by a state approach, benevolence, concern for people's careers, and mutual responsibility. Last year, for instance, hundreds of events were held to strengthen ties between intelligence officers and Army and Navy servicemen.

[Falichev] And yet, Comrade Lieutenant General, perhaps the fear of imperialist intrigue is more a throwback to the past than a reflection of the present? After all, as many readers have been writing in to say, today nobody is planning to attack us, and the image of the enemy is being increasingly eroded.

[Sergeyev] Indeed, the transformations taking place in our country are meeting with understanding and support in various circles abroad. But something else is obvious too—certain forces, special services, and propaganda and information organs in a number of states have in no way diminished their subversive activity against the USSR. Needless to say, they are interested above all in the Armed Forces and our country's defense potential, as well as in the existence of opportunities to mold and maintain destructive sentiments in Soviet society. To illustrate this, let us turn to one relatively recent statement by the CIA director on this score: "The Soviet Union will continue to be the main focus for our intelligence-gathering effort in the nineties. Its military potential and attempts to expand its world influence continue to pose a threat to U.S. security. The Soviet leadership's attempts to restructure the country have not radically altered these truths—strictly speaking, they make the Soviet Union even more interesting to U.S. intelligence."

If we wanted to be complacent we could, for instance, put down this statement—and others, incidentally—as representing the purely personal position of the CIA director. But reality shows that this is unfortunately the strategic line that is actually being implemented by certain structures in the U.S. legislative and executive branches. And against this backdrop the claims to the contrary which have been appearing are naive to put it mildly and, at bottom, politically mistaken.

[Falichev] Does this mean that despite the warming in the international atmosphere you face no threat of unemployment?

[Sergeyev] The many years' experience of my job and the objective information which we have available permit me to state with every justification that it is too soon for some of our countrymen to start doubting the need for state security organs in the country. Throughout the centuries history has known no sociopolitical formations without such an institution. This is also shown by the example of the Western countries. In the United States quite recently a scientific center in its recommendations on the question of national security strategy formulated its conclusion as follows: The conclusion of multifaceted agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will require a beefing up of the intelligence services and an upgrading of their technology....

[Falichev] Recently people have been increasingly talking and even making demands about the need to reveal information on the forces and means employed by counterintelligence and the tactical methods used to resolve its mission. Such questions, I know, are also being put to special USSR KGB departments locally. Should there be limits to glasnost in this area?

[Sergeyev] World practice essentially knows no cases of anybody seriously trying to combat secret intelligence and other subversive activity with purely open and public methods. People who are actually rather than just opportunistically concerned about improving the reliable safeguarding of the state security of the country and its Armed Forces are more concerned with something else—whether Soviet law enforcement organs have everything necessary, including modern technical equipment, to successfully carry out their operational investigation duties. As for revealing information on the strength, methods, and tactics of the operational services' work, many professions have their secrets but nobody asks them to be publicized. Most Soviet citizens and Armed Forces servicemen understand that.

Our public and people having the right to know the results of the work of state security organs and their structural components is another matter. The more glasnost there is in this area, the more obvious the effectiveness of our work will be. We are striving for this. Recently USSR KGB special departments have published around 130 articles in the local and central press and discussed many cases of combating strong, professionally trained Western special services and unmasking their agents. I recall the well-concealed spy links maintained with a Western special service by former officer A. Ivanov, who was unmasked. Or take the example of the well-organized "activities" of the Stanin family duet in finding out military secrets—something KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already discussed.

In the last two years we have had to take precautionary measures against approximately 150 servicemen, workers, and employees to prevent them slipping onto

the path of crime. Military intelligence officers have uncovered cases among the troops and in headquarters, institutions, and organizations of the Armed Forces which testify to blatant violations of secrecy and the premature loss by certain individuals of such a professional quality of military men as high vigilance. Captured Western intelligence service agents admit that they have often used the secrecy system and losses of vigilance for espionage purposes. Western experts believe that as a result of contacts with Soviet servicemen and visits to our military installations by foreigners it has been possible to obtain information evaluated at many hundreds of thousands of dollars for minimum expenditure. They note that certain Soviet servicemen, in an attempt to show how well-informed they are, provide information that is of great value to specialists.

While welcoming our openness and glasnost in the military sphere, Western representatives at the same time are strictly monitoring the observance of the highly strict restrictions on visits by Soviet servicemen to Western armies' installations.

At the same time—and I want to particularly emphasize this—we are aware of by no means isolated incidents of servicemen showing high standards of morality, political vigilance, and patriotism in preventing state crimes in the Armed Forces.

[Falichev] Now, Vasiliy Stepanovich, if you have no objection, I would like to talk about our general civic problems. It is well known that, in connection with the deteriorating crime situation in the country, KGB organs are getting more and more actively involved in the fight against organized crime and the drugs trade. What is the role of military counterintelligence in this area?

[Sergeyev] Military counterintelligence has previously resolved and is now involved in carrying out tasks in fighting organized crime. Including such manifestations of it as smuggling and violations of currency operation regulations. Over the past few years around 200 smugglers, some of whom acted in well-organized and clandestine groups, have been uncovered and prosecuted. On the whole, KGB organs have instituted criminal proceedings against more than 1,500 smugglers and money changers—both Soviet citizens and foreigners—during this period. The state has recovered Soviet and foreign currency, precious metals and stones, industrial goods, antiques, works of art, and cultural artifacts worth tens of millions of rubles. More than 12 tonnes of narcotic substances have been confiscated with the help of state customs organs.

[Falichev] How would you comment on the increasingly frequent attacks on the Soviet Armed Forces?

[Sergeyev] We are noting the increasingly vigorous actions against the Armed Forces from various kinds of antisocialist structures. And some of their representatives use the smokescreen of instilling order among the troops to hide their real intentions. What, for instance, is the kind of order advocated by the leaders of so-called fronts, parties, and unions in well-known regions of the Transcaucasus who are organizing murders of servicemen and moral and physical terror against members of their families? What kind of order would the representatives of the "Democratic Union" and similar organizations like to campaign for? These are people who seek out simpletons among servicemen to act as guerrillas in "groups," "militia detachments," "sections," and other illegal armed formations. And what about those who would like to gain access to weapons through servicemen? Such a path is hardly likely to lead to a rule-of-law state or protection for Soviet citizens from tyranny. Illegal actions by extremist elements against servicemen, all Soviet citizens, and society should not go unpunished. We must all firmly assimilate this and not confuse real democracy with anarchy and total license.

Naturally, the aforementioned phenomena cannot be divorced from the processes taking place in the country and society, including those linked with corruption and the black economy. Some people in the Armed Forces have already been attracted to and received the blessing of certain "uncivilized" cooperative members acting on the principle of buying scarce and strategic materials for a song and selling them at a high price abroad. We are satisfied that the information about the scandal involving tanks in the well-known story involving the ANT cooperative concern has been properly regulated. We hope that a principled assessment will be made of such phenomena in the future as well, not least in the mass media.

[Falichev] Vasiliy Stepanovich, it is naturally impossible to cover in this talk all questions of interest to readers relating to the activity of military counterintelligence officers...

[Sergeyev] I think that our contacts will strengthen. I also hope that in the very near future "roundtable" articles will appear at the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office, where, it seems to me, certain aspects of intelligence officers' work have been covered more extensively.

Bakatin Expects Interpol Membership

LD0203151190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1845 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the "Topical Interview" program: interview with USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin by TASS Correspondent Andrey Korotkov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Here, Comrades, is the final topic, which is closely linked with the previous one. As you know, the international seminar devoted to the subject of crime prevention strategy began in Moscow on 26 February. USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Bakatin met Interpol Secretary General Raymond Kendall of France on the same day. Interpol's task is to combat the drug smuggling business internationally. Specific questions connected with the possibility of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) joining Interpol were discussed at the

meeting. Andrey Korotkov, a TASS correspondent, has interviewed Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin:

[Bakatin] I am very satisfied with this meeting. This is because it is my view that there now are no obstacles whatsoever—I am completely confident of this—that some time in September or October, at the next Interpol Congress, which will take place in Canada, I hope, I am 99.9 percent certain that the USSR and the MVD will be admitted to Interpol.

[Korotkov] What will Interpol membership give us? What can Interpol get out of cooperation with us?

[Bakatin] You know that we do not, after all, have such a...It is a practical organization, a police organization that is engaged in practical work connected with combatting international crime. After all, crime is not some sort of local or national phenomenon. It is an international, transnational phenomenon. That is why it is not possible to tackle all the problems connected with combatting international crime through MVD channels. This is not a rational system, the one we now have. What is needed are direct ties, direct ties between countries.

From the point of view of the forecast that now looms large, as it were, before us, the international mafia is becoming stronger and looking more and more toward us. Likewise, our own mafia already is looking toward foreign countries. From this point of view, it will represent precisely the barrier that is now necessary, simply necessary at present.

[Korotkov] As far as I know, Interpol has a very large computer data bank on international crime. What steps have we taken in this direction?

[Bakatin] We now have agreed with Mr. Kendall that in the very near future one of our engineers literally will make a trip to Interpol Headquarters, where we will have exhaustive consultations connected with essential equipment of our national bureau. Well, I said national bureau, call it our Union Bureau of Interpol, and we will take all the necessary steps. I think that no excessive quantity of hard currency resources will be needed here, but we will be able to have state-of-the-art equipment. As for compiling a data bank, we will start working and this bank will get off the ground. The main thing is that we will gain access to the entire Interpol bank. This is something that must be mentioned above all else.

[Korotkov] How will this interaction affect the ministries of internal affairs of our union republics?

[Bakatin] It will affect them outright and in a most direct way. This is because the MVD represents the sum total of the ministries of internal affairs of union republics, if you like. After all, apart from union republics, there is nothing else we have. We work directly with union republics.

Frolov, Bakatin Address PRAVDA Reporters

PM0103184390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 8

[Unattributed report under the rubric "In the Editorial Office": "PRAVDA Staff Consulted"]

[Text] PRAVDA's own correspondents are traditionally a reliable channel of communication between the newspaper and various regions in the country and their problems and interests. The correspondents are the first to look for the location of the best experience, to report about "troublespots," and to analyze the state of affairs at local levels. As part of the active preparation for the 28th Party Congress the editorial office invited its envoys in the republics, krays, and oblasts to a consultation about how to more effectively carry out the discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and report questions of perestroyka at the stage of its resolute renewal. I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, gave the report at the conference. V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, talked about the work of the law enforcement organs, and L.B. Vid, first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], talked about the implementation of radical economic reform.

A detailed report about the conference will be published in one of the forthcoming issues of the newspaper.

MVD's Bakatin on Handling Juvenile Offenders

PM0502181190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, under the "Authoritative Opinion" rubric: "'I Don't Want My Former Freedom...'"]

[Text] I personally have not heard convicted minors making the kind of statement cited in the headline. But that does not indicate anything. It is a fact that some of those who have been released from educational labor colonies do not want to return home, and ask the administration to help by providing them with a residence permit in the area of the colony.

Although over the last three years the "population" of educational labor colonies has almost halved, there has been no decrease in the acute problems of juvenile crime. Crime is becoming younger every year—this has been indicated on several occasions. There are many reasons for this. They are inherent in our society and ourselves. One of the most widespread reasons is serious trouble within the family.

Today, of 26,000 inmates of these colonies, one in ten is an orphan or deprived of parental care. A female inmate from a Ukrainian colony would hardly want to return to her family if she was raped by her stepfather at the age of 14, while her mother brutally beat her daughter when she found out who was responsible for her pregnancy.

The girl became a drug addict straight after leaving the hospital...

Each of the 500 young alcoholics and 300 drug addicts currently undergoing treatment in educational labor colonies have a history of constant drunken rampages in the family, brawls, and violation of moral norms. That is why the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] proposes, inter alia, to elaborate proposals regarding changes to administrative legislation, and to hold parents more strictly accountable for their children's offenses.

But this alone will not rescue a juvenile.

Work with juveniles from underprivileged families is becoming a highly important area of the new MVD preventive service and divisional inspectors. Work is currently under way to resolutely humanize educational labor colonies and introduce A.S. Makarenko's teaching principles into their work. One of the proposals aimed at resolving this question was the creation of a social adaptation center at each colony.

Nor is it a secret that recidivism among people released from educational labor colonies currently totals 12.5 percent. A state program for fighting crime, now under preparation, envisages measures to prevent recidivism among lads who have served their sentence. A new humanized model has been elaborated. A draft USSR Council of Ministers resolution is being prepared on measures to improve the activity of educational labor colonies. We believe that they must be opened in every autonomous republic, kray, and oblast of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic where they have not as yet been set up. Then the size of a colony could be reduced to 300-500 people and transportation of convicts sometimes thousands of kilometers from their place of residence could be eliminated. But the most important thing is to enable the family, labor collectives, and the public to work actively with the educational labor colony and resolve questions of finding jobs and homes for released convicts. Work is also under way to organize detention centers at educational labor colonies: Juveniles under investigation and adult criminals must be separated once and for all.

All this depends directly on internal affairs organs.

What is the situation like later with regard to finding a job and a home on release? Whereas there were no problems in these areas previously, given the transfer to economic accountability and self-financing, they have become considerably complicated. Your newspaper has written about this. Of the juveniles released under the Amnesty Decree alone, hundreds failed to find work or study for six months or more owing to unwarranted refusals to provide them with jobs.

The USSR MVD is proposing the drafting of a normative act on juvenile job placement, which would envisage establishing guaranteed jobs for juveniles amounting to five percent of the total number of employees at an enterprise. It is also important to give the plans for juvenile job placement the status of a state law and consolidate the principle of guaranteeing jobs for juveniles by providing an enterprise with economic incentives.

Provisions have been made for vesting employment and vocational orientation centers with the functions of state control over the execution of juvenile job placement laws, along with the right to apply economic sanctions via the State Board of Arbitration—notably for unwarranted refusal to employ adolescents owing to a past criminal record or offenses. The ministry is proposing that enterprises who accept former inmates of educational labor colonies be exempted from payment for manpower resources and authorized to use these sums for patronage work with them.

But this is still not a solution to the problem. There are many cases of the Commission for Minors' Affairs and executive committees expending tremendous efforts to ensure that a former convict does not end up in their area rather than help him.

This extremely widespread indifference answers the question of why a convicted lad may be heard to utter the bitter words: "I don't want my former freedom..."

Bakatin Previews Crime Seminar; Data Cited

PM0503100190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Feature under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Against Crime"]

[Text] For the first time our country is holding a seminar at a high international level called "Strategy of Crime Prevention." It opened 26 February and will last five days in Moscow's Oktyabrskaya Hotel. Specialists in the fight against crime, experts, and representatives of law-enforcement organizations from more than 30 countries have been invited.

This meeting has been organized by the country's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Helsinki Institute for the Prevention and Combating of Crime, which is associated with the United Nations. On the eve of the seminar's opening IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Mostovshchikov met with V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs.

[Mostovshchikov] Vadim Viktorovich, for a country which only one year ago declassified crime statistics an international seminar on problems of crime is an exceptional event. Tell me, are we holding it out of prestige considerations or does it have practical meaning for the militia?

[Bakatin] First of all, I find nothing reprehensible in prestige. Prestige also has practical meaning. Is it not useful when people trust you, when you enjoy respect? It would do us no good to remain isolated from the whole world —it is the wrong situation. The crime surge in the

country is a fact, and it is clear that efforts will be required to change the state of affairs for the better. Why not take advantage of the experience that has already been accumulated in the world?

In my view, this seminar is the first small practical step we are taking after we simply stated that things are bad regarding the growth of crime. In principle, it is planned to do a great deal—for example, we are examining the question of joining Interpol, and we are also planning in general to expand international contacts. I believe that our guests will be interested in more detailed information on what is happening in the USSR, and it will be useful for our specialists to learn how law-enforcement organs operate, let us say, in the United States, Austria, France, China, Cuba, and so forth. [Bakatin ends]

Commentary by A. Illesh, IZVESTIYA editor for the domestic news department:

The reader will be interested to familiarize himself with the "baggage" of crime that exists in the country today. First, a table compiled by IZVESTIYA with the help of the USSR MVD, from which the peaks in certain most dangerous types of crime can be seen.

And so, the statistical maxima since 1961:

Total number of crimes	2,461,692 (1989)
Murders and attempted murders [ubiystva s pokusheniyami]	21,467 (1989)
Premeditated aggravated assault	51,485 (1989)
Rape and attempted rape [iznasilovaniya s pokusheniyem]	21,873 (1989)
Theft of state and private property	111,601 (1989)
Robbery with regard to state and private property	22,174 (1989)
Thefts of citizens' private property	845,157 (1989)
of which, burglaries	252,960 (1989)
Hooliganism	257,015 (1966)
Speculation	45,235 (1988)

Now some analysis of the data for last year, 1989. In all, during this period, the militia and the prosecutor's office received 4 million reports of crimes committed. Officially, as you already know, 2,461,692 crimes were registered.

Growth in crime has been noted practically everywhere in the country. The growth rate is still great—31.8 percent. Only once in the history of criminal statistics in the USSR has crime grown faster—this was in 1961. Then the rate of increase stood at 34.7 percent.

In order to understand how the curve has crept upward, we will cite the following data in absolute figures:

	Crimes
1983	2,017,000
1984	2,029,000
1985	2,084,000
1988	1,867,000
1989	2,462,000

Grave crimes. These accounted for practically one in every seven of the crimes committed last year. Let us also examine the dynamics of these, the most heinous crimes.

	Aggravated Assault	Rape	Premeditated Murder
1980	44,332	20,225	21,430
1985	38,423	19,438	18,718
1988	37,191	17,658	16,702
1989	51,458	21,873	21,467

One murder in every three is committed on grounds of jealousy or other domestic grounds. Nine percent of murderers are women. Almost 20 percent of murders are committed out of mercenary motives, while in 10 percent the murderer's aim is to conceal another crime or he is guided at that moment by hooligan impulses. One murder victim in every five is a relative of the murderer. And here is what seems to be a specific feature of our country: Practically half the victims at the moment of a murder had been drinking liquor with their future murderer...

Crimes in the economic sphere. The militia and the prosecutor's office brought to light 257,485 of these criminal actions. Thefts of state property were committed on a large scale in 7,235 cases and on a particularly large scale in 1,079 cases. Criminal proceedings were instituted against 13,541 enterprise leaders and 7,062 accounts office workers.

In all, 1,303,958 criminals were apprehended during the year. I will attempt to paint a brief statistical "portrait" of the modern Soviet criminal. Crimes were committed by 689,519 workers, 113,499 employees, 74,756 collective farm members, 138,562 students, and 208,284 able-bodied but unemployed people. The proportion of persons with higher or secondary specialized education who committed crimes was 15.9 percent, and those with secondary education—83.6 percent.

Precisely 293,963 persons were caught who had committed crimes previously. Of these, 169,385—57.6 percent—had already been held in camps or jails. Crimes were committed by 49,402 people during the year following release. Precisely 77,222 particularly dangerous recidivists were apprehended for crimes.

Foreign citizens in the USSR committed 351 crimes—4.6 percent less than in 1988. Hooliganism accounts for one-fourth of them, thefts of private property for 18.5 percent, and thefts of state property 5.7 percent. Precisely 6,319 crimes committed against foreigners were recorded, or twice as many as in 1988. Thefts account for

69.9 percent of them, and robberies for 15.9 percent. Thefts are most frequently committed from hotels or parked cars, in trains and aircraft, or at stations.

Having familiarized you with the numerical crime data, I would like to report also on some changes in the actions of the militia itself. And these changes inspire optimism. At any rate, they show that there is no unchecked growth in crime. We now have the recording by law-enforcement organs (unlike in recent years) of all crimes committed in the country, and the militia's attempts to take control of the situation. A few more figures in confirmation of this thought.

Measures to stop the actions of dangerous criminals have begun to be applied more boldly and professionally. The number of apprehensions increased 55 percent, and arrests 37 percent. At the same time—and this is very important—the number of unsubstantiated apprehensions and arrests fell by half. Practically the same militia forces investigated 1,456,000 criminal cases during the year (an increase of 53 percent). Nine percent more crimes were exposed by criminal investigation departments than in 1988. And 18.8 percent more grave crimes. There was an increase in the number of murders, muggings, robberies, and thefts exposed. Some 128,400 (or 79 percent) of all criminals who went into hiding were hunted down.

'ANT' Cooperative's Dealings Reported

PM2202104590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Gennadiy Yastrebtsov article under the "Pertinent Comments" rubric: "Clearance Sale. Will We Raise the People's Standard of Living by Auctioning Off the Country's Scanty Resources?"]

[Text] The expression "clearance sale," where the addition of the adjective implies "everything must go," has become widely used in conversation along with talk of empty stores and the so-called doorstep trade—or, more accurately, the distribution of goods around enterprises.

The magic cry "clearance sale!" whisks talented engineers, distinguished team leaders, honored teachers, and venerable scientific personnel from their workplaces. God knows how much time, effort, and nervous energy is wasted around the country in agonizing expectation of the longed-for "supply of goods"! It cannot be helped; each one of us wants to be clothed and shod, and look as good as other people. Admittedly, the fact that by no means every worker, engineer, or even professor who comes to the latest clearance sale with the collective thinks deeply about how the state has to pay for the fine foreign shoes or particularly fashionable hosiery is quite excusable.

Readers may remember the letter from S. Kolpakov, USSR minister of metallurgy, and G. Serov, the ministry's party committee secretary, front-paged in PRAVDA 1 February. They appealed on behalf of all metallurgists to workers in related sectors to provide them with scrap metal more rapidly. In 1989 the state order was not met; there was a shortfall of almost five million tonnes of scrap metal against the planned figure. This year the situation is worse.

Calling for shortsighted leaders' attempts to sell scrap metal abroad to be curbed, the letter's authors explained that transitory hard currency advantage will develop into huge losses tomorrow owing to the need to compensate for the reduction in national metal production with imported procurements.

Literally a few days before this article, People's Deputy Ye. Kogan received the following letter from workers at the "Estrybprom" Association and immediately sent it to the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR People's Control Committee: "We ask you to put a deputy's question regarding machinations involving the supply of scrap metal from the 'Noves' cooperative. Last March the USSR People's Control Committee noted in its resolution that this cooperative concluded a contract to deliver 250,000 and 50,000 tonnes of ferrous and nonferrous scrap metal, respectively, abroad. This is much more than the annual amount procured in Estonia.

"The People's Control Committee demanded that these deliveries be halted; however the leaders of 'Noves' announced that they were only storing metal which belongs to the ANT State Cooperative Association.

"Metal shipments are now continuing via the 'Estrybprom' Association's fishing port. Moreover, high-strength steel, which is in short supply in our country, is being shipped out on foreign vessels. Rails removed from railroad tracks are being recast, yet they could after all still serve on spur tracks..."

ANT [Avtomatika nauka tekhnika: Automatics Science Technology] is a well-known abbreviation. Of late it has frequently appeared in newspapers and been heard on radio and television. Yes, I am referring to that octopus-like concern involved in the sensational attempt to sell a whole convoy of battle tanks abroad. That sensational report eclipsed other aspects of the concern's activity for some time.

For instance, in circumvention of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution prohibiting cooperatives from exporting nonferrous metals, ANT shipped by the northern sea route from Norilsk not scrap or waste products but a consignment of highly valuable electrolytic nickel, along with copper which is also in short supply. Murmansk Oblast KGB Administration officials interrupted the shipment's onward journey abroad.

A few days later there was a fresh report. While processing freight in the port of Nakhodka, Maritime Kray, customs personnel withheld 50 tonnes of magnesium bars. The strategic shipment was bound for Japan. The specific recipient is at present unknown. But the consignor is well known—the same ANT.

The concern even tried to carry out stunning, breathtaking commercial operations after the notorious train carrying tanks was stopped in Novorossiysk. ANT representatives, inter alia, signed a protocol in Nikolayev seaport concerning the processing and shipment abroad via the country's southern ports of five million cubic meters of lumber, 500,000 tonnes of metal, 600,000 tonnes of chemical freight, and 2,000 units of military hardware. Hardware that was by no means old and decommissioned, but quite combat capable.

What is happening then? Who gave the cooperative the right to export—and on such a gigantic scale at that—raw materials, metal, and combat vehicles?

At the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, V. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, said that there are finished homes standing empty in the republic without windows and doors for lack of timber. In the Donetsk mines miners cannot work normally owing to a shortage of wood and lack of pit props, while at the same time cooperative workers are off-loading millions of cubic meters of wood onto foreign firms. To call a spade a spade, our national wealth is being sold off wholesale and retail.

But tell me, what services to the fatherland can account for the fact that the ANT State Cooperative Concern, which was unknown to anyone until quite recently, has acquired such fantastic power overnight?

We talk a great deal about perestroyka processes and the braking forces impeding the development of these processes. We call for the administrative edict system to be smashed once and for all, and we urge people to act by primarily economic methods, to have more trust in people, and to promote to leading economic posts energetic enterprising workers capable of bold, nontraditional actions, including on the foreign market. All that is absolutely correct and is not in doubt as a political principle. But you will agree that you have to look before you leap in every specific case.

PRAVDA published the official report by the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee "On Gross Violations of State Discipline by a Number of Communist Leaders in the Sale of Military Hardware and Output in Short Supply." It gave a harsh but just assessment of those people who have intentionally violated our laws and those who protected the offenders.

I attended that session of the Party Control Committee. It lasted almost six hours. I heard and watched everyone throughout that time but, to be honest, I was most struck by the irresponsibility and, I would say, uncommon levity with which people who hold lofty posts in our government apparatus embraced adventurist businessmen and, I will make no secret of it, talented rogues. As if hypnotized by fantastic promises "to rescue the country from economic collapse and shower the people with consumer goods," the high-ranking benefactors immediately granted the new concern simply unlimited rights and opportunities.

ANT was in the charge of one V. Ryashentsev, a relatively young man who is not in the party (he left the CPSU 2 years ago) and who possesses business acumen, although his education is nothing to boast about—only 10 years at a school for worker youth. After working as a lathe operator and a hospital orderly, and even serving in the KGB forces, approximately three years ago he organized the ANT cooperative at a local fuel apparatus plant and registered it with Noginsk City Soviet Executive Committee, Moscow Oblast. At first the tasks set were modest—to supply spare parts and subassemblies for metal-working equipment assembly lines, highway construction machinery, tractors, and trucks.

But the scale of this operation soon seemed too small. So a year later ANT obtained the status of a production state cooperative association and then a year later it became an intersectoral state cooperative concern. Now its general director Ryashentsev can push open any door along the corridors of the USSR Council of Ministers building. He is ready for operations involving billions of rubles [R]. Like Ostap Bender in provincial Vasyuki [reference to swindling wheeler-dealer character who was the hero of two satirical novels by 20th century Russian novelists Ilf and Petrov], he painted grandiose pictures of the country's future prosperity as ensured by the ANT concern before amazed officials in the supreme executive body.

"We will begin with a most noble undertaking," Ryashentsev lectured them; "we will actively combat the disease of the century—AIDS."

The head of the concern sent a note to the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission. This document was striking for its astronomical figures: "I am asking you for help in carrying out export-import operations designed to supply the USSR with 500 million disposable syringes and 1 billion condoms in 1990. ANT is also to complete a program for supplying consumer goods (television sets, videorecorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, footwear, and computer equipment) with an overall retail value on the domestic market of up to R1 billion."

Isn't that impressive? At any rate, Yu. Pekshev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission, and his first deputy, B. Grinev, were delighted by Ryashentsev's venture and rapidly began to put it into effect, creating absolutely special conditions for ANT.

The concern effectively received the "go-ahead" to sell virtually any Soviet goods on the foreign market. In June 1989, after ratifying the ANT charter, A. Bratukhin, first deputy minister of the aviation industry, even authorized it to import and export arms! So the vague contours of state-of-the-art tanks, aircraft, and God knows what

else may even then have been looming in the state cooperative dealers' ungovernable imagination.

Cooperative members smartly bought up strategic materials in short supply—zirconium, tungsten, cobalt, titanium, and nickel. Their appetite grew day by day—and lo and behold ANT is already raising the question of exporting uranium. Admittedly, it didn't reach the point of atomic bombs, but Makarov and Tokarev pistols, combat helicopters, launch complexes, and missiles have already featured among foreign clients' requests. Thus the attempt, together with General V. Dovgan, to sell tanks abroad is only a commonplace episode which received noisy publicity.

V. Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, authorized Ryashentsev and his company to export goods across the state border without licensing documentation, just an indication of the freight's provenance on the customs declaration. This made life much easier for the cooperative members. The concern darted around buying up more and more consignments of lead, bronze, sheet carbon and stainless steel, plastics, and mineral fertilizers—everything of which there is an acute shortage in our country—and selling them to foreign partners.

I have frequently written in PRAVDA about exaggerations and distortions within the cooperative movement. I am grateful to those readers who greeted these articles with understanding—after all, people have now learned perfectly well to distinguish between the normal, honest cooperative operation that the people need and the scum, the dross, the speculators, and the self-seekers who feather their nests from our shortages and our problems.

With rising inflation many cooperatives are endeavoring to find outlets on foreign markets. On the whole there is nothing reprehensible in that. People want to earn hard currency or obtain the requisite foreign goods in exchange. But it is bad when individual or narrow group interests often overshadow the country's interests. In other words we are rushing to throw out things that our own house lacks.

I would return to that scrap metal. It is no secret that the leaders of many respected union ministries are persistently bombarding the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee with letters in which they try to prove the impracticability of state orders for scrap. Whereupon they strike up talks with foreign businessmen—sometimes via cooperatives—about the sale of this scrap metal. Where is the logic here? "Surpluses" are going abroad— without licenses— to the detriment of state order deliveries to Soviet plants whose collectives are clamoring: "Give us some scrap metal at last, our furnaces are standing idle!"

You get the impression that we are only living for today—and tomorrow the flood!

When ANT was closed down, Ryashentsev composed an emotional missive to high offices in which he claimed, inter alia, that "closing down ANT does the USSR tremendous damage" and "this closure will only benefit the enemies of perestroyka."

Is that indeed true? I would cite two brief reports in conclusion, and let the readers judge for themselves.

"According to the concern's own figures, diverse output worth R564 million has been procured for shipment abroad."

And this is what S. Sarukhanov, USSR deputy minister of trade, says: "During its existence, the ANT concern has supplied Moscow's GUM department store—and the latter sold for in-house trade to the 'ZIL' Association collective—French-made ladies' lingerie (panties, brassieres) worth R119,000. The concern has rejected further cooperation."

Compare the figures and you will see the kind of clearance sale that is going on here.

Yeltsin Dubs Himself 'Enemy Number One' of CPSU

PM0603164890

[Editorial Report] London BBC Television Network in English at 2230 GMT on 5 March, carries a short interview with USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin, in Russian with English subtitles, during a BBC-2 "Newsnight" report on a poll of Soviet attitudes commissioned jointly by "Newsnight" and THE GUARDIAN.

Newsman Peter Snow discusses the poll, conducted by the Moscow Institute of Sociology, in which 3,000 people in six cities—Leningrad, Moscow, Tallinn, Irkutsk, and Alma-Ata—were asked to choose who would make the better leader. On a scale of one to 10 with one the worst and 10 the best, Gorbachev was given an average of 6.9 points; Yeltsin, an average of 5.7 points; and Ligachev, an average of 2.7 points.

Snow reports: "I asked Boris Yeltsin how he felt about being defeated by Gorbachev." Yeltsin answers: "I could name six different cities where the percentage would be the other way around. Snow replies: "But Moscow and Leningrad are two rather important towns, and he defeats you in those two." Yeltsin says: "Well, Moscow's the home of the party apparatus: There's hundreds of thousands of members of the apparatus there, and Yeltsin's its enemy number one, so it's natural, up to a point."

Yeltsin Interviewed by Latvian Newspaper

90UN1013A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH: "Boris Yeltsin: I Will Not Withdraw"; date not given, by telephone from Riga]

[Text] [SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] What prompted you to agree to run for the post of an RSFSR [Russian

Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy? After all, you hold quite a few prominent posts to begin with.

[Yeltsin] Indeed, there is plenty of work without this. However, what was my reasoning? The Congress of People's Deputies will hardly justify our hopes. Two-thirds, a stable majority, will remain. There were hopes that the congress would "go left" gradually. However, I believe that in five years no particular changes in the thinking of this majority will come about. Therefore, it is hardly realistic to expect the congress to make some radical decisions. We will just have to shoulder this burden for five more years.

On the eve of the Second Congress, we had this idea: Is there an opportunity to form right now a more progressive corps of Russian deputies? To be sure, we will have to work on this in every region, every district, taking into account that out of 10 or 15 candidates there are one or two democratically minded, interesting people. Even if the split at the congress of Russian deputies is going to be 50/50 we may hope for some kind of a breakthrough in the matter of the national, economic, and cultural renaissance of Russia. It is high time to stop handing out raw materials dirt cheap and losing the Russian ethnicity as such. The center may be compelled to change its policy exactly through the radicalization of Russia, and in the process this will be an unavoidable step because Russia is not the same as the Baltic republics.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] Will you not repeat what you did at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies when you withdrew as a candidate chairman of the Supreme Soviet of our country? Do you intend to become president of Russia?

[Yeltsin] I will say this definitively: In this case, I will not withdraw. I am already preparing for this step.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] What do you expect of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum scheduled for early February?

[Yeltsin] This is going to be a decisive moment. The plenum will adopt the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Congress of the party. It is not the congress but this plenum that is going to be decisive. The reanimation of the party is only possible if the platform contains items on a radical renewal and democratization of the party, if the party gives up its monopoly on power, Article 6 of the Constitution, if it gives equal rights to all public and political organizations in public life. It is also necessary to elect delegates to the congress directly from party organizations, and to renounce the principle of democratic centralism. It is also necessary to repeal the resolution of the 10th Congress of the party on factions and to allow them to be set up. If these issues of principle are not included in the platform of the Central Committee, the party will split and ultimately lose its authority in the eyes of the people. I think that the fate of the communist parties of East European countries may befall it.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH] What is your forecast for 1990?

[Yeltsin] We will roll back into an abyss given the situation when not one serious issue is being radically resolved. Like a gravely sick person, we will have a crisis this year. If Gorbachev opts for radical reforms it will be possible to retain the credit of confidence in the leadership and perestroyka. It is impossible to make further progress through half-measures and compromises. My program includes proposals for economic stabilization in three years....

[SOVETSKSAYA MOLODEZH] What position did you take on the problem of the Kuril Islands during your trip to Japan?

[Yeltsin] It seems to me that at present we should "unseal" this issue as soon as possible in order to improve mutual relations with our neighbor to the east. This is why I made specific suggestions for relieving the tension surrounding the Kuril Islands in five stages during a meeting with a number of Japanese statesmen. The first stage is to admit officially that such an issue exists. The second stage is to declare this island a free economic zone. The third stage is to demilitarize this piece of land. The fourth stage is to sign a peace treaty on the Kuril Islands. The fifth, final, stage will be decided by a new generation of the leaders of the USSR and Japan. Various ways out of this situation are possible: a joint protectorate, free islands. Fifteen years from now, some unconventional solutions might appear. It is exactly within this time frame that I propose to complete the first four stages.

In the course of answering questions, Boris Yeltsin set forth the idea that all the privileges of the command-administrative echelons should be eliminated without any parliamentary commissions, and special dachas, special sanatoriums, and other things "special" should be turned over to the least socially protected strata of the population, primarily children. "Our supreme leaders are served at present by the people from a certain KGB administration. Unfortunately, our people know little about it. Meanwhile, this is a tremendous apparatus which consists of cooks, governesses, guards.... It is time to liquidate this subdivision." In one of Yeltsin's answers, the idea of creating a new Russian party was stated but, as he put it, without the "com" prefix....

Medvedev Meets Education Officials

LD0103212190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] A meeting took place in the CPSU Central Committee today between Medvedev, a member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU, and a group of secretaries of party committees of the country's higher education establishments. They have gathered in Moscow to discuss the matter of setting up an all-union council of secretaries of party committees of higher education establishments. In his speech Comrade

Medvedev informed those gathered about the measures undertaken by the Central Committee for the democratization of party life. He dwelt on the fundamental problems raised during the course of the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress and of the preparation for the new CPSU rules. He drew attention to the importance of the mobilization of the intellectual potential of communists of the higher school to seek ways of renewing the CPSU quickly and decisively and of summing up, in a detailed manner, the practical experience of political work by primary party organisations under the new conditions. An exchange of opinions took place. Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev answered the questions of the secretaries of the party organizations.

Medvedev Meets With VUZ Party Secretaries

PM0203122990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting at the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a meeting 1 March at the CPSU Central Committee with a group of party committee secretaries from the country's higher educational establishments [VUZ]. They met in Moscow to discuss the question of setting up an all-union council of VUZ party committee secretaries.

Proceeding on the basis of an assessment of the sociopolitical situation within the country, V.A. Medvedev briefed the gathering during his address on the steps taken by the Central Committee to democratize party life and dwelt on the main problems raised in the course of the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress and the preparation of a new CPSU Statute. In this connection he noted the importance of mobilizing the intellectual potential of higher education Communists to seek ways of rapidly and resolutely renewing the CPSU and comprehensively generalizing primary party organizations' practical experience of political work in the new conditions.

Yakovlev on Rallies, Party Platform

PM2602151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Yakovlev article: "At a Watershed"]

[Text] Rallies, rallies... The speeches in the squares, if they have actually added anything at all to the state's reserves, have added only shouts of "down with"—down with the authorities of course—whatever authorities happen to be to hand. There are rumors, some more incredible than others. There are lies. There are leaflets designed solely to be as painful a blow as possible to the "enemy's" heart. There is a fever of irresponsibility; and reason is numbed. And all this breeds bitterness and wipes the smile from people's faces, fear steals into people's hearts, and *joie de vivre* vanishes. Are these paradoxes of our being or the seamy side of our legacy?

Yes, things are not going smoothly, there are plenty of difficulties and outrages too. But the process of social renewal and of moral recovery is advancing inexorably and there is no going back, so long as we do not stumble over stones in the roadway, do not lapse into a riotous emotional rampage, do not again drop the banner of freedom, which people have gained at so high a price, and do not fall into the temptation of populist destructiveness.

The country is moving toward presidential government and is preparing for the 28th congress, power is being formed at local level, and measures are being implemented to improve the health of the economy and finance. The USSR Supreme Soviet is examining draft laws on ownership, land, local self-management, and many others. The CPSU is offering society its platform of action for the immediate future.

All these are realities of perestroyka that now determine the state's future, its democratic development, and its material and spiritual prosperity. This is not a matter of reassuring statements, though it is high time we came to our senses.

I think there is general consensus that common sense is in favor of perestroyka. There is an awareness that we cannot continue to live the way we lived before. That in the recent past the country had begun to lose what it had gained, what it had created, and what it had achieved and to slip back socially and in science, technology, culture, and education. The poverty and quality of goods and services, the decline in health care and education, the increasingly backward structure and equipment of industry, and the downtrodden agriculture all speak in favor of perestroyka. As does the moral degradation that even stoops to neofascism and monarchism, that is, mocks the memory of the great revolution and the Great Patriotic War.

But we continue to experience fear of what is new, unfamiliar, unknown, and unaccustomed. We suffer from inertia and passiveness. We are prey to rooted freeloading attitudes and to the apparent easiness of living not independently but according to someone else's command and directive. We are accustomed to less than onerous work, to the apparent prosperity that stems from overreporting, to irresponsibility and laxity. The burden of habit and laziness of thought and action hold us back. We are also slowed down—and slowed down with great malice and vigor—by the various interests and groups that waxed fat under the former, pre-perestroyka setup and would like to continue to be able to do so in the future, regardless of what their egotism means for the country and the people.

But all this summons us to creation rather than destruction. Five years is quite a long time. It has proved the validity of the process of recovery. It has proved that there is no rational alternative to it—provided, of

course, that we want to see our country prosperous, thriving, and democratic. But these 5 years have also proved something else: The forces of opposition are strong and have far deeper reserves than some people may have supposed at first. And if we are making a choice in favor of overcoming their resistance, it must be clear that a struggle lies in store, a difficult struggle. Especially as, for the sake of the country's future, this struggle must be waged solely by legal, rule-of-law means, even when it comes to monarchists or anarchists.

In 5 years, perestroyka has arrived at a watershed beyond which the phenomena and processes it has brought into being will become determinant and will begin to shape all aspects of our existence. For this reason resistance to perestroyka is becoming more stubborn. In these conditions the CPSU is taking a step—a major step in the country's history, both in transforming society and in the perestroyka of the CPSU itself and a new consciousness of its functions in Soviet society.

Everything that makes up the content of the draft platform is the result of perestroyka. It is the result of the analysis carried out by it, of the theoretical breakthrough achieved by it, and of the spiritual, moral, and political changes that it has already introduced into our life. And this is what determines the main novelty of the document: It is the first strategic program for the renewal of society whose origins are not speculative but rooted in the very practice of renewal. For the first time in 73 years of Soviet power the CPSU is submitting for the people's judgment a comprehensive program for the improvement and development of everything created and built over these decades: the economy, social and production relations, political structures, interconnections between the individual, the collective, and society, and the party itself.

A review of approaches and principles had been put off for decades. Let us add to this all the distortions in former practices—we now have quite a full idea of their scale and meaning. This is why society is on the verge of a dangerous crisis. This is why it was necessary to conduct perestroyka simultaneously in all spheres. Had this been done in time, such a critical situation would not have arisen and there would have been no need for such radical and therefore painful perestroyka.

Understandably, in the period of the October Revolution and immediately afterward, when we were faced with the task of "breaking away" from the old society, socialism was identified primarily with overcoming the most essential features, symptoms, and characteristics of the past. And the first notions of what is socialist and what not emerged from the repudiation of bourgeois-landowner Russia. Then, later on, the cultivated worship of schemes and dogmas born of the practice of Stalinism was added to these.

But the real picture of society was far more complex. Especially of a society that had embarked on solving the age-old problems of social justice, humanism, democracy, and the elevation of man. Here you cannot manage with general formulas that are correct in terms of abstract theory but are too general to be put immediately into practice without mediating links and mechanisms.

The time has come to think about such mechanisms. In the proposed draft platform we see not only analysis and clarification of concepts and terms but also the direction of efforts to create such mechanisms. These are ramified socialist democracy and people's self-management, the renewal of the party itself, a planned-market economy, and a new USSR federation.

The platform expresses a new approach toward organizing supreme power in the country. It speaks of establishing presidential government. This is not a purely formal question. In our complex, huge, rich, multinational country, a country that lacks experience of democracy and political culture but is now attempting to make a breakthrough into the expanses of a free life, there is a need for a kind of symbol of unity, a guarantee of democracy and confidence in life, or, if you like, a custodian of the constitutional foundations of the state who is responsible before the law and the people.

Such a power is needed immediately and is all the more necessary tomorrow, for the complex situation in the country has arisen partly because there have emerged broad clefts of anarchy into which the forces of lawlessness and disorder in political and economic life have rushed.

We must put the law back on its feet, we must do this all together. The country needs law and order and the country's citizens need tranquillity and personal safety. It is time to resolutely stop the sordid wave of lawlessness, violence, and crime and the activity of mafia formations.

In essence, in my view, the difficulties that have befallen us are explained by the fact that economic reform is lagging behind political reform. In the political sphere dogmas are being overcome more rapidly because the people's masses have actively joined in the turbulent flow of life. But in the economic sphere the braking mechanisms, the mechanisms of the cost-based economy, and mismanagement still have us firmly by the coattails. Economic laws and norms are not yet working and, this being the case, management is ailing. This transitional period is putting us in turmoil. Along with the errors, especially in the financial sphere, which have unbalanced the consumer market. All this is keenly felt in politics and in public opinion. "Crazed" money is devouring not only goods but also power. Today this is the toughest political and economic knot, and a great deal, if not everything, depends on the untangling of it.

Man must really be at the center of social development and the party's policy. What does this mean? If there is a shortage of food, housing, goods, and services today, if the social sphere is weak and the countryside is lagging

behind, the whole economy, its organization and management, and policy must be attuned to really satisfying these needs as rapidly as possible. If the intensification of market principles, a multiplicity of forms of ownership, competition between producers, joint-stock formations, concerns, and so forth will help this, all this must be utilized without hesitation.

For it is now clear that if we retain untouched all kinds of "sacred cows" while the economy suffers from its old ills and things become no better for people, then all the talk of the socialist nature of this situation will amount to crude self-deception at best. And this is no longer a supposition, it is a fact proved by experience of life. It is elementary politics. And this is why the fact that the CPSU platform puts people's problems in first place is no mere rhetorical flourish. It is the essence of the new thinking, of the approach of renewal, and of the course of perestroyka.

There is one more feature of the precongress platform. Namely its passionate call for constructive, creative work. For unity, which presupposes pluralism, that is, a multiplicity of opinions, views, and approaches, but also mutual tolerance. And presupposes democracy and glasnost—on a basis of legality and discipline. This is unity not as mechanical obedience of commands, but as a conscious choice by each citizen.

Perestroyka has awakened hopes, hopes that the peoples of the Soviet state will achieve not only freedom but also material prosperity and spiritual renaissance. But it has also awakened passions, and, unfortunately, passions that do not always stem from reason and common sense, and has roused emotions in which those people are also wallowing for whom the people's interests are secondary and what comes first is the desire to hold sway over people, immoderate vanity, and the triumph of nationalist fanaticism.

Perestroyka is democracy and people's power, but only the law can be the reliable guardian of democracy. When the law sleeps, schemes fraught with trouble for honest people and all society ripen in dark corners of the human heart. To elect power in the streets is not democracy but arbitrariness disregarding consultation with the people. For anyone to lay claim to a monopoly of thought is unforgivable conceit and self-deception. A "witch hunt," a hunt for the "skulls" of culprits, and a thirst for your neighbor's blood are extremely dangerous symptoms of the mentality of those terrible years which crippled the souls of millions of people.

Discipline and responsibility are the main thing today in the developing democratic process, otherwise democracy will cease to serve the people.

The situation is difficult, it is not easy to live, and in people's minds at one moment there is the confusion of blizzards, at the next there is February slush.

These days and months, more than ever, we must come to our senses, display calm and wisdom, and not succumb to transient sentiments, and some people must moderate their ambitions. The thirst for power makes the head spin. Let worthy candidates reach power through the people's choice, but their consciences must be clear.

Stabilization of the situation and consolidation of society are vitally necessary in the name of the success of further transformations.

If we continue rocking the boat, we will all end up beneath the water. That is how the issue stands today.

We have struggled a great deal. Sometimes we have been forced to struggle, but often we have struggled on our own initiative. Sometimes against a real adversary. But sometimes against an invented or artificially created adversary. The urges for such a struggle are deep within our blood and mentality. But it is precisely our own experience of struggle that ought to convince us more strongly than anything that any violence degrades people and the nation, is an offense to democracy, and casts us back. Malice and hatred are immoral and can breed only violence.

Perestroyka, the attempt to straighten out life and to create new economic and political structures, has also highlighted the huge problem of Russia. Many ordeals have fallen to Russia's lot—it has endured them and has borne its cross with dignity. But today, when the ruin of the countryside and the poverty of urban life can be tolerated no longer, it is everyone's sacred duty of conscience to do everything possible, to do the impossible, to ensure that Russia can straighten itself up and breathe deep.

A bitter and hard destiny brooks no hysterics, it demands practical work and deeds rather than bogus lamentation, actions rather than buffoonery. Of course, for me personally it is unbearable to see my village of Korolevo in the Yaroslavl area now—three tumbledown houses just a little way from the city dachas. Clearly even these surviving houses will disappear and my childhood and everything connected with the peasantry will vanish into the haze of memory.

But what must prevail is not fevered vengeance but resolute action aimed at ensuring that peasants old and new stand firmly on the land, but stand as independent masters proud to feed the country and leading a worthy life themselves. In other words, the country cannot be prosperous unless Russia is prosperous.

Those are a few points about the draft CPSU Central Committee platform and the present day.

Yakovlev Perestroyka Volume Reviewed

PM2302181290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 18 Feb 90 p 7

["Book Review" by Len Karpinskiy: "Humanism, the Background for Perestroyka"]

[Text] Politizdat (Political Literature Publishing House) has brought out a new book entitled "Realism, the Soil of Perestroyka"—selected speeches and articles by Aleksandr Yakovlev, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

To put it bluntly, many such publications are viewed with some scepticism. In the past top Party leaders had the privilege of putting their names to books written by their aides and by writers specially used for the purpose. It would be more correct to call the books foisted upon us in huge editions the authorities' "selected instructions and injunctions" to their obedient nation. The book in question, however, is a phenomenon of a different order: Aleksandr Yakovlev does not call upon others to tackle the intricate problems of perestroyka, but instead he himself offers clear-cut solutions. These are his personal opinions for which he is ready to take the blame. Nor has the author reached these assumptions

But what is the main theme of the book? No matter what subject the author touches on, he is essentially speaking about the resuscitation and recovery of socialism through human emancipation and advancement.

Socialism with humankind as its focus is the essential purpose of perestroyka. "Political and economic success," writes Yakovlev, "is always transient. But man is eternal, his moral values are unchanging."

Please note that he means man in general, the human race in totum. And you will agree that this is something totally different from what was hammered home to us in the past: "human-kind is as nothing when judged outside of class consciousness."

Hence the second keynote of this collection—the comprehensive democratization of society. Socialism is closely related to the development of democracy. The latter also constitutes, according to the author, the only possible means of progress: "Democracy is simultaneously the prerequisite, the wherewithal and the purpose of perestroyka".

But democracy is contradictory in itself. Although it emancipates it also permits resentment to rise to the surface and gives vent to all the injustices suffered over many decades. Perestroyka, the author says, has been forced to pay debts by proxy, the debts of the preceding stagnation and prestagnation years. Where then is the guarantee that democratization will really yield prosperity and harmony instead of an aggravation of strife. This is a question of the utmost importance, not just for the author, but for all of us.

It is no mistake to say that for the author the universal moral principle is that integrating and consolidating force which underlies politics, economics, production, and even our day-to-day life. Through democratization society is turning its attention to the human factor while we are coming to terms with society, keeping it from falling apart. Democracy means tolerance, mutual respect and charity.

From generalized humanistic statements the author returns again and again to the drama of inter-ethnic conflicts. For human development is necessarily national develoment. But this, too, flourishes only with the ultimate triumph of that which is common to the whole of humankind. National pride becomes national arrogance and exclusivity, which soon results in social arrogance, and a feeling of social exclusivity within one nation. It is in the order of things that a nation which tramples on the dignity of another nation is bound to lose its own dignity beneath the jackboot of a strong tyrant.

Why then do many feel irked by a policy of charity and peaceful relations? The book says much about the contradictions and difficulties of the processes involved in perestroyka. By no means everyone is interested in the advent of a society providing healthy competition of knowledge and ability, the vindication of free enterprise and just rewards for talent and ability.

The author identifies dogmatism among the maladies which have affected society's spiritual well-being. The "deadening effect" of this desease of the consciousness has no equal. The author makes it clear that dogmatism is not a scientific theory, but a thriving attitude prompted by personal or group interests. Dogmatism is a perculiar "punitive apparatus" in the sphere of spiritual life.

Quite often, if not always, the weak assume a position of aggression. It is not accidental that most of those attacking the author's ideological position are dogmatic Stalinists, the politically dependent or high-pressure salesmen-"patriots" whose personal qualifications and competitiveness come under question. These people fear real conflict. Calumny and fabrication are reliable, tried-and-tested techniques for them.

"...As they say, if a person is right he must always be on the alert," Yakovlev writes. "Thus perestroyka, the cause of conscience and truth, must call for increased vigilance against acts of revenge from those guided by self-interest and dishonesty."

It might be advisable to include a number of articles written by Aleksandr Yakovlev before April 1985 in this collection. If I didn't know beforehand when these texts had been written, I would definitely think that they were written recently, now that it has become possible to write what one thinks. It is not accidental that each text has a footnote: "Published for the first time."

It means that the consolidation of democratic forces is the consolidation of a generation of people who have passed through the internal school of democracy in defiance of external despotic circumstances. Perestroyka mainly needs personalities, not "those in charge." This requirement acquires special importance with the CPSU transition to fundamentally new regime of activity—that of political competition within the multiparty system

now taking shape. Let us not forget that the newly-emergent socio-political groups resolved to act in opposition to the CPSU, are not, unlike the CPSU, burdened with an unseemly past. Presumably they will not miss the chance to accentuate this contrast. One thing alone can help the Communist Party—the human merits of Communists themselves as outstanding personalities marching in the van of the Party's renewal.

I am not going to sing my praises for the author. On the contrary, I have a few objections which are by no means new. I used to read the texts of Aleksandr Yakovlev's articles and speeches and feel as if they lacked something. The book gave me an idea what this was: the political "frisson" you feel as events actually happen. There is no personification of the opposing forces—their identity is not made obvious.

I understand that here, too, the author is evidently held back by the principle he professes of tolerance towards those who think and act differently. But then he himself constantly reiterates that perestroyka is a critical, dramatic moment in time. The country will really have begun to feel the efect of perestroyka if the forces sabotaging it hear the admonishment "take care" in every second sentence pronounced by the democratic front.

Yakovlev Discusses Perestroyka Problems

LD2502154390 Moscow World Service in Russian 1000 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From "The Soviet Week" program]

[Text] Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has addressed the students of the Moscow Higher Party School. He devoted his address to the role of the party in perestroyka, beginning with the fact that many communists at the present time are displaying confusion because of the unusal and complex nature of the situation. The thing that is unusual first and foremost is the central task of perestroyka itself, since for the first time in world practice it poses the goal of conducting a comprehensive renewal of social relations. But let us listen to Aleksandr Yakovlev.

[Begin Yakovlev recording] An unusual thing is the realization that after decades of verbal lyricism, self-glorificaiton, and an arrogant attitude to the experience, approaches, and views of others, one suddenly discovers that in volume of production we are now third in the world, not second, and in social quality of life indicators we are not even among the top 10 states of the world, but only among the top 50 or 60. [end recording]

Another unusual thing is the reaction of the external world where friends and allies are suddenly in a matter of days becoming difficult to recognize, while those whom we have traditionally been inclined to regard still as enemies are suddenly declaring their support for perestroyka, Aleksandr Yakovlev went on to say. Finally the entire appearance of the party and the atmosphere outside and around it is unusual. It has fallen to the lot not merely of the party as a whole, but indeed of the present generation of communists and the present membership of the party leadership at all levels to bear the moral and political responsibility for all the costs of the distant and the recent past. Some deserve it and some do not, but it has fallen to everyone's lot. The party and it headquarters find themselves under critical fire, and in the party itself, as is always the case when the question of responsibility arises, several tendencies, trends, and approaches are appearing. That is the picture of what is unusual, Aleksandr Yakovlev noted.

Many are still too frequently striving to think according to previous attitudes and categories, and only adapt previous attitudes in a minimal, frequently mechanical way to the present conditions. There is still an expectation that some clever person and some authoritative person will provide us with a magic formula for answering all the questions and issue us with instructions for whatever may occur in life. This is not possible.

In this connection Aleksandr Yakovlev dwelt on the CPSU platform adopted at the February plenum of the central committee. Is this platform ideal as an action program, he asked. Of course not.

[Begin Yakovlev recording] This is not only because nothing ideal exists in general. The platform is one of the results of perestroyka and this is its strength. However, this is also the prime cause of its shortcomings or indeed of what some communists perceive as shortcomings. The platform has developed out of the experience of perestroyka, out of the vast realm of information that it has opened up for us, the frank and honest analysis of the state of affairs, the new social atmosphere created by perestroyka, the outlook that has become possible also thanks to perestroyka and, of course, out of its practical deeds, and everything that has been successfully accomplished as well as that which has not yet been achieved or has not turned out for the best. [end recording]

Aleksandr Yakovlev went on to say that the diseases of the economy and society had been too neglected. Too many grave problems have accumulated. The problem today is to preserve what has been achieved and to preserve the standard of living, the social gains and guarantees, and the social protection of the individual. We will be able to do so only if we radically restructure the entire organization of life itself. Only when we restructure will we create the economic and political foundation of qualitatively new social relations. Only then will we be able to move ahead. This is the reality, Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, emphasized. Otherwise other forces will overtake us.

After his address Aleksandr Yakovlev answered numerous questions from those participating in the meeting. He noted that a considerable part of the current troubles deprives from the fact that in the Soviet Union

there is neither personal nor departmental responsibility for the development of the state. This even applies to relations within the CPSU Central Committee. Commissions and subcommissions are created and it is not known who is personally responsible for various matters. It should be otherwise. The Council of Ministers should be responsible for the economy and the legislative bodies for their sector, while the party should be able, through the communists located in various sectors of work, to influence the strategy of economic and social development.

Answering a question on which political forces might in the longer term be rivals to the communist party, Aleksandr Yakovlev said that, judging by certain observations, social democratic thinking is gaining some strength. It is difficult at present to say how this process will develop, but one thing of importance is that, if at some stage of development some competing party appears, it must be responsible, be based on socialist ideas, and defend the interests of the country and the people.

Aleksandr Yakovlev was asked to describe what kind of presidential system he envisages in the Soviet Union and why it is needed.

[Begin Yakovlev recording] My starting point is that when we used to have one-man government in the country, the question of democratic process did not really arise, but now that this stormy democratic process has entered our lives, now that a vast number of forces of the most varied kinds—and not always creative ones—have surfaced, we have actually ended up with anarchy. We have nothing to guarantee legality, the constitutional system, and the country's integrity, no symbol of statehood. [end recording]

Take the country's Constitution, Aleksandr Yakovlev went on. What decisions does the Constitution permit the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet to take? None at all, apart from assembling the presidium. We do not even have the right of veto over decisions of the legislative or executive bodies. The idea that the country can be governed by either the executive or the legislative power alone is an illusion. I think, emphasized Aleksandr Yakovlev, that our extensive, multi-ethnic and very complex country needs the institution of president as a symbol of our country's statehood and integrity as well, and this may in addition contribute some element of stability to the development of the state as a whole. The president should be a consolidating core uniting us in times of both of calm and of difficulty.

Asked how he envisages the future role of the party chairman, Aleksandr Yakovlev said that the chairman should be the party's leader and bear responsibility for the strategic and political strands of the party's activities, while the organizational work should be done by some Central Committee body.

That was excerpts from the speech by Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Moscow Higher Party School.

Slyunkov Addresses Science Conference on Progress

LD2102235490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1740 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—Over 2,500 representatives of Soviet fundamental, higher education, and sector science and public scientific organizations took part in an all-union conference that ended today. The conference discussed ways of improving the management of scientific and technological progress in the USSR.

Nikolay Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivered the final report summing up the results of its three days of work. He said in particular that the economic situation and the progress of perestroyka in the USSR convince one afresh of the correctness of the conclusion of the April (1985) plenum and the 27th Congress of the party: The fundamental issue in economic policy lies in a cardinal acceleration of scientific and technical progress. However, the scientific potential that has been accumulated is not ready to implement fully the tasks facing the country. The unreceptive attitude of the national economy toward scientific and technological innovation that existed for many years, the imbalances in structural and investment policy and the omissions in the development of the material base of science led to barriers both between science and production and between academic, higher education, and sector sciences.

The course of economic reform has shown the need to seek new approaches to formulating high-efficiency economics and socio-economic, scientific-technical, investment and structural policies. It is not just a change in the levels of technology and production and increased monetary returns that are needed. A qualitative replacement is needed for the productive forces that have been created in the country—a replacement which is based on new front-ranking achievements in Soviet and world science.

Nikolay Slyunkov noted that the conference confirmed the need for organic unity in the management of socio-economic and scientific-technical development. This task should be tackled through a close combination of planning and market methods of regulating scientific and economic activity. In particular it is very important to work out a system of privileged taxation and provision of credit for progressive areas of science and technology, to establish differentiated prices, and to link the earnings of those involved in the cycle of innovation with the end results of their work.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary proposed that a system be arranged on a democratic basis for the interaction and consolidation of the forces of the scientific-technical public with state bodies and that thought be

given to the creation of a council on science and technology under the head of state, as is the practice in some countries.

He went on to stress the importance of strengthening the thorough character of state scientific-technical programs. The mechanism for their operation should be based on the principle of "science - technology - production - market". In this regard the introduction of a system of competitive financing of research projects will make it possible to overcome monopolies in respect of scientific truth and to break down the barrier between science and production.

Great attention in the speech was paid to problems relating to the regional management of scientific and technological progress and to the development of the USSR's international cooperation in the realm of science and technology.

Ligachev, Kryuchkov Attend Pasternak Celebration

PM1302120990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "A Knight of Russian Poetry"]

[Excerpts] The fact that Pasternak belongs to world culture is incontestable. And his recognition in his motherland is no less gratifying. That recognition was achieved through suffering by the outstanding poet throughout his life and creative work. Admirers of his luminous talent are now able to pay proper respect to the memory of this artist-citizen. A soiree was held at the USSR Bolshoy Theater 9 February to mark Pasternak's birth centennial, which is being celebrated worldwide under a UNESCO decision. [passage omitted]

The following attended the soiree: V.A. Kryuchkov, Ye.K. Ligachev, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, A.I. Lukyanov, Ye.M. Primakov, and Yu.A. Manayenkov. Representatives of the public and prominent figures of Soviet and foreign culture were also present.

Roundtable of CPSU, Informal Organizations

LD2002120990 Moscow World Service in Russian 1033 GMT 20 Feb 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Day by Day" program]

[Text] Representatives of the ruling party, the CPSU, and their opponents from informal public organizations have had a roundtable meeting in Moscow. During the discussion issues such as attitudes toward the socialist idea, renewal of the CPSU, and prospects for the future of the country were discussed. It is characteristic that when attacking the CPSU, the informals criticized its former methods of work and former apparatus. But to a large extent the party has changed today. New people have joined both elected bodies and the apparatus. The draft CPSU platform adopted by a Central Committee plenum gives hope that the renewal will get speed up. The meeting showed that today, in a situation of crisis for society, the idea of compromise and consensus is finding more supporters.

Komsomol Bureau Views CPSU Plenum, Hits Platform

PM2002123590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Komsomol Central Committee Bureau"]

[Text] In conjunction with the first secretaries of the union republic Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committees and the first secretaries of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol kraykoms [kray party committees] and obkoms [oblast party committees], the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Bureau discussed an information report by V. Mironenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, on the results of the February (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress.

As a result of the discussion, the session participants agreed that the course and results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism" attest to the efforts by progressive forces within the party to accelerate renewal processes within the CPSU and society.

At the same time, they noted that the document left much unsaid. It is clearly a compromise between trends and groups both within the CPSU Central Committee itself and in party organizations, and it offers no clear picture of the society to which the party aspires. In these conditions the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau comes out decisively in favor of radical transformations.

The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau regards the CPSU Central Committee's declaration on renouncing its monopoly and its readiness for political dialogue with other forces as a fundamental step. At the same time, it feels that the recognition of political pluralism must be underpinned by constitutional guarantees and the adoption of a law on political parties. The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau feels it would be advisable to begin "roundtable" consultations with representatives of various democratic movements.

The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau has declared itself to be in favor of the following:

A just solution to the nationalities problem in the USSR and the earliest possible conclusion of a new union treaty designed to transform the USSR from a unitary association of republics into a union of states with authoritative presidential power;

The adoption of a decision on equal functioning for different forms of ownership and the limits and extent of

these forms of ownership, working on the basis of economic and social expediency at local level;

The revision of the sections of the CPSU Statutes and corresponding party decisions which have turned the Komsomol into a "supervised" organization.

The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau urged young Communists, members of the Komsomol, and young people in general to boldly approach the all-party discussion with their own ideas and political initiatives. The general dissatisfaction with the pace of renewal of all aspects of society's life must, as noted, develop into constructive participation by young people in working out really revolutionary solutions. Young people must be heard.

The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau has recommended that the country's Komsomol organizations discuss the documents of the February (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress and generalize the proposals they receive; it proposes that they then be discussed in March at a Komsomol Central Committee plenum.

CPSU Plenum Materials Published

LD0203194490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] A collection of materials from the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 5-7 February, 1990, has been published. It contains Comrade Gorbachev's report on the draft platform for the 28th Congress, the draft itself which was approved by the plenum, and other materials. The book has been put out by Politizdat [Political Publishing House].

Democratic Platform Official on CPSU Problems

AU0203102390 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Feb 90 pp 2,3

[Interview with Philosopher Igor Chubays, by Peter Dunai: The Party Will Disintegrate As Early As This Year"—in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpts] He is a pleasant, red-bearded man in his forties. He is a philosopher. He is an assistant professor at the prestigious College of Dramatic Art. Long ago, at the beginning of restructuring, together with many other young people, he took the opportunity of renewal seriously and began seeking a common way with others. He confronted and polished his ideas as a member of the Perestroyka Club, the first "non-formal" organization. Today, the pioneers of this club represent the engine, a rather active core of the unofficial political organizations. Everyone started in this club, from the heads of the Social Democrats, up to the left-wing of the Democratic Alliance. Igor Chubays was among those who remained in the party and has been seeking a way out of the crisis that is threatening the Soviet Union and the CPSU with an almost imminent collapse. Our Moscow correspondent interviewed him.

[Dunai] Igor, you are known as an outspoken person. Recently, you drew the attention of the people at the mass meeting held in Moscow on 4 February, when you said that "there are enough people here to storm not only the Winter Palace but also the Lubyanka" (the KGB image).

[Chubays] I was admonished for this sentence of mine by some party leaders. This sentence contained one of the essential elements of my program: We must eliminate the KGB and maintain only its foreign intelligence departments. In addition, we need to eliminate censorship, to hold really free elections, and to reelect all the power bodies. In our economic life, we must implement the principle of "land to the peasants and factories to the workers." Inefficient collective farms should be eliminated and their land should be given into private property.

[Dunai] Do many people in the party share your radical views?

[Chubays] We can no longer speak of the party as a uniform entity. The CPSU will disintegrate this year. Naturally, this will be a painful process both for the conservatives and the reformers, but this is inevitable. The optimists count on the split of the party only at the 28th Congress. The less optimistic version has it that the split will occur after the elections (at the end of March, beginning of April). Besides, according to a recent survey, 30-40 percent of party members are reform-minded and they largely share the ideas expressed in our democratic platform. Another one-third of the members are hopelessly conservative and neo-Stalinists. The remaining part is insignificant for the time being.

[Dunai] Where would you put Gorbachev?

[Chubays] Many people say that he is a centrist. In my view, the notion of centrism has no place in the party today because this has a meaning only in a democratic society. Either democratization, or totalitarianism. The Gorbachev line, or the CPSU Central Committee platform, does not satisfy anyone, precisely because of its centrist nature. [passage omitted]

[Dunai] The Democratic Platform proposes roundtable discussions with the participation of representatives of unofficial democratic movements, along with representatives of the prevailing power. The national demonstration scheduled for 25 February, the mass rallies, and the demonstrations are serving this goal, namely to force the leadership to the negotiating table. [passage omitted]

[Dunai] According to the "official" opinion of the CPSU, the party can be reformed, despite its bankrupt state; thus, there is no need for roundtable negotiations.

[Chubays] The party has exhausted its possibilities and its renewal is not realistic; thus, it has to be reorganized

into a social democratic party. The party can no longer be maintained in its current form, because it cannot be renewed, reorganized, or democratized.

[Dunai] How can the elimination of the party and the creation of a new party be carried out?

[Chubays] From within, by remaining within the party. Leaving the party is not a solution. The party structure—which is still stronger than anything else—should be used to build new parallel and alternative organizations. Thus, a double power would emerge within the party. [passage omitted]

[Dunai] What opportunities does your Democratic Forum have in disseminating your own information?

[Chubays] The official press organs have little interest toward us. We are now preparing to change our press organ OBNOVLENIYE (Renewal), an organ that has been xeroxed so far. I hope that our new press organ, the Democratic Platform, will be a real newspaper published in a real press.

Economic

Consultant Addresses Implications of State Debt

904A0206A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 8, Feb 90 pp 14- 15

[Article by B. Fedorov, consultant of the Socioeconomic Department of the CPSU Central Committee: "Credit for the State"]

[Text] **The country's state debt... Last year its amount was estimated at 400 billion rubles [R]. Is this large or small? Where is this sum derived from? Is it possible to eliminate the state indebtedness, and in what amount of time? Finally, what are the paths to achieving this? The questions are far from idle. The problem of the state debt is a political problem.**

In spite of such a significant amount of the state debt, in our country up to this point there has been no full-fledged system for its accumulation and servicing. I am not going to assert that we need a special law on the state debt but we must clearly determine what is included in it. In any developed country the amount and structure of the state debt can be found in a statistical reference. For a long time we have not only denied its existence but we have not even had the concept of a state debt.

What is a State Debt?

To put it simply, the state debt includes everything that makes up for the shortage of money for the financing of its activity. In developed countries the state debt consists almost exclusively of various securities which have concrete addressees—the population, the banks, companies, and foreigners. Thus in March 1989 the total U.S. national debt was $2.741 trillion, including $2.738 trillion in securities.

In our country the state debt includes indebtedness for bonds from state loans and credit borrowed from the Gosbank [State Bank] and also money mobilized by the savings and insurance systems. According to my calculations, the R400 billion that are usually mentioned comprise at best three-fourths of the actual amount.

But what is the reason for the state indebtedness? The main reason is the deficit financing of the economy (state expenditures being greater than revenues), the devaluation of money, and the decline of the buying power of the ruble. Therefore it is possible to get rid of the state debt only by eliminating the deficit of the state budget and halting inflation.

But as soon as the state debt is a reality it is necessary to have the corresponding system for its financing and control. What should it be?

First of all it is necessary to distinguish between finances and Gosbank resources. The government should not automatically dispose of the loan fund. In the majority of countries the government has the right to borrow money from the central bank in strictly limited amounts and with the corresponding backing (for example, gold or foreign currency). I think that we too should adopt this practice, legislatively restricting the government's use of Gosbank resources for financing the budget to a specific sum and making it available only under certain conditions.

Moreover, all resources borrowed by the state from the bank should be reprocessed into a debt with specific repayment deadlines. It should be made to pay for the use of this money, envisioning in the budget a special item called "servicing the state debt." It will also be necessary to have a well-thought-out strategy for refinancing the debt, in other words, making new loans to pay off those whose time periods have expired.

Who should be in charge of the state debt? The answer to that question, in my opinion, is simple—the Gosbank. In other words, the institution which is constantly in contact with the other banks and can use them as creditors of the state. Controlling the debt is an extremely important function. Any "failures" are directly reflected in the monetary circulation and the stability of the ruble. A decision to increase the debt should be made by the government and must be approved by the country's Supreme Soviet. And the Gosbank will be in charge of operations for distribution and refinancing.

The concept of the state debt also includes regional aspects. The general principle says that the budget deficit of the central government should be financed by its own loans. At the same time all republics should have the right to issue bonds for financing their own expenditures, distributing them mainly on their own territories. Until the creation of a full-fledged financial market the conditions for local loans, it would seem, should be coordinated with the USSR Gosbank in order to eliminate unnecessary competition (it is possible to establish a waiting list for the issuance of loans).

A full concept of the state debt requires new approaches to the foreign debt. The main thing, in my view, is to control this debt from a unified center. And we should make a clear line of demarcation between state and commercial foreign loans. Republics, ministries, banks, and enterprises must take responsibility for the credit they receive. There should be no automatic redistribution of foreign credit in the form of budget allocations. It is much more effective to hold currency auctions and distribute currency in the form of credit with specific deadlines for repaying it.

What Kinds of Papers to Issue?

The 1990 budget envisions financing the state budget deficit by issuing securities. It is planned to issue bonds for the population in the amount of R15 billion and for enterprises—in the amount of R60 billion with five percent annual interest and a period of 16 years.

But are we prepared to issue and distribute securities for such a significant sum? In my view, not completely. First of all we have not thought through the consequences of issuing enormous amounts of securities all at once. It is doubtful that our enterprises, which have no experience in investments, will voluntarily give up a large part of their free funds. And there might not be a demand for securities among the population: The five percent paid for them annually will not be sufficient incentive for their consumption.

Therefore unless we have a clear cut strategy for issuing and distributing securities, flooding the market with them might merely exacerbate an already difficult economic situation in the country. But what should we envision?

State securities, in my opinion, should be issued for various periods of time: From treasury notes (for a period of three-12 months mainly for enterprises and banks) to medium- and long-term bonds intended mainly for the population. In the first stage we must not be oriented only to loans for periods of 15-20 years. Under the conditions of uncertain prospects for the development of the economy this could cause a lack of confidence among the population. The time period that would be optimal for today, judging from the experience of the PRC, Hungary, and Poland, is three-five years. These papers could then be refinanced with new loans.

Under our conditions we should take the path of signature bonds. This should involve computer registration of the owners of the bonds and the holders should be given signature certificates. This is necessary primarily in order to prevent the laundering of dirty money.

The emission of new securities should take into account the securities that are already in circulation—bonds for 1982 and unpaid securities—bonds from the fifties. In order to avoid mass sale of bonds from 1982 (which were issued in the amount of R18.4 billion) in the event of the issuance of more marketable securities, we should envision the conversion of existing loans, including those from the fifties, into new ones—under beneficial conditions.

The issuance of new securities should be coordinated with the interest policy of the State Savings Bank. Otherwise there could be a simple shifting of money from one state "pocket" to another with no net effect (the bonds would be purchased with savings).

A guarantee of successful distribution of the state debt would be immediate steps to create a market for securities on the basis of state and commercial banks. More than 200 commercial and cooperative banks have now been created in the country and this would be a natural function for them. The prices of the bonds in this market should reflect the supply and demand, that is, in the final analysis, the level of interest rates and inflation. The distribution of the state debt without the creation of a regulated "secondary" market of freely circulating securities would be limited in scope.

When organizing secondary circulation of securities one must be oriented at the same time toward the advanced experience of other countries. For the traditional securities exchange as a place for trade in securities in developed countries is increasingly giving way to trade on the basis of computers and telephones. I think this is the most promising path for us.

World Practice of Calculating Inflation Adopted

PM0603164390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Romanyuk report: "Living Standard and Inflation"]

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Statistics has started practical work on calculating inflation and the living standard of the population on the basis of the methodology accepted in world practice.

The level of inflation for 1989 calculated using world statistical methods looks like this: There was a total drop of 7.5 percent in the purchasing power of the ruble, of which two percent was the actual change in prices, and 5.5 percent was suppressed inflation caused by the imbalance between the supply of money and of goods.

No one particularly questions the dynamics of suppressed inflation. But the two percent direct growth in in prices seemed dubiously low to many people. The USSR State Committee for Statistics held a press conference last Wednesday during which the committee's leading specialists half-revealed their "trade secrets" and demonstrated the methods for producing data concerning social statistics. In particular, prices of 650 items in the state trade network and 50 items produced by cooperatives and individuals are now being registered in order to calculate the price index for population groups.

Admittedly even these average figures do not reflect the picture at the republic and regional level, not to mention

in individual groups of goods. Thus the price of potatoes rose by 13 percent in the past year, vegetables by six percent, and fruit by 11 percent.

When doubts were again voiced about the accuracy of the calculations at the press conference, L. Umanskiy, member of the collegium of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, called for independent expert assessments to be carried out. Well, I think that the public must "pick up the gauntlet." Although the positions of the State Committee for Statistics seem preferable today. The quoted statistics for family budgets lend a certain strength to the calculations. But questions arise with respect to certain population groups, particularly those on the poverty line. For instance, the indexation of the living wage is made more complicated by the absence of a unified approach toward the question of the poverty level in our country today. A series of "shopping baskets" has been worked out—it is calculated that there will be around 30 of these for families with various income levels.

So much for the living wage. As for calculations of indexes of price levels for other population groups, calculation of these will begin from the second quarter of the current year. "Shopping baskets" will appear among the statisticians' instruments in May in both physical and cost terms Prices of services—health care, legal consultations, and others—will also begin to be calculated for the first time. The index of the cost of living will be examined in several versions for various population groups.

I asked L. Umanskiy how the index system is used. It turns out that for the time being it is only used to inform the public. Which isn't enough! Admittedly it is intended that it may be used by the government for the indexation and review of pensions and grants in line with the growth in the cost of living. This has long been done in the civilized world. We are only beginning to adapt to world experience.

Agricultural

Production Figures for Stock Farms Discussed

PM0603131590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Ye. Grigoryev under the rubric "In the Mirror of Statistics": "What We See on the Shelf"]

[Text] Although winter has already "met with" spring, there are different readings on the stock units now: stocks of feed and livestock productivity. After all, it is such a long way still to summer! And, of course, stocking the food shelves is something that perturbs everyone.

The workers of Latvia's villages did not please us last year when they reduced meat production. Milk yields have declined on the stock farms of the Transcaucasus, Kirov, Perm, Kemerovo, and Kamchatka oblasts and Checheno-Ingushetia. Were it not for such disruptions, the increase in meat and milk in the country compared with last year would have been not three or two percent, but considerably more.

These percentages are "collected" more confidently where people are unstinting in buying equipment, organizing a reliable feed base, and caring for people. Geared toward intensive methods, the Moldavian farms have brought cows productivity up to 4,015 kg of milk. (Let us compare that with the average of 2,854 kg for the country). The exploits of the stock raisers of Belorussia and Kirghizia are also notable.

In the mirror of statistics we can see not only end results but also how they were reached. Where thriftlessness rules, as is well known, production goes downhill. Well, surely you cannot continue to count on a serious market if only one-fifth of forage is processed in advance. Even grain is sometimes given whole to livestock. After all, according to those same statistics, nearly one-third of farms have no feed shops in their cow sheds.

The hay shortage is just as huge—66-77 million tonnes. And that with the 325 million hectares of meadows with which nature has endowed us!

Nonetheless an increase in meat and milk production was achieved last year. It enabled the processing industry to increase the production of meat, cheeses, and sausages and to fill the shelves of the city markets with them. The sale of mutton and pork there increased 8-14 percent compared with the previous year. It is true that the sale of beef fell seven percent. And, which is distressing, prices increased. The city inhabitant began to pay six to eight percent more per kilogram of market meat than in the previous year.

And stoppages on the stock units are continuing to make themselves felt. While January was generous in terms of milk (a three percent increase in yields), there was a decline in meat production. The farms reduced the sale of livestock while the processing industry reduced the production of meat articles.

So there is food for thought for the rural workers: Prepare better for the new pasture season to avoid repeating the errors from which we are all suffering, constantly coming up against the meager stocks on the food shelves.

Swelling these stocks is not only an economic but primarily a political task. The general social state of society, the people's trust in the authorities, and the success of perestroyka as a whole depend directly on its implementation.

Scientific

Mir Crew Begins Fourth Week of Space Flight

LD0503201290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] The fourth week of their flight in orbit has begun for cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin. The crew of the Mir scientific research complex is today engaged in unloading the automatic Progress-M3 craft which brought a varied cargo of 2.5 tonnes into orbit. Communications sessions via telemetric channels are transmitting scientific data to earth on the micrometeorite situation on Mir's flight path. Work in the near-Earth orbit is proceeding according to schedule.

Case for Underground Nuclear Stations Aired

PM0603113990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 2

[V. Umnov "Forecast" article: "Shall We Bury AES's?"]

[Text] Even before the nuclear power industry had emerged, an argument developed: Where is the safest place to site nuclear power stations [AESs]—on the ground or beneath it? Scientists took the former path, but without forgetting the latter. Experimental underground nuclear power plants, admittedly small-capacity ones, were constructed in the United States, Norway, Sweden, France, Switzerland, and also our country.

What is the gist of the argument, what is the point of "burying" AESs? The point would seem to be simple: It is necessary to increase the safety of the nuclear power industry as much as possible.

Here is A.D. Sakharov's opinion, which he repeatedly voiced and expressed in writing:

"I believe that the surface sitting of nuclear reactors should be prohibited regardless of what estimate is made of the likelihood of an accident and of what kind of accidents are regarded as technically possible. The point is that major accidents always occur unpredictably... And when it is a matter of nuclear reactors, there is always the danger that they will be destroyed as a result of a terrorist act or a military conflict."

The psychological argument is also equally important. After Chernobyl people are simply afraid of living near nuclear power stations.

Another point in favor of underground AESs is that in the event of an accident, the likelihood of an escape of radioactive material, the pollution of the locality, and the threat to people's health would all be many times smaller.

Now for the "cons" of underground designs. These problems are economic and technical. Such an AES must either be sited in rocky ground where there is no groundwater, therefore the spread of radioactive material is impossible, or be buried very deep, or be "placed" on a special tray.

Estimates of the cost of such AESs diverge widely. According to the USSR Academy of Sciences Kola Scientific Center, for instance, costs increase by 10-15 percent for a buried station, and by 15-20 percent for a station sited in rocky ground.

So which comes out on top? As yet specialists do not provide an unequivocal answer. After all, underground projects—both research and planning ones—have been studied largely on the initiative of various organizations, and so are still at the initial stages. They have had no unified targeted program nor coordinator. They have often been based on the same principles established in the "surface" nuclear power industry.

But underground AESs have many peculiarities, and the experience of the subway construction administration, the mining industry, and the creators of compact nuclear reactors for ships would be useful here.

So are we going to bury our nuclear power stations? I think the answer to that question will emerge in a few years. The scientific and technical council of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Fuel and Energy Complex examined this issue at the end of last year.

The Academy of Sciences and the country's Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry received instructions to hold in 1991-92 a competition for designs for the construction of one or two limited-capacity underground stations—specialists believe that small reactors may be the most promising.

Military

Missile Officer Discusses Cuts in Armed Forces

PM0603152190 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English Nos 8-9, 4 Mar 90 p 11

[Interview with Igor Sergeyev, deputy commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, by Yuriy Teplakov; date of interview not given: "Main Headquarters of Strategic Rocket Forces": "We've Broken the Habit of Disarming Ourselves"]

[Excerpts] [Teplakov] "For too long we've lived in a world of myths. One of them was that the 'Army is the beloved offspring of the people.' It was hammered home to us from childhood. Even now one hears in kindergarten: 'Our Army is strong and stands guard over peace'...And it seemed that the Army was better than one's own home. Is this really so?" This was my first question to the general.

[Sergeyev] "The Army is first and foremost a stern necessity. And this is only how it should be perceived. Both from the positions of state interests and from

purely human positions. Although I remember the time when the Army really was better than one's own home. In 1940-50 it was only via the Army that rural boys could escape the collective farm. Having completed their term of military service, they received a passport. And with a passport they stayed in the city, got accommodation in hostels, built dams and smelted steel. This was better than working on the collective farm without wages and without the right to choose a place of residence. People in the Army felt well fed in comparison with those hungry in the countryside. And the greatcoat was warmer than a torn quilted jacket. People were delighted to go into the Army." [passage omitted]

[Teplakov] "I believe that there are some who still profess the Stalin-Voroshuilov outlook on the Army: make everything secret, hide everything, employ windowdressing, have absolute confidence that you are right. Why do most of our generals, whose number has topped 6,000, so furiously, with such hostility, respond to any criticism addressed to the Army, claiming that all this merely brings grist to the enemy's mill and saps the troop's battleworthiness?

[Sergeyev] "The curtain of excessive secrecy is falling, and many feel uncomfortable without the usual fences. It has become possible to make comparisons with other armies - to compare the living conditions of officers, their social standing in society, the training of soldiers - and this has given birth to some very sad thoughts. The Army has found itself simply unprepared for dialogue. Yet dialogue is absolutely essential.

"There is a great deal of facts to ponder. On the one hand, in our rocket forces there are regiments which have not seen a single injury in the past 15 years, not a single scandal with equipment or any breaches of the regulations. On the other hand, the number of recruits with previous convictions doubles in every call-up.

"Until 1988 the number of deaths had been steadily falling among soldiers. But all of a sudden, last year, tragedies became more frequent. We started analyzing. As it turns out, this was due to the fact that students had been discharged from the Army. The new replacements were unprepared to handle the sophisticated hardware which the Army has attained. We have more than 2,000 specialities alone. Try and master them when some soldiers do not even understand Russian. Statisticians have told me that the number of privates with no command of Russian increases by nearly 5 percent with each passing year. Problems keep piling up...

"It would seem that the shortest way to their solution is to have a 100 percent professional army, the more so that privates account for less than a quarter of the total personnel in the rocket forces.

"Is a professional army more effective in comparison with the existing one? Beyond all doubt. But can we afford it? No, we can't. Even today about 200,000 families of officers have no homes of their own and have to rent rooms or part of a room.

"There are other meaningful reasons: training of the reserve, cultural (technical and general) background of the younger generation. Prior to the war we tried everything: a volunteer army, militia-based, territorial and national armed forces. But we won the war when the defense of the motherland was declared to be the sacred duty and obligation of everyone. Therefore many see universal military service as the symbol of our Army. That is also why generals are reluctant to part with this corner-stone of society. Kind of let well enough alone. But there is a need to look for better. We are living in a different time. What fighting men need today is not so much readiness to overcome privations (though this, too, can be useful) as intellect, knowledge and professionalism. This cannot be achieved by making everyone run through the corridors of the existing Army. Different times will come, and surgical operations will be indispensable from our Army. Pills, slogans and sacred duty will no longer do. Otherwise, defense will suffer."

[Teplakov] "But reliable defense does not always depend on us alone. In all probability, we shall withdraw our troops from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Will this not impair our defense?

[Sergeyev] "No doubt about it. Parity is intended for the present-day status quo. The defensive doctrine takes account of the existing grouping and alignment of troops. If we lose space, we shall come closer to danger. If someone loses in parity, it means that someone else wins. The coming changes in the Warsaw Treaty Organization certainly spell a loss for us militarily. All the theoretical logic about replacing the military-political alliance with a politico-military one comes as poor consolation. This is a play on words."

[Teplakov] "Considering the global weapons which you possess, does the territory factor have any considerable part to play for the country's defense?"

[Sergeyev] "This is a view from aside. Super-pinpoint combat materiel is being developed. American Tomahawks and air-based cruise missiles have an action range of 4,000 km, hitting targets with a deflection of 10 m. In the long term, accuracy will become absolute—if need be, a missile will hit an infantryman. They will be able to carry warheads permitted in conventional warfare. Therefore it is very important for our strategic nuclear missiles to be as far as possible from the line of combat contact. The more so that NATO's concept—follow-on forces attack—implies action along the entire formation of our battle order. Therefore something will have to be changed in the defense. After all, the chief criterion of the military doctrine of a state is the possibility of implementing it.

"I'm not a hawk by nature or in my professional views. This evidently has also been understood by my American colleagues, who studied my part in drafting the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. But I, too, have doubts when I study both declassified information and intelligence data on

prospects in the development of combat materiel in the United States, the operational training of its troops, their organizational structure and battle orders. What is striking is the growing share of research and development in the appropriations. Money is spent on weapons and development of weapons. In 1980-84 this share stood at 23.4 percent, in 1985-89—at 27.8 percent and in 1990—at already 34 percent (tenatively). This is an interesting indicator.

"Furthermore. Of the total spending on research and development projects, 31.1 percent is invested in strategic nuclear forces, 21.5 percent—in intelligence and communications. In order to see and hear our every step and sigh? Not only. This is vital for delivering pinpoint strikes.

"As a human being, I would like to believe that nothing will happen, but as a professional, I have to ponder counter-measures."

[Teplakov] "Suppose the world has in general given up nuclear forces, would that relieve your headaches?"

[Sergeyev] "A nuclear-free world? I find that hard to imagine. A lowering of the nuclear threshold? This is clear. Incidentally, when we started talks on the elimination of medium- and shorter- range missiles, I, admittedly, did not have much faith in the end result. I thought it was some diplomatic move. But everything new, as philosophers say, arises in the image of heresy. Maybe that's why, to me, a nuclear-free world seems impossible."

[Teplakov] "The 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, which is already near, will evidently be a step towards such a world? Are you glad?"

[Sergeyev] "I may be glad, but it's a lot of worry and a lot of money. The very process of elimination is a costly affair. Especially when there is a need to take care of nature. We destroy medium- and shorter-range missiles by the method of wasteless production. Here is the latst information, certified with American experts' blue seal, 'out of the 1,215 combat units, 630 have already been destroyed, processed and sent to nuclear power stations'. The units were smashed at the missile range in Kapustin Yar. Now we are preparing to send another consignment there."

[Teplakov] "An odd metamorphosis—I remember how our people rejoiced that we could produce so many missiles, and they gave it their all if only there were more missiles, if only there would be no war. Now we rejoice at destroying them."

[Sergeyev] "People are irked not by missiles as such, but by their surplus. After all, forgetting old ideologicl cliches, it has to be admitted: peace has been safeguarded precisely by nuclear parity, precisely by the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides. I believe that this guarantees the impossibility of world war. It can even extinguish local conflicts. The shadow of nuclear strike, with its merciless and inexorable force, always hangs behind one's back. Some may think my beliefs go against their grain. Only quite recently we had different words, and deeds too."

[Teplakov] "But how many of these missiles do we need to have a world that feels safe?"

[Sergeyev] "Military parities follow in the wake of politics. In the INF Treaty there was the one-to-three ratio. But there is no military damage. Those who persuaded us that this Treaty must not be accepted, that this nearly spelled the end of our defense, seemed to have acted correctly on the face of it. But they considered the strategic variant: the United States—less, the USSR—more. But military parity was found as soon as they satisfied themselves that we were getting rid of the threat of Pershings which could pierce us by direct aim to the Volga, the blue ribbon of defense."

[Teplakov] "Why was the road towards this Treaty so hard?"

[Sergeyev] "We did not disarm ourselves for so long—we had lost the habit. We were always going up. And it was unusual, even strange, to be coming down. To this day they write: 'Aren't we stripping ourselves in the face of the threat from the West? Haven't we lost vigilance?' It is by such letters that, for example, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev explains his position. "If only they should not strike at the Armed Forces, should not lower their combat readiness."

"The Marshal can be understood. He passed through the war and saw the horrors of our impotence in the beginning of World War II. And since then his world view has been geared not to looking for ways for reciprocal weakening, but to covering and protecting everything as reliably as possible. The past baggage is pulling us back into the past.

"Proceeding from the old postulate—'constant military danger'—we have already 'gained' political capital, and morale too, in Europe when we replaced the obsolete SS-12 and SS-13 with the modern Pioneer complexes. We were laying aside, and excessively built up the grouping. We were also urged on by the fact that no one seemed to notice anything—space reconnaissance facilities were still poorly developed. Carelessness gave us full scope. Even the decision was taken by a narrow circle, distinguished solely by the abundance of Gold Star medals received for their birthdays. And to aggravate matters—all of this took place after detente had been endorsed at Helsinki-75. Later that lie, like lightening, instantaneously, killed our prestige. To regain it, years upon years are needed.

"I believe we are living in precisely such years."

Commander Tretyak Interviewed on Army, Navy Day

90UM0324A Moscow TRUD in Russian
23 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with General of the Army I.M. Tretyak, commander in chief of the Air Defense Troops, by V. Badurkin on the occasion of Soviet Army and Navy Day; place not specified: "On the Eve of Military Reform"]

[Text]**Is the Army to be professional, are its combat capabilities being lowered, is the discharge of students ahead of schedule warranted, has "dedovshchina" [mistreatment and abuse of recruits] been eliminated?.. General of the Army I.M. Tretyak, commander in chief of the Air Defense Troops, answers these and other questions asked by TRUD.**

[Badurkin] One of the most popular subjects lately is the military. Many, from students to people's deputies, are discussing the situation in the Army and its outlook. I would like to hear the opinion of a person who has spent more than a half century in the Armed Forces as to the condition of the Armed Forces today.

[Tretyak] That society is not indifferent to its Army is comforting. It is worse when it is evaluated by people who are not competent to do so. I have not yet met a person in my life who would be ecstatic over criticism directed against him. I am no exception. Of course, I do not accept malicious nit-picking. I read reasoned criticism with pleasure.

Has the Army changed? Yes and no. I will not talk about the technical side of the question—it is understandable. But with respect to soldiers and officers, there is something to think about here. I often catch myself making comparisons between my subordinates today with those whom I led into battle as a 22-year old regimental commander. There is the same loyalty to the oath, duty, and the native land. The same courage and readiness for heroic deeds.

But our whole society is changing with the years, and so are those people who come into the Army. They are not only more educated, but they are more demanding of social and everyday living conditions, and they aspire to greater democracy and legal protection. I see this, understand it, and accept it as proper. Another thing troubles me. Last year alone we reviewed about 2,500 reports of officers who could not cope with the burdens of military service. And what is most alarming is that among these there were 130 graduates of military schools. We must think about this problem and resolve it.

[Badurkin] Many speeches by military leaders note that perestroyka in the Army is moving along the path of "strengthening the priority of the qualitative parameters." What do you specifically mean by this term?

[Tretyak] You know that the total sum of expenditures for defense this year is 8.2 percent lower than last year. The structure of the Armed Forces is being changed in keeping with the new defense doctrine, and the process for reducing their numerical strength has been started. Given all of this, how does one avoid a reduction in the combat capability of the state? Only through the qualitative growth of its components. And this is people and combat equipment. Therefore, the main thing now is professional skill combined with discipline and high moral qualities.

We are also perfecting arms. For example, the obsolete TU-128 interceptors were replaced by the far more advanced MIG-31 and SU- 27. The same applies to surface-to-air missile systems and radar sites. This process affects all armed forces. The more so because now our relationships with enterprises of the defense branch industries are changing. The Ministry of Defense now will be in its rights not to accept poor quality equipment and to apply punitive fines for failure to meet contractual conditions.

[Badurkin] At the Second Congress, a group of people's deputies who are young officers put forth a program of reorganization of the Armed Forces...

[Tretyak] I am very familiar with this "concept of military reform," as the authors called it. It has quite a few constructive points, which are already in a stage of resolution.

[Badurkin] One of the main points of this program is a transition to a professional army...

[Tretyak] Yes, and I am not in full agreement with it personally. And not as a general and commander in chief, but as a people's deputy. For if you examine the problem of a professional army in its pure form, then for the military—from lieutenant to marshal—this is advantageous. Monetary salaries would increase substantially, social and everyday living conditions and other problems would be resolved better, but the main thing is that there would be a sharp increase in combat training and personnel discipline. For the Air Defense Troops, the question of professionalization is far from new. Already today, 35-40 percent comprise such specialists, and in aviation it is significantly more. But, nonetheless, I am against a quick transition. Because our society is not ready for it now. Not on a political, economic, or social level.

[Badurkin] Since we have already touched on the congress, then there is this question for People's Deputy Tretyak. Many people have observed that, during its work, a certain confrontation was noted between the deputy-officer corps and the deputy-generals. Is this not a reflection of the real situation in the Army?

[Tretyak] I would not call this opposition. In the officer corps, as in any collective, there can be (and there are) various opinions, views, and even polarized points of view. And this, perhaps, is not bad. No one needs a show of unanimity. Because even the "generals" in the national economy do not always coincide with the intentions of their subordinates. Everyone is free to think his

own way and to defend his own point of view. If the debate is conducted with reason, then a matter can only win from this. So there are differences on certain questions, but there are no antagonisms. I declare this with complete amenability.

[Badurkin] The decision of the Supreme Soviet of the country concerning the discharge of students was received in different ways in society. A bitter joke is making the rounds: Is it time to return to the Army its former designation—Worker-Peasant...

[Tretyak] Of course, this decision was hasty and not thought through. Here, the decisive role was played by emotions, and not by a well-considered approach. The leading specialists and the junior command personnel left the Army, as a rule. Just from Air Defense units, about 19,974 were discharged. Could this have occurred painlessly? Of course not. The result is a paradox: With one hand we vote to increase the professionalism of the soldier, and with the other, we vote to discharge highly professional specialists.

And more. They were demobilized to continue their education, but one out of every five did not even try to reenter a higher educational institution [VUZ]. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is preparing a proposal to the government to recall them to complete their service. I think that this will be fair.

[Badurkin] The Air Defense Troops are special. They protect our peaceful work directly. Are the "defects" of the Army, especially "dedovshchina," present in the Air Defense Troops?

[Tretyak] Unfortunately... In 1989, compared with the previous year, we were able to reduce the number of such crimes by one-third. I understand that this is not enough, but it is still a real achievement.

We are especially troubled now that "dedovshchina" is assuming a tendency toward mocking based on ethnic origins. At present, there are relatively few such incidents—11 percent, but if the recent outburst of national emotions is taken into account... We have to continuously consider this exceedingly unpleasant phenomenon in work, right down to the formation of individual alert duty staffs.

[Badurkin] And from your standpoint, what were you able to do that was most significant in your two and a half years in the position of commander in chief? Because you, as I recall, were appointed after the well-known "visit" of Rust.

[Tretyak] I would not like to tire the reader with a detailed report about my service activity. I will observe only that we reduced the number of stages of transmitting information, cut back command and control organs by 10-15 percent, and strengthened the subunits engaged in alert duty because the main load falls on them. More than 90 radars are activated every 24 hours to prevent violations of air space, about 100 commands are issued to bring surface-to-air missile batteries to a No. 1 readiness condition, and about 20 aircraft and helicopters take to the air. In January of this year alone, more than 220 reconnaissance aircraft approached the borders of the USSR.

Many people do not know about this. And this is good. This means we are working normally.

[Badurkin] Some of our readers were perplexed by the government's decision to increase the officers' pay rate, thinking that the military receives a lot as it is. Pardon my impudence, but, nonetheless: What is the rate of pay of a USSR Deputy Minister of Defense?

[Tretyak] When they talk about an increase in the salary, for example, of a teacher, then it is not a question of the chairman of the Committee on National Education or his deputy, but of that huge group of people which, figuratively speaking, sits behind a desk.

Until the present increase, a senior lieutenant with two children (the wife, as a rule, does not have an opportunity to work) received an average income per family member that was on the poverty line (R55-60). Other categories of junior and even senior officers are not much different. Add to this service duty at times equal to one and a half to two shifts. There is a popular saying that two permanent moves are equal to having one fire. And, during his service, an officer moves from six to 12 times. A lot has been written about how much he pays to rent part of an apartment. You cannot get by with R100 in the cities. So, calculate whether the R40-50 was a large addition.

As for myself, my new duty pay (without taking increments into account) is R620 (editor's note: The pay of a soldier in the U.S. Army is $783.60).

[Badurkin] So much has already been said about the daily living burdens of servicemen, and "things are still not moving..."

[Tretyak] Unfortunately, the "residual principle" in the resolution of housing and social and living condition problems has led to the fact that today in the Air Defense Troops more than 20,000 families of officers and warrant officers do not have apartments. We lack dozens of clubs, schools, consumer service facilities, and stores. Soldiers' barracks and mess halls are in a rundown condition in a number of garrisons. This did not happen today and yesterday. The problem has built up over the years. But it is not enough for the people that the leaders recognize the presence of the problem. Deeds are needed. Improvement in facilities and the resolution of the problems of housing and everyday living conditions are broadly reflected in my platform as a USSR people's deputy.

[Badurkin] Speaking in the Supreme Soviet, the minister of defense reported on the participation of the Army in the resolution of national economic problems: food, construction, etc. What do you think of an alternative service?

[Tretyak] Yes, today our subunits have to resolve numerous tasks that are not part of their mission. Even those who are on permanent alert duty. But, understand, this is not on behalf of a good life and not because the commander would like very much to raise bull-calves. Our table of organization does not have "pigpens," "shepherds," and "milkmaids." And this increases the burden on those who are on combat teams.

As an ideal, everyone should be engaged in combat training. But it is not necessary, I trust, to explain to anyone what the situation is in the country with respect to food and construction. So we take part of the burden on our shoulders.

The subject of an alternative service deserves attention. But this should not be service that is easy, a "loophole," for those who are too "resourceful."

In conclusion, I would like to say: Defense of the country is not a matter just for the military. The Army today, perhaps, as never before, needs the active assistance and support of all of the people. And not only in words. The main thing that is needed is action.

Baltic Republics

No Plans To Restation E. Europe Troops in Baltics

LD0603143190 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—Follows text of Soviet Defence Ministry Press Centre's statement, distributed here:

Some foreign news organisations, particularly Swedish, claim that some Soviet troops withdrawn from Czechoslovakia will be stationed in the Soviet Baltic Republics.

The USSR Defence Ministry Press Centre announces that such allegations are groundless. The stationing of the troops in the above-mentioned republics is not planned.

Riga Radio Carries Latvian Party Plenum 6 Mar

Deputies Begin Speeches

LD0603154190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0931 GMT on 6 March continues its live relay of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum. Procedural matters are undertaken, allowing first secretaries of rayons to speak. A debate on these matters follows.

At 0936 GMT Klautens, a rayon first secretary, begins his 12-minute speech to the plenum. He says the Riga gorkom plenum stressed that the organizers of the new party aim to weaken the Communist Party's ranks, not strengthen it. He says this is especially dangerous now, as the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet are forthcoming. He adds that the gorkom plenum has noted a lack of confidence in Vagris, Sobolev, Kezbers, Bresis, and Prieditis. He states further that the gorkom has expelled Rukmane and Zile from membership for undermining the foundations of the CPSU, aimed at splitting the Latvian Communist Party. Klautens concludes his remarks at 0948 GMT.

At 0949 GMT Aivars Goris refers to past mistakes. He says it is necessary for the congress to adopt a declaration condemning Stalinism. He notes there were the events of 1940, and also in 1988 a decision was adopted in Moscow without the participation of the Baltic representatives. The bureau cannot serve as a vanguard if it only acts as a buffer between different forces, for the old inertia leaders must be condemned, he urges. He supports convening the congress in April, saying the future of the party will depend on the new theoretical platform of the congress. Goris concludes his remarks at 0959 GMT.

Debate Continues

LD0603181490

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1000 GMT on 6 March continues its live relay of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Riga.

At 1001 GMT Lyalin, first secretary of the Leningradas Party Rayon Committee, addresses the plenum, in Russian.

At 1009 GMT Voldemars Sarkans, first secretary of the Talsi Party Rayon Committee, stresses that with the endeavors for an independent Latvia the party should be independent.

At 1019 GMT Dzenitis, the former Latvian SSR procurator, talks about the renewed CPSU platform, which he supports. He says a Communist who rejects the CPSU Central Committee platform could not remain a member, also noting a territorial dissociation, he says secession of Latvia from the Soviet Union would be an absurd step. The United States and West Europe cannot help Latvia. Discipline and order should be established in the country; there should be a move from slogans to workbenches.

At 1030 GMT Marite Rukmane emphasizes it is time to listen to primary organizations, not what comes from above, claiming one cannot wait for what the center says. She says it is time to establish an independent party. There would be a split with the CPSU republican organization, the conservative wing would break away. The independent party would be a multinational one, but there would not be only one-third Latvians. She says the party does not even have common election lists; she also has doubts about the forthcoming Latvian Communist Party Congress. The Communist Party must not be double-faced. She supports the proposal of many primary organizations for the Supreme Soviet to take under its care the property of the party.

At 1042 GMT Miervaldis Ramans emphasizes the importance of ownership and also is of the opinion that the new draft of the federation is not satisfactory.

At 1054 GMT Antons Gruduls, head of the Ideology Department, speaks in Russian.

At 1101 GMT, after approving an editorial commission, the session adjourns.

Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum Meets

Sets April 6 Congress

LD0603201590 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Riga March 6 TASS—By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina:

The plenary meeting of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee held here today decided to call the 25th Congress of Latvian Communists on April 6.

Earlier, the congress was scheduled for June. This decision was prompted by a possible split in the Latvian Communist Party.

As it was reported earlier, about 1,000 Communists from all Latvian cities and districts representing only one faction of the Latvian Communist Party gathered for a conference late in February.

They decided to hold a constituent congress of an independent Latvian Communist Party on April 14. The convocation of this forum before the 25th Congress of the Latvian Communist Party would actually mean a split between republican Communists.

Speaking at today's plenum, Latvian Communist Party leader Jan Vagris said the party is living through a crisis.

According to him, if radical decisions are made at the forthcoming congress, some Communists will change their mind to set up a parallel party. Vagris believes that any issue of perestroyka can be settled not by a split but by multiplication of democratic forces in the entire Soviet Union.

He familiarised the gathering with a new draft of the CPSU rules, stressing that this document, as well as the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, grants the status of broad independence to the Communist Parties of union republics.

Specialists believe that there are many common ideas in the positions of the new faction in the Latvian Communist Party and its other members. Both of them advocate the construction of a human democratic society.

The platform of the CPSU Central Committee proclaims the same goal. However, the new faction stands out for separation from the CPSU, while others believe that it is possible to achieve the sovereign status of the republican Communist Party within perestroyka in the Soviet Union.

Some speakers at today's plenum expressed the opinion that the 175,000-strong Latvian Communist Party, 70,000 of which are Latvians, may split according to their ethnic affiliation.

The decision of today's plenum to move up the date of the congress gives a chance for a dialogue and a compromise.

Vagris Delivers Information Report

LD0603143390 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0920 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Information Report delivered by Yan Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, at Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum in Riga—live, in Russian]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The state of affairs is changing literally every day. The process of democratization and perestroyka in the party is deepening right before our eyes, as they say. The acuteness of the problem is also growing in the Latvian Communist Party [CP]. A little more than a month has passed since the 18th plenum of the Latvian CP Central Committee. However, the situation today has already emerged on to a new level of tension. At the last Central Committee plenum, as you all remember, faced with the threat of a split of the Latvian CP, nevertheless, the conclusion of the need to maintain the organizational unity of its ranks on the threshold of the congress was supported, to go forward to a single scheduled party congress on a maximum democratic basis, taking account of all possible ideological platforms, and to resolve there all matters of principle on a platform of a policy of perestroyka. [passage omitted]

However, the plenum decisions did not satisfy those who were expressing extreme viewpoints, and immediately there was a withdrawal of a section of communists and party organizations from them. On the basis of the party committee of the University of Latvia an organizational committee was formed for a conference of supporters of radical perestroyka of the party. It was originally announced that it would be a gathering of like-minded people to discuss and work out their versions of documents of the Latvian CP to be presented to its scheduled congress, i.e. the impression was created that we were dealing with an element of precongress discussion, about the need for which much had been said at the previous Central Committee plenum. However, during the preparations for it the desire prevailed among the organizers to transform that conference into an organizational meeting to set up a new party. Indeed, on 24 February the conference under the clear pressure of the group of organizers set aside all other versions, and by a majority vote adopted the decision immediately to embark on the formation of a new party, provisionally under the name of the Independent Communist Party of Latvia [CPL], and to convene its constituent congress on 14th April this year.

Thereupon there was a response reaction in the form of condemnation and indignation on the part of a number of communists and party organizations. Such are the facts known to everyone, such is the bitter truth. The start of an organizational split of the Latvian CP had arrived, and the situation had become, basically, one of crisis.

The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau has already expressed its attitudes: It believes the decision of the conference contradicts the decisions of the 18th Central Committee plenum on convening the 25th congress of the Latvian CP, does not reflect the views of the majority of the republic's communists, and is directed at a split in the republican party organization. For this reason the bureau considered it necessary to convene today's plenum of the Central Committee to discuss the situation in the party, to make the necessary changes in the

resolution of the 18th Central Committee plenum and to the very process of preparing for the 25th congress of the Latvian CP. [passage omitted]

At first glance it seems it is simplest to take the formal attitude on the conference's lack of conformity to the rules and program of the party, and to start a campaign of persecution of supporters of the Independent CPL, up to an including their expulsion from the the party. Incidentally, such calls are already being heard, and several of them. But, comrades, we must understand that there are no easy solutions today. Let us ponder seriously: What will this produce? What will come from a campaign of internal repressions, at a time we are already daily losing communists, and by no means ballast. [passage omitted]

We must finally say openly today that unless there is a radical perestroyka in the Latvian CP, it will be primarily Latvians who will leave it, their proportion is already a little over one-third. This is a very serious matter. We must clearly realize that the Latvian CP, even if fairly numerous but virtually without Latvians or with a minimum number of indigenous inhabitants, will never be able to gain any real positions in the spectrum of political forces of Latvia. There must be no illusions on that score. [passage omitted]

Changes must evidently be made in the plan of preparing for the 25th Congress of the Latvian CP adopted by the 18th Plenum of the Central Committee. First and foremost what is at issue is that the time for holding the congress must be considerably brought forward, specifically it should start on 6 April of ths year. Why? Because if at the 25th congress we succeed in adopting radical decisions, some communists, and, I think, quite a few of them, will change their views on the need for the creation of a parallel Communist Party. I must inform the plenum members that the views of the bureau members were divided on this question, but the majority supports precisely this viewpoint. [passage omitted]

At the center of all discussions today there are two questions on which we must come to a common view. They are our understanding of state sovereignty of Latvia and the independence of the Latvian CP in the transitional period from a unitarian state to a real, equal union of sovereign republics. I think the basis for a single understanding of them should be comprised of the following tenets and approaches.

First, on the new union: In decisively rejecting the Stalinist model of the state system, we are consistently in favor of building a free union of free republics. It is precisely in this way that I would define the essence of radical perestroyka and renewal of the union. [passage omitted] The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau is still convinced any problem of perestroyka can be tackled not by means of splitting and splintering democratic forces, but by their unity and multiplication all over the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have declared several times that we see our task as being to build a sovereign and democratic state of Latvia on the clear understanding that the sovereignty of Latvia is not an end in itself, but a means or prerequisite for tackling successfully the problems of perestroyka on the basis of principles of democratic socialism in contemporary conditions of the republic, and for striving to achieve a rise in the quality of life for the people of Latvia. [passage omitted] Hence the road to the sovereignty of Latvia lies not against the Soviet Union, but against the unitarian state, administrative bureaucratic centralism, toward a democratic union of free republics. The logic of the development of events and common sense suggests that Latvia will be as independent and democratic as we ourselves make it with our own forces, by our own hands and minds in everyday work.

Now, about the second fundamental question, on the status of the Latvian Communist Party and its place in the socio-political structure of society. The aim of perestroyka in the party is clear; it is the formation of an independent and democratic party of left-wing forces of Latvia, a party of socialist choice. We will be able to restructure the Latvian CP in its currently functioning status as an oblast organization of the CPSU, in my view, without disrupting and breaking the whole system of deep and multifarious intra-party ties, but by restructuring it consistently and democratically, on a juridical basis.

The Latvian Communist Party must become a fully independent political party, operating on the whole territory of Latvia within the framework of its constitution and laws on the basis of its own program and rules. For this we must strive to ensure that the Latvian CP can carry out the possibilities envisioned in the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for independently deciding organizational, personnel, financial, and other questions of its internal party life, conduct its own publishing and management activity, determine and implement its own economic, social and cultural policy on the territory of Latvia. The independence of the Latvian CP—and this is provided for by the platform of the CPSU Central Committee—includes the right for direct participation in tackling the fundamental questions of the life of the whole country, of the whole Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the right freely, by decision of its higher organs, to decide itself the nature and content of relations with communist parties of other union republics and with the CPSU in the person of its leading organs.

In turn, the main direction of perestroyka of these relations will be the overcoming of the [word indistinct] of centralism, subordination, petty dictatorship and control on the part of the so-called center, and the creation of relations of reciprocal equal cooperation and partnership, and—this is of special importance—unity of loyalty to the policy of perestroyka and the ideals of humane, democratic socialism. For the sake of justice it must be admitted that in precisely this area a great deal has already changed, and we must only welcome and implement the specific proposals in this area contained in the

CPSU Central Committee platform. I am convinced we must boldly move forward in precisely this direction, and in a considered way make concrete our rights and obligations. [passage omitted]

These are two matters of principle in my view. First, let us call things by their proper names, and recognize that the proposed version in the platform of the CPSU Central Committee on forming the leading organs of the CPSU of course correspond to our interests but contain an element of territorial-organizational federalism, especially if a Communist Party of Russia or the Russian Federation is formed—and I am convinced that it will be set up—then the representation of leaders in the supreme organ of party power, i.e. the presidium, is already an element of federalism. I think there is no point in simplistically hanging on to individual episodes in the history of the party and on that basis depicting [word indistinct] the very word federalism as applied to party construction in contemporary conditions.

Second, the real content of independence of the Latvian CP will only [word indistinct] if we are able consistently to distance ourselves from the practice which took root for years whereby the party organization of the republic was led from outside, when we acted only on orders from above, as I already said. One of the most important guarantees of irreversibility of perestroyka in the name of incarnation of the ideals of human, democratic socialism and the priority of common human values on Latvian soil lies in how resolutely and radically we will be able to implement these tasks and the problems of perestroyka in the Latvian CP.

In conclusion, I want to again stress that I am deeply convinced that in a sovereign and democratic Latvia there should operate an independent and democratic paty of left-wing forces. For this reason we should not split, not splinter the forces of the party, but multiply them by a realistic policy and concrete work to overcome the profound crisis in society. We must not hunt out and fan the fire of reciprocal claims and mistrust of what today differentiates the various platforms, but painstakingly find and carefully nurture the common things which make all of us patriots of the whole republic. [passage omitted] At our plenum today, comrades, by common efforts, let us seek correct steps toward the goal we have set out. Thank you.

Klaucens Delivers Address

LD0603155690 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0936 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Speech by Klaucens, a rayon party first secretary, delivered at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum in Riga—live, in Russian]

[Excerpts] The situation that has come about in the (Riga) city party organization following the conference of supporters of an Independent Latvian Communist Party, which we are talking about today, was also examined at an extraordinary plenum of the gorkom (city party committee) on Saturday, 3 March. [passage omitted] It was stressed at the gorkom plenum that the activity of the organizers of the new party are directed not at strengthening our Communist Party of the republic, but at weakening its ranks. This is especially dangerous precisely now at the period preparing for holding elections to the Supreme Soviet of our republic, when for the first time in conditions of a multi-party system there is a sharp political struggle for power. [passage omitted] At the party gorkom plenum, at plenums of raykoms, and at party meetings of a number of party organizations of the city there has recently been sharp criticism of the decisions of the Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau and Comrades Vagris, Sobolev, Kezbers, Bresis, and Prieditis, about which I have been instructed to tell the participants of the Central Committee plenum. Lack of confidence is expressed in them. I think one could add other members of the bureau to that list, including Klaucens (himself). [passage omitted]

The party gorkom plenum adopted a decision on the impermissibility of repressions on the party of party organizations against those communists who, for ideological considerations, have expressed themselves in favor of an independent Latvian CP. The main method of work today is persuasion, explanation, agitation. Of course, we do not intend to use any force in our ranks. At the same time, we cannot agree with the rapporteur, Yan Vagris, in the assessment of those communists who were the organizers of the split in the Latvian CP, those who did not heed either the call for common reason, or balance, who deliberately went for a violation of the rules of the CPSU and the decisions of the Latvian CP Central Committee plenum, not to mention decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum. They include members of the Latvian CP Central Committee our colleagues today. Can one agree with this? A conciliatory position here in my view would mean even support and agreement with their line. [passage omitted].

The party gorkom plenum, for undermining the single political foundations of the CPSU aimed at splitting the Latvian CP, has expelled Comrade Rukmane from membership of the party gorkom, and instructed me to table the proposal to expel her, and also Comrade Zile, from membership of the Latvian CP Central Committee for the same reasons. We also consider it impossible to use Comrade Zile in the post of director of the Institute of Party History. I do not think this is a repression. If comrades do not want to be in our party, and insistently seek ways of withdrawing from it, why keep them in its leading organs? If they cannot work it out for themselves, then we must help them. [passage omitted]

We propose, following the example of our Estonian neighbors, on the eve of the congress of the Independent CP, i.e., obviously on 6 April, to hold a republican party conference which will look at all our differences and try to work out a common concept. Why a conference and not the scheduled 25th congress, which in our view would be advisable to hold in May this year? The main

reason is that there is an election campaign in progress, which I already mentioned. It will probably go on until the end of this March. It is proceeding, as is known, in a sharp, very fierce struggle. Our party today is a ruling party. This does not suit certain forces in the republic. For this reason there are slogans being raised: Soviets without communists. [passage omitted] Preparations for a congress do not only mean congress documents which are being worked out today; it involves rayon conferences, election of delegates to two congresses. For the first time they will be elected by all communists by secret ballot. This is a huge and as yet unknown work. [passage omitted] For our gorkom, for the raykoms and the city's party aktiv this means a dilemma, either give up all other matters, including the elections, i.e., voluntarily give them up to our opponents and rivals, or on the contrary, let preparations for the congress of the republic's CP trickle away. Neither are acceptable. This also concerns the apparatus of the Latvian CP Central Committee, if, of course, it is thinking of remaining a ruling party. In Lithuania it is no longer a ruling party. I think there is not a single party in the world which will voluntarily give up its right to rule. [passage omitted]

Latvian CP's Vagris Describes Party 'Crisis'

LD0703001790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Interview with Ya.Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee by N. Kasyanova, identified by screen caption; in Riga on 6 March—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Kasyanova] The republic's Communists are anxiously discussing the acute problems which have arisen in the party.

The word crisis, a crisis in the party, was heard at the plenum. How do you evaluate the situation?

[Vagris] Here, in the first instance, it is probably necessary to define this crisis more precisely—what was heard in the Communist Party of Latvia—so that television viewers do not perceive this as a crisis relating to the party as a whole. Yes, this was heard, since in actual fact during the process of discussions on the status of the Communist Party of the union republic, in particular on the status of the Communist Party of Latvia, a division occurred between Communists, even between organizations which consider that the Communist Party of Latvia should be independent. In principle, we are all coming out in favor of an independent, an independent Communist Party in Latvia, too, but without severing links with the CPSU. This, properly speaking, is what comprises the fundamental difference and is what the discussion is about. My hopes are for common sense, for reason, for a discussion which excludes ambitions—well, for a platform relating to real life. Not what some person wants, or what I or another side wants, but what life today and the real situation in our republic demand.

[Kasyanova] Life demands cardinal changes, but probably the possibility of implementing them is only by common efforts?

[Vagris] Yes, yes. Cardinal changes are necessary. Well, proceeding from the real situation, independence is needed. It is necessary to fight for the independence of the Communist Party of Latvia, but, I stress once again, without severing links with the CPSU.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Reported

PM0603155990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS dispatch: "Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] Riga, 2 Mar—Can a judge be a party man? This question was discussed at the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session which continued today and revealed a divergence of opinions. None of the deputies questioned the principle of the independence of judges, but it was noted from the rostrum that it is no less important in the case of prosecutors, arbiters, militiamen, and representatives of other professions. However, can a legal ban stop people showing their sympathies toward a specific political current? Would this not amount to an infringement of freedom of conscience and of citizens' constitutional rights? Many doubts were expressed, and it was even proposed to wait until the Law on Parties has been adopted. The debate ended with the introduction of an addendum to the Law on the Legal System in the Latvian SSR. It reads: "The post of judge is incompatible with membership of political parties or sociopolitical organizations."

The deputies could hardly have foreseen that the laws on local self-management that they had adopted would require amendment even before they came into force. But this is exactly what happened as a result of a stalemate which arose at the Riga city soviet. After the elections two factions formed there. One was made up of supporters of the People's Front, the other of deputies occupying the positions of the city party committee, the Interfront, the Center of Democratic Initiatives, or simply independents. The former had a small advantage—two votes. However, without the support of the opposing group they were powerless, since there was no two-thirds majority. The minority lodged a protest in respect of the voting procedure, claiming it had been violated, refusing to return to the organizational session, and demanding that the opinion of their voters, too, be respected. The city soviet deputies who were elected with the support of the Latvian People's Front recognize that it is hardly fair to adopt all decisions with a majority of two votes. The second group, on the other hand, do not want to be treated as extras with no say at all. The conflict was submited for consideration by the Supreme Soviet session. The session added the following provision to the laws on local self-management: If the appropriate number of deputies fail to attend a soviet session,

the session is to be reconvened with the same agenda and is competent provided that at least half of its elected members are attending.

A commission to elaborate measures to restore Latvia's economic and political independence was approved. Working groups, authorized to submit proposals to the competent organs of state power and administration of the USSR for joint discussion, will be formed from among its members.

Independence Commission Established

PM0603152790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Irina Litvinova report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Last Decisions of Current Parliament"]

[Text] Riga—At the last session of the current Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet deputies examined a number of questions concerning relations between the republic and the country's central authorities.

The main debates developed during the discussion of the question of introducing into effect on the territory of the Latvian SSR the USSR law of 23 December 1989 "On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR." Nonrecognition of the right of USSR state organs to oversee sovereign republics' constitutions and laws was the stumbling block. But, believing that real political activity nonetheless requires knowledge of what is happening in the union Constitutional Oversight Committee, deputies decided to include Latvian SSR representatives in this body.

The session set up a commission to elaborate measures to restore Latvia's economic and political independence. It will form working groups empowered to submit proposals to the relevant organs of USSR state power and management for joint examination.

The Law on Banks was also examined. According to the law, the republic's banking system includes a central bank, commercial banks, and finance and credit establishments. The commercial banks can be state banks, joint-stock companies, shared banks with mixed capital, or joint ventures with banks from other union republics and foreign states. Under the new law the Latvian Central Bank is an independent state bank whose charter is ratified by the republic's Supreme Soviet. It is noted that it is the only emission center on Latvian territory, that is, it can issue its own republic banknotes. It also determines the rate of exchange between the republic's currency and the monetary units of the USSR, other republics, and foreign states.

New Security Chief Appointed in Latvia

LD0703111190 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0530 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] At the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]: The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR has appointed (Edmunds Johansons) chairman of the State Security Committee of the Latvian SSR. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has relieved Stanislavs Zukulis from his duties of chairman of the State Security Committee of the Latvian SSR.

Gorbachev Tells Brazauskas of Lithuanian Debt

LD0603233990 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] It has come to light unexpectedly that on Monday [5 March] Mikhail Gorbachev had an official meeting with President of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Algirdas Brazauskas, in Moscow. He was invited specifically in this capacity and not as the leader of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party.

Although the meeting was confidential, party affairs of the CPSU and the Lithuanian Communist Party are reported not to have been touched upon. The meeting in the Kremlin could be assessed as a continuation of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania under the prelude to the negotiations between Moscow and Vilnius.

As Mikhail Gorbachev had promised during his visit to Lithuania, at the Kremlin meeting he brought forth documents prepared by different departments which specify Moscow's estimation of Lithuania's debt to the Soviet Union. The estimate is R17 billion of capital investment and another R4 billion for the produce that Lithuania failed to deliver in (?odd) years.

Thus the debt amounts to R21 billion in all. Well, if the same holds good for Latvia and Estonia, no wonder the big country is so bad off.

Now, these are emotions while there were not many during the Kremlin meeting. [sentence as heard]. Mikhail Gorbachev is believed to have tried to intimidate Lithuania for the last time before the new Supreme Soviet embarks upon its activity.

Lithuanian KGB Chief Eismuntas Resigns 6 Mar

LD0703115990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] Government spokesman Ceslovas Jursenas has announced the following:

Yesterday the request by General Eismuntas, head of the State Security Committee, to release him from the post he currently occupied, was granted. In other words, he has retired as a general.

CPSU Working Group Arrives in Vilnius 2 Mar

LD0503100990 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Text] A working group of the CPSU Central Committee consisting of 12 persons arrived yesterday in Vilnius from Moscow. It was accompanied from Moscow by Secretary of the interim Central Committee of the CPSU organization in Lithuania Mykolas Burokevicius. In Vilnius, the group was met by another secretary of that Central Committee, Vladislav Shved. It has not been announced officially, but it is presumed that the guests from Moscow came to obtain as much as possible of the former joint party property for the CPSU members in Lithuania.

Lithuanian Election Results Reviewed

90UN1089A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 9, 3 Mar 90 p 8

[Report by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA staff correspondent V. Burbulis, Vilnius: "In the Minority"]

[Text] Elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet have already taken place in the republic—472 candidates fought for 141 deputy seats. Of these, 139 were nonparty members, 210 were members of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania, 78 were Lithuanian communists who advocate the CPSU platform, 27 were Social Democrats, and two candidates were from the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] (independent). Lithuanians constituted a majority of the candidates—401 individuals. There were 30 Russians, 30 Poles, and six Belorussians.

As expected, the preelection campaign was acute. Both the independent Communist Party of Lithuania and Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform constantly found themselves under the fire of criticism. Conflicts between the two communist parties did neither of them any good, but were the cause of great joy to other parties and possibly added to their vote count.

The first round of voting ended in the election of 90 deputies. The independent Communist Party of Lithuania obtained 22 seats in all, the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform, seven. Nonparty candidates won 48 seats; nine went to the Social Democrats; and two seats each were gained by the Christian Democrats and "Greens" party. Of 90 individuals elected to deputy, 72 enjoy the official support of Sajudis. In Kaunas, the second largest city of the republic, communists failed to gain a single deputy seat.

Observing the course of the elections were groups of parliamentarians from Canada and Austria. More than 50 foreign journalists were in the republic as well.

The republic election commission reported that only about 70 percent of all eligible voters took part in the elections. Many explain this in the fact that the population got pretty tired of all the rallies, political fervor, and drop in discipline.

So, 51 seats remain vacant in the Lithuanian parliament. Runoff elections will be conducted 10 March in 45 okrugs, and new elections will take place 7 April in six okrugs. When we consider that elections to the local soviets in Lithuania have been announced for 24 March, it is not difficult to predict that the political life of the republic will not soon be entering a mode of calm.

Finally, all four secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (independent)—A. Brazauskas, V. Berezovas, Yu. Paletskis, and K. Glovatskas—were elected to the parliament right in the first round of voting. However, among the contenders for first secretary posts of gorkoms [city party committee] and raykoms [rayon party committee], only one candidate gained a deputy seat.

Lithuania's Paleckis Views Election Result

LD2702113490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Excerpts] I think of the election results fairly positively because they are significantly better for our party than were the elections of the USSR people's deputies, said Justas Paleckis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LCP] Central Committee and already a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, to the correspondent of ELTA. [passage omitted]

While assessing such a significant victory won by Sajudis at the elections, Justas Paleckis stressed that this was exactly what had been forecast, because such a result corresponds to the interests of Lithuania. The independent LCP is not only a natural ally of realistically minded people and a prudent wing of Sajudis, it is also a part of it.

Speaking about the formation of the future government, Justas Paleckis said that after the 20th LCP congress, the leadership of the Central Committee sees the future government only as a coalition. During the especially complex period soon when difficult negotiations with Moscow and other states will have to be undertaken, a cabinet of ministers is needed which should enjoy the strong suport of the absolute majority of the population of Lithuania as well as all political forces of the republic. It would be easier for the LCP at the moment to retreat into opposition and to criticize the government. However, Justas Paleckis does not think this would be a decision useful to Lithuania.

Commission Discusses Lithuanian Independence

LD0103235990 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] A meeting of the parliamentary commission on the reestablishment of Lithuanian independence was held today in Vilnius. A group of commission members

informed the rest of the members about the work of the Estonian parliamentary commission on the same issue. Everybody was interested in the activities of the Estonians on working out political, juridical, economic, and social foundations for the reestablishment of the independent state of Estonia.

It was decided to cooperate more closely in the future. Information provided by separate working groups of the independence commission was also debated. Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, spoke about external contacts, while Algirdas Zukauskas, vice president of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, spoke about economic contacts.

Romualdos Ozolas, one of the chairmen of the commission, told Radio Vilnius that the principles of reestablishing independent Lithuania should be approved next Tuesday [6 March]. These principles would include common, economic, juridical, foreign and internal and cultural principles as well as a general understanding of the mechanism of reestablishing independence. According to Romualdos Ozolas this document, now being worked out, would be valuable only in case Lithuania is able to achieve independence by way of evolution. On the other hand it is still unknown how the activities of the commission are going to be evaluated by the new Supreme Soviet.

Militia Officer Says Committee Spied on Sajudis

LD0303185590 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] A militia officer interviewed by a correspondent of the popular Lithuanian weekly GIMTASIS KRASTAS has disclosed that a special independent department was set up at the Lithuanian State Security Committee and the end of 1988 to spy on the Lithuanian reform movement Sajudis.

Sajudis was founded at the beginning of the summer of that year, but by the end of the year it was already an immensely powerful force.

The anonymous militia officer disclosed more new facts, producing the impression of a well-informed person. It turns out that there is a separate department of the Security Committee to spy on employees in the militia, prisons, and military conscription centers. A department which functioned earlier kept under surveillance the higher schools and the Academy of Sciences, the clergy, the religious organizations.

The anonymous militia officer also reaffirmed that a number of important documents from the Security Committee's archives have been lately carried beyond the borders of Lithuania. He also confirmed the reports that the Security Committee's employees have been filling in evacuation cards and that the 38 security officers who had expressed support in public for the independent Lithuanian Communist Party had been sent away on the pretext of business trips.

Lithuanian Commercial Office Opened in Hamburg

90UN1020B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 3

[Correspondent Ye. Savishchev report: "Lithuanian Commercial Office in Hamburg?"]

[Text] Bonn—Deutsche Welle has told listeners about the opening in Hamburg of a Lithuanian commercial office, which, it was emphasized at a press conference, is the first foreign policy step toward Lithuania's independence.

On 22 January the Hamburg press baldly affirmed that the opening of a Lithuanian commercial office in Hamburg had taken place at 47 Ruetherstrasse. The ceremony was attended by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee of the republic and a minister and representatives of business circles of Hamburg. The central West German papers did not deem this fact worthy of attention.

As instructed by the editorial office, I called Hamburg. I reached A. Klimaytis, an employee of this commercial office. I introduced myself.

"How do I address you, Mr or Comrade Klimaytis?"

"Better Mister," my partner readily replied, "since I consider myself a citizen of Lithuania, not the Soviet Union. The main mission of our republic's commercial office," Klimaytis said, "is a search for new trading partners in the markets of Hamburg and the FRG. We can offer the Western market certain types of mechanical engineering and metal-working products and electrical equipment and also products of our furniture industry and crafts."

I was told in the general consulate, which was notified of the opening of the commercial office after the fact, that the West German side and Hamburg's business circles were adopting quite a guarded attitude toward the appearance of the new commercial office. This is perfectly understandable. After all, reputable representatives of West German and Hamburg business circles are oriented mainly toward the USSR as a whole.

Incidentally, the commercial office has been entered in the register of firms of the Hamburg Chamber of Trade merely as the "Litkommerz GmBH" trading firm.

Lithuanian Tautininkai Union Registered

LD0203132890 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] The Council of Ministers of Lithuania has registered the Lithuanian Tautininkai Union that has governed Lithuania for quite a long time in prewar years.

This party, alongside with the others, was banned in 1940 at the very beginning of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania. The party of Tautininkai declared to have resumed its activities last spring. The union is headed by a council of nine. The union has a fixed membership counting several hundreds members at present. In 1938 the union of Tautininkai had a membership of 14,700, half of them being prosperous farmers. The ultimate goal of the party is free man and free nation in a free state. For the achievement of this aim the union means all the spiritual values of the Lithuanian nation. Therefore only Lithuanians can be its members.

Preparations for Estonian Elections Continue

LD0203140790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 2 Mar 90

[From the press review: unidentified correspondent's report from Tallinn—in Russian]

[Text] Preparations for the elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet continue in the republic. In all, 474 candidates have been nominated. Eighty-one of them have withdrawn their candidatures, so 393 candidates will compete for the 105 seats in the parliament, that is an average of four people per seat.

A meeting of the primary party organization of Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium employees has taken place. It was noted that after the changes of Paragraphs Six and Seven of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic main law, the fulfillment of the CPSU statute requirements is contrary to the republican laws. [words indistinct] Therefore, members of the primary party organization of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium have decided to cease organizational work by the primary party organization of the Supreme Soviet Presidium employees from March 1990 until these contradictions are eliminated.

According to the Estonian Congress Central Electoral Commission, 496,351 people—including Estonian citizens, their heirs, and applicants for citizenship—participated in the election of candidates to the congress. This is far from being a final figure, as information on the election has not yet arrived from all parts of the republic. However, in the opinion of the commission members, it is possible to speak of 500,000 Estonian residents taking part in the elections. The congress will met 11-12 March.

Emergent Split in Estonian Party Viewed

PM0203103590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent I. Teterin report under the "Party Life" rubric: "Overwhelming Differences of Opinion"]

[Text] Tallinn—Estonia's communists held their republic party conference at a complex time full of political contradictions. The question presented for the 358 delegates' discussion was: "On the ideological and organizational bases of the preparation for the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress." For two days passions ran high in the hall and opinions were expressed that were sometimes mutually exclusive. But now that some time has elapsed, let us try to calmly examine why communists at the republic party conference were in fact unable to achieve ideological unity.

TOGETHER OR APART? Recently a well-known physicist said: "What is happening in our country is somewhat like a thermonuclear reaction. So you wonder: What is in store for us? After all, the critical mass may produce a powerful destructive explosion or it may result in nuclear fusion, which will release tremendous creative energy. It is daunting to think what a gigantic responsibility rests on politicians' shoulders!" Those words came back to me several times recently during the conference. But the debates there sometimes assumed the nature of a truly political duel.

As is well known, there is a classic Marxist formula which runs: An idea becomes a material force if it is taken up by the masses. I would add to this that for some two-three years the idea of Estonian state self-determination has, without any exaggeration, become all-important here.

Until recently, the Estonian Communist Party shut itself off from frankly separatist tendencies. Party committee plenums firmly stated: Leaving the USSR is impossible. There was an objective assessment of such political groups as the national independence party, citizens' committees, and so forth. But gradually the idea of state self-determination began to be actively debated in communist ranks, too. There is nothing surprising in that: The party cannot live in isolation from the people's feelings.

In brief, the following questions are now being asked quite openly: Will the republic remain in the USSR, will the Estonian Communist Party remain in the CPSU?

TWO PROGRAMS. But Estonia, as is well known, is not a state inhabited by a single ethnic group. Almost 40 percent of its population hail from other parts of the USSR, and within the Communist Party that percentage is even higher. That fact ultimately also determined the conflictful nature of the party conference.

Vayno Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, tried to give the discussion a constructive tone: "We have now understood that social life cannot develop according to this or that exclusive truth and that life is the result of various paths of development; there may be, moreover, several paths, but no one path can be proclaimed the only correct one or one that is known to be unsuitable." After which the delegates were offered two alternative forms of restructuring the republic's Communist Party. I shall try to explain the essence of the two programs, albeit briefly.

The first version is called the "program for the renewal of the Estonian Communist Party." It designates the present period in the republic's life transitional. This

period will end when Estonia is restored as an autonomous state. The party promises to struggle for the creation in an independent Estonia of a democratic society similar to that of the Scandinavian countries today. Mutual relations with the CPSU can only be relations of alliance based on a unity of ideology. The right of nations to self-determination is proclaimed as the highest political value.

The second version is more modestly titled—it is an "action program." This platform is a declaration of a policy aimed primarily at realizing values common to mankind—the building of a society based on the primacy of the individual's needs. The republic is a sovereign state and member of the Soviet federation. It is a rule-of-law state. Therefore Estonia has its own citizenship, takes part in the activity of international organizations, and resolves all domestic questions by means of a lawfully elected government. The Estonian Communist Party is an inalienable part of the CPSU.

IDEALS VERSUS INTERESTS. I would probably not be telling the truth if I claimed that the process taking place within the Estonian Communist Party is in some way unusual or extreme. On the contrary, it seems to me most closely linked to the situation existing until very recently in the CPSU. The constant delay in assessing political processes, the feeling of unease in the face of the mobilized masses, and the lack of trust in popular leaders whose views differ from the traditional world outlook of the party "top brass"—it was only the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum which really spoke out against all these party ailments.

That was why the speakers' ideas and moods swung like pendulums. For example, Yu. Raydl, recently first secretary of the Pyarnuskiy Estonian Communist Party Raykom [rayon party committee] and now chairman of the district Council of Representatives [uyezdnyy sovet upolnomochennykh], exclaimed emotionally: "The moment of self-determination has come. The Estonian people want their own state. But we are not going to shut ourselves off, like Albania. Estonia will be open both to the West and the East." But V. Chetvergov, an experienced economic manager and director of "Baltiyets," a large plant in Narva, raised serious objections: "They say that when we leave the Union we will be able to set up a modern economic base more quickly. I have my doubts on that. People are only talking about leaving the USSR, but some people outside the republic are already refusing to sign contracts with us. No, such a program will not find support among Narva's communists...."

What has split Estonia's communists into two opposing factions now? Probably primarily the fact that one talks about the ideal of the self-determination of the nation, while the other talks about people's everyday interests. In this context you often hear such lofty words as "people's mandate," "sincere aspirations of the nation," and "demands of the working class." But here is an interesting detail: Among the conference delegates there were just eight workers and two ordinary rural workers. Need I say more?

You will agree that it may seem quite strange when A. Maarend, second secretary of Paydeskiy Estonian Communist Party Raykom, said from the conference platform: "Today the Communist Party is a structure serving as a regime of occupation in Estonia. Another party must be created in its place and its material base must be transferred to local self-management organs." After which the words of V. Yermolayev, party committee secretary of the "Estrybprom" Association, seemed not without logic: "The documents submitted to you, which announce the creation of a new independent party, apply to some other party, not the Communist Party. I do not consider it possible to discuss their merits or shortcomings."

There were also some proposals: To end the conference by approving both platforms so as later to hold the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress and the constituent congress of the new party—the party of democratic reforms—at the same time. But something prevented the conference delegates reaching the stage of a definitive split. What was it?

I believe that by no means least important here was the CPSU Central Committee February plenum's assessment of the 20th Latvian Communist Party Congress decisions.

IS COMPROMISE POSSIBLE? Before seeking an answer to that question, I want to say the following. The party, which is being convulsed by ideological disagreements, can no longer be a party with a firm political will. I believe that in view of the actual existence of a multiparty system, none of the Estonian Communist Party's current members, whichever wing they belong to, can be satisfied with this situation which merely plays into the hands of their political opponents.

Essentially the discussion at the conference should have been about saving the party from collapse. What possible remedies are there here? I want to draw special attention to the speech of V. Myurk, a young scientist from Tartu: "The vast majority of the population in Estonia has a real interest—a vital interest in the civic community [grazhdanskiy mir]. We must formulate a platform capable of uniting the majority of Estonian and Russian communists. Let us call it a 'Bolshevist' platform. The two Estonian Communist Party draft programs that have been proposed are rather like children playing with matches. A split in the party will rob it of all prospects and weight in society."

Incidentally, the idea of a civic community in Estonia is beginning to be developed now even by those radical political groups which hold to firm separatist positions. For example, after the well-known deputies' meeting in Tallinn 2 February when the "Declaration on the Question of Achieving Estonian State Independence" was very loudly approved, some characteristic documents

appeared in the press. For instance, the main committee of citizens of the Estonian Republic stated: "Once again we assure Russians, Slavs, and other nationalities that there will be no place for ethnic discrimination in the democratic Estonian republic." A few days later the rural centrist party published a similar appeal in which it stated that it even "opposes any attempt at ideological division on ethnic grounds."

Well, it must be admitted, this was a political slap in the face for communists. After all, members of the Communist Party, which has an absolute majority in the republic's Supreme Soviet, have recently adopted quite a few laws containing elements of civil discrimination—the residence qualification, a confused electoral system, language restrictions, and so forth.

Unfortunately, the civic community idea could not change the course of the discussion. The reason for that, I think, was correctly given by L. Annus, member of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee: "The state of affairs in the Estonian Communist Party today cannot be other than it is because the party lacks an integrated and universally acknowledged ideological concept."

Admittedly, though, I still harbor the hope that the ideological differences within the Estonian Communist Party will be overcome. The CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform for the 28th Congress gives Estonian communists that chance. A last chance.

The conference resolution states: A partywide discussion will be held in the republic. It will center on both the CPSU Central Committee document and the provisions of the two alternative forms of restructuring the Estonian Communist Party. But its fate will be finally settled by the 20th congress, which is due at the end of March.

On the first day of the conference M. Rossman, a schoolteacher from Rakvere, declared to the audience, excited by the heated debates: "If there is even one real communist left in Estonia, it is always possible to begin again!"

Did everyone hear her?

Estonia To Begin Own Diplomatic Training

36170001 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Feb 90 p 16

[Text] Last week Estonia began its own two-year training program in international affairs for diplomats. It is being organized by the Estonian Foreign Ministry. Candidates have been selected from applicants who responded to an announcement placed in newspapers last December. Requirements for acceptance into the program include having an academic degree and foreign language capability, as well as being under age 35. Of the more than 280 who applied, 25 were selected for the first class. Presently in the Foreign Ministry directed by Arnold Green there is a staff of 21.

Estonian Citizens' Committee Plans Viewed

90UN1066A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Feb 90 p 1

[Correspondent S. Tarakanov report: "Automatic Majority"]

[Text] Tallinn—Last Friday and Saturday in Estonia [23 and 24 February] were packed with important political events. A report on each of them individually would not provide a complete picture of what is happening and of the extent to which these events are related. I shall attempt to analyze them.

On 23 February the 11th Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet 15th Session issued a decree on the preparation of the state independence of Estonia and established an economic and political independence commission which incorporated leaders of the party, the government, and the unions of the republic, representatives of the artistic intelligentsia and public movements and organizations and prominent scientists and legal scholars. The assignment of this commission is to negotiate with the Soviet Union on Estonia's independence. The debate on its composition was heated. Questions arose as to the competency of such a commission prior to the adoption by the country's Supreme Soviet of the procedure of republics' secession from the USSR, its personal composition, and the need for a referendum on the future of Estonia. The speeches of a number of deputies showed that, in their view, the recommended candidates called on to express the interests of the northeast of the republic—where, as is known, non-Estonians constitute the vast majority of the population—could not, in view of the political orientation of some of them and the nonconcordance of their candidacies with the local soviets, be included on the commission. But, for the umpteenth time, the automatic majority came into play when the issue was put to the vote.

An important political feature was the refusal of two members of the main citizens' committee to participate in the work of the commission. Their consent would on the one hand have meant the departure of this committee from its fundamental position—only the Estonian congress is competent to negotiate with the Soviet Union—and, on the other, official recognition at the level of the supreme authority of the republic of the legitimacy of the activity of the citizens' committees. Therefore these committees proceed from the fact that neither the formation of the Estonian republic nor the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty have been abrogated by any legislative instrument. The priority task of the Estonian Congress is the start of negotiations (if possible, in contact with the ESSR Supreme Soviet) on termination of the annexation and the withdrawal of the USSR Armed Forces and also on recreation of the legitimate authorities of the Estonian republic—the state duma and government. The Estonian congress itself is not an organ of state power, merely a representative assembly of citizens, as all who resided in Estonia prior to 17 June

1940 and their descendants are deemed to be. Registration of citizens of the Estonian Republic was conducted for the purpose of determining their numbers. The congress regards the ESSR Supreme Soviet as the highest administrative authority of the USSR on the territory of annexed Estonia, and cooperation with it will continue until independence is restored.

Estonian Independence Day was commemorated on 24 February. Early in the morning, at sunrise, there was a ceremonial raising of the national flag at the Tall German Tower. A grand concert was then performed for deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet. But it was not these official measures which determined the character of the festivities but the elections of delegates to the Estonian congress. It will last through 1 March.

Political importance is attached to the elections. As RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has already written, a republic rally of deputies of all levels called for participation in them on 2 February, and the People's Front had appealed similarly the day before.

In its appeal to the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the republic, the main citizens' committee assured them that there would be no room in a democratic Estonian republic for discrimination on a nationality basis. But many people are distrustful of these assurances—for which there are sufficient grounds. For instance, Reyn Taagepera, a professor at the University of California, who is a member of the main citizens' committee (RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has already spoken about him in the article "Prescriptions for the Indigenes"), broadcast on Radio Free Europe that the Estonian republic would undertake to grant "an amnesty to illegal immigrants who arrived during the occupation." Considering the multitude thereof, the recreated state "would undertake out of humanitarian considerations to authorize permanent residence to the immigrants with no criminal record who submit an application in time." A timeframe for such applications was eve determined—up to 19 March. "Estonia will not undertake to give other immigrants permanent authorization in all cases.... Both states will incur separately the expenses pertaining to resettlement on their territory...." Why precisely 19 March? Because R. Taagepera is calling on the Supreme Soviet to declare itself replaced by the Estonian congress and so that the elections planned for 18 March might be renamed elections to a provisional state council of the Estonian republic.

One notices also that the majority of deputies of the supreme authority of the republic not only do not condemn the activity of the citizens' committees, but are prepared to cooperate with them. Yet they are, in the main, communists. In addition, the Supreme Soviet has virtually ignored the evaluation of the situation in the republic and the activity of the citizens' committees made in the political statement of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 16th Plenum. It says, inter alia, that the intention of the main citizens' committee to accord only the citizens it has registered and their descendants and persons applying for this status the right to determine Estonia's future will not resolve the internal problems of Estonia's actual acquisition of independence in point of substance. This will lead rather to a further exacerbation of the contradictions on nationality grounds.

Leader of Estonian Russophones Profiled

90UN1031A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 2

[Profile of V.I. Yarovoy: "Vladimir Yarovoy: There Is a 'Russian Question'"]

[Text] Vladimir Ivanovich Yarovoy—director of the "Dvigatel" State Union Plant, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the OSTKE [United Council of Labor Collectives of Estonia]—is head of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights, which was formed recently in the republic. He is 49 years old. He has lived in Estonia for 4 years. He enjoys great authority in the Russian-speaking community. Among some Estonian journalists he rapidly earned the labels of conservative and opponent of perestroyka. For what sins or merits? Let us listen to Vladimir Ivanovich himself.

Perestroyka in our republic has reached a critical point. We are now faced with a choice: Either to build a society on socialist principles together with all peoples of a USSR in renewal, or to slide onto the impasse route of self-isolation and secession from the USSR. There is no other option.

The OSTKE firmly adheres to the first position. The pseudodemocratic slogan of the separatist forces, "Better poor, but free," is alien to the workers who are joining our enterprise council. Only those who by their worker hands produce material values, not the unthinking politicians proclaiming this slogan, will be poor.

When the OSTKE was formed, we saw it primarily as an economic organization capable of considerably increasing the contribution of the enterprises associated therein to republic coffers. We welcomed the STKE [Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia], which was founded simultaneously and in parallel with us, since we contemplated the possibility of prospective cooperation with it in the solution of socioeconomic problems of the republic. At the present time the situation is such that the STKE is campaigning for the restoration of an internationally recognized independent Estonian state, private property, and free enterprise. Its leader, USSR People's Deputy Yulo Nugis, declared in a recent interview that he saw no possibility of cooperation with the OSTKE. A year ago the situation was different, allegedly, but today their union is a political party.

Nor do we see such possibilities, but we do not consider ourselves a political party. Moreover, we are not in such a complex situation, forgetting about the economic aspect. We are increasing the contribution of our enterprises to the development of the highway system and

supply lines, social development, housing and industrial construction, and consumer goods production.

For instance, in the last 13 years alone the "Dvigatel" Plant has spent more than R46 million on the said purposes.

Our OSTKE has also become politicized, of course. It could not have been otherwise inasmuch as it has proven the actual organization which is capable of defending the interests of the republic's Russian-speaking population. In the course of the organization of various political activities—mass meetings, strikes—a bloc of forces allied with us, which included the Intermovement, the strike committees, and the war veterans and soldier-internationalist section, took shape. It has to be said that, despite our efforts, a policy of total disregard for the interests of the Russian-speaking community has continued. This was manifested particularly clearly at the time of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Tartu peace.On 6 February RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA published a report on these activities, providing a full picture of what was happening. I will not, therefore, dwell on this. I would merely add that many people have finally come to understand that the "Russian question" cannot be disregarded.

Noteworthy in this respect is the appeal of the Main Committee of Citizens of the Estonian Republic to the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia, which, as you know, is struggling for the restoration of the former bourgeois statehood. It says, inter alia, that the committee shares our concern at both the prospective position of Estonia as a whole and the problems of the present.

We do not support the policy of the citizens' committees but we have to give them their due. They have a clear "Russian program," which, although unacceptable to us, is without national hostility.

Following the republic rally of deputies of all levels which adopted the declaration on the issue of state independence, its participants representing Tallinn, Kokhtla-Yarve, Narva and Sillamyae elected the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Civil Rights in Estonia, which I was entrusted to lead. This was a forced step. We were unable to accept the lines of the declaration which said that the meeting welcomed all measures of a democratic nature geared to the restoration of the Estonian Republic and called on the citizens to participate actively in the elections of the Estonian Congress and the ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

Our defense committee has begun to function. All the legislative instruments enacted by the ESSR Supreme Soviet as of 16 November 1988 are now being analyzed. It was no accident that this date was taken as the point of reference. It was on this day that the declaration on Estonian sovereignty, many propositions of which were in violation of civil rights and the USSR Constitution, first saw the light of day. The analysis which we are making will make it possible to compile an exhaustive list of such violations.

The place of the Defense Committee and its offices on the periphery will be determined, in our view, by coalition cooperation with the self-managing authorities. The more so in that we already have support. Thus having discussed the declaration on the issue of Estonia's state independence, a session of the Sillamyae City Soviet confirmed the authority of deputies Tadeush Punkevich, Yuriy Tolmachev and Aleksandr Maksimov on our committee. A decision to present the initiative concerning a joint session of people's deputies of Narva, Sillamyae, Kokhtla-Yarve and the Kokhtla-Yarve District, which would discuss measures pertaining to realization of the ESSR law on the principles of local self-administration in the northeast of the republic and the preparation and realization of a "northeast" program, was adopted unanimously.

We certainly understand that this decision runs counter to the declaration of the ESSR Supreme Soviet Presidium concerning the republic's territorial integrity. But it also was adopted without regard for our interests. We disagree with the assertion that, in accordance with international law, only the people primordially resident here are accorded the right to decide Estonia's fate. After all, we include in the people concept all those residing on republic territory.

The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress showing the effective way of solution of interethnic problems on the paths of perestroyka, which has been submitted for discussion, is very close to us in this respect. We also share Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's opinion that only in practice will people see the tremendous advantages of the new Soviet federation. We perceive for ourselves the justice of his words concerning all kinds of separatists, chauvinists and nationalists hastening to take advantage for their own selfless ends of the growth of the national self-awareness of the peoples in order to deliver a preemptive strike against perestroyka, which threatens to cancel out their far-reaching aims.

RSFSR

Yeltsin's RSFSR Election Platform Outlined

90UN1013A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 2

[Unattributed item: "Pre-Election Program of Boris Yeltsin"]

[Text] The readers of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH learned that Boris Yeltsin was running in the elections for RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy from the reports of our volunteer correspondent in Sverdlovsk, Boris Yarkov.

At your request, he also relayed to SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH by phone the most important provisions of B. Yeltsin's program...

—The main point: A real improvement in the living standard of the people, overcoming the crisis, and building a republic with a highly efficient economy geared to the needs of the people. There is only one way out of the situation: Perestroyka should be accelerated and radicalized; a new model of it should be developed to this end.

1. Political Acceleration of Russia

—To transfer all power in its entirety to the soviets, having repealed Article 6 of the RSFSR Constitution, and to eliminate the CPSU monopoly on power. Within the framework of a multi-party system, the communists of Russia are to form an independent Russian party based on a non-apparatus structure and striving for humane and democratic socialism.

—To bring to account those who have brought about the crisis in Russia.

—To adopt a new Constitution of Russia which proceeds from the principle of the primacy of law and the main rights and freedoms of citizens: freedom of speech; freedom of meetings, rallies, and demonstrations; freedom of political organizations; and freedom of conscience and religion. To adopt a law on Russian citizenship and to ensure the freedom of residence, entry, and exit for the citizens of Russia.

—To adopt the constitution by way of a public referendum.

—To establish a presidential republic in Russia as the form of state structure. Presidential elections are to be held only from among competing candidates by a direct, universal, equal, and secret vote, for a five-year term. To make a constitutional provision to the effect that the president suspends his membership in all political parties and organizations for the duration of the exercise of his powers. Any citizen of Russia may be elected president for no more than two terms.

—Within the RSFSR, self-governing socioeconomic territories, and regions—Center, North, South, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East—may be formed after a referendum. Their rights will be set forth in the new RSFSR Constitution.

—To reconsider, with a view to restoring the economic sovereignty of Russia and taking in[illegible]count the practice and prices of the world mark[illegible]he issues of price setting and mutual deliveries o[illegible] materials, equipment, and technology in relations with other republics and for exports and to make corresponding adjustments.

—To create in Russia a continuously operating, progressive parliament, elections to which should be held on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage.

—To set up the Constitutional Court of Russia with a view to the efficient oversight of compliance with democratic rights and freedoms in Russia; its chairman and members are to be elected from competing candidates by a direct and secret vote for five years.

—To abolish as discriminatory all instructions and provisions according to which certain positions in state and economic organs may be held by CPSU members only.

—The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is to have professional Armed Forces whereas Russia will have territorial militias (the duration of service 10 months, the place of service within the republic to be that from which the person has been drafted).

—Churches and all denominations are to be given by law the rights of corporate persons.

2. The Economy of Russia

—To carry out the transition to a competitive market economy based on a plurality of ownership forms—republic, local, collective, private, and individual ownership.

—To de-ideologize economic operations and abolish the principle of party influence in the management of the economy. The presence of the organs of any political organization in state and economic organs, including at enterprises, kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], research institutes, colleges, and so on, is to be allowed only when authorized by the labor collectives.

—To carry out a radical land reform in Russia, restore the peasantry, and grant to it the absolute right to select a form of organizing its own labor. To transfer land to owners with the right of inheritance.

—To repeal the bans on private enterprise activities and extend such activities primarily to agriculture, the processing of farm goods, construction and the construction industry, crafts, the sale of agricultural products, and local industry.

—To take measures aimed at eliminating those enterprises operating at a loss and to encourage their buyouts by labor collectives and cooperatives.

—It is necessary to create a number of free economic zones with their subsequent expansion and transition to a market economy.

—To carry out radical reforms of the credit and finance system and the investment policy in existence to which end the RSFSR State Bank is to be separated from the government and conditions are to be created for the formation of commercial banks and exchanges; to switch to the convertible ruble in the internal market at the first stage, and in the international market at the second stage.

3. Social Policy

—To abolish all the privileges... of state, party, and economic leaders.

—To work out a program for a voluntary, organized return to Russia of the Russian population currently residing in the ethnic areas of the USSR...

—To pass laws on the status of the refugees and the unemployed which guarantee full rights for these categories of citizens.

—To set up the Russian Academy of Sciences (on a basis which is new in principle), a telegraph agency, a television and radio service...

...We need a renewed democratic Russia!

Need for Russian Komsomol Debated

LD1702231690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] The debates which have developed at a congress of Russia's Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations have taken an urgent character. The deputies assembled at Moscow's Palace of Youth are engaged in a complex conversation about the fate of the Communist Youth League, which has continued well after midnight. The focus of attention is the need for the organized formation of a Russian Komsomol. A majority favored putting this issue to the vote. The congress will continue its work tomorrow.

Leningrad Dockers Decide To Strike

LD0503161690 Leningrad MARITIME PRESS SERVICE in Russian 1400 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] A decision to strike was taken at a joint session of the Leningrad port trade union committee and labor collective Soviet. There was a one hour warning strike at the port on 27-28 February. Why were the dockers on strike? Ports have been ordered to stamp imported cargoes when dispatching them. This places all the responsibility on the dockers. The first to protest this injustice were Klaipeda dockers and now they have been supported by their colleagues in Leningrad.

'Passions Running High' in Moscow Campaign

LD0203095890 Moscow TASS in English 0941 GMT 2 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Polunin]

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—Opposition groups are likely to win at least a third of the seats for the Moscow City Council on Sunday, according to pre-election opinion polls.

A total of 3,282 canidates with varying political views are running for 498 seats in the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies. Some constituencies have 15 and more contenders, and run-up elections are most likely.

On Sunday, Moscovites will be choosing representatives to the city and district councils. They will also elect Russian Federation people's deputies who will then select a republican parliament.

The media is giving extensive coverage to the election races. Candidates for the Moscow Soviet are presenting their platforms in the "Good Evening, Moscow" prime time television programme.

Passions are running high in the elections, based on new democratic laws. However, some contenders are indulging in negative campaigning, too eager to slam their rivals.

The city is plastered with campaign ads with candidates' platforms and biographies. Many have four-letter words scrawled all over by some passer-by-turned-wall poet. This even prompted some campaign officials to put ads in glass frames—a fragile protection easily shattered by the "writers."

The "wall-paper war" is in full swing as officials battle attempts to replace mundane official campaign announcements (the law requires that every candidate has equal campaigning opportunities) with home-made ones.

The campaign is in its last hours, and, in accordance with the election laws, will come to a close on Saturday.

Vorotnikov Tours Adygey Oblast Facilities

PM1602154790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "No Perestroyka Without Unity"]

[Text] Maykop, Adygey Autonomous Oblast—V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, began his 12-14 February visit to Adygey Autonomous Oblast with meetings with voters in Shovgenovskiy National-Territorial Electoral Okrug, for which he is the candidate for RSFSR People's Deputy.

Representatives of labor collectives from Krasnogvardeysk and Shovgenovsk Rayons were awaiting him at the Palace of Culture in Shovgenovskiy Aul, the candidate's destination. Many of them know Vitaliy Ivanovich personally. This acquaintance took place 7 years ago when he was first secretary of Krasnodar Party Raykom [rayon committee]. People valued his energetic activity and uncomplicated way of dealing with people. By his implacable struggle against favoritism, arrogance, and abuse of office he restored many people's faith in social justice at that time. That is why the audience at the meeting was eager to know his views on the country's urgent problems and his approaches to resolving them. A particularly

large number of questions were related to the key provisions of the February (1990) Plenum and the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress.

Addressing the voters, V.I. Vorotnikov said that the CPSU Central Committee draft platform offers the Soviet people a concept of socialism based on the principles of humanism and democracy. Today it is clear to everyone that the fate of perestroyka and the country's future depend on how interethnic relations shape up.

Russians, who for centuries have been the focal point of the formation of our united state, are convinced that the integrity of the USSR is a prerequisite for the progress of all republics and nations and the precondition for the success of perestroyka. The weakening and—even more so—the destruction of the national economic complex formed through extensive joint work and of scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation would have incalculable adverse consequences.

As chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, V.I. Vorotnikov said, I am convinced that the strengthening of the republic's sovereignty and the broadening of its right to independently resolve major socioeconomic development tasks while remaining within the USSR are of crucial significance for overcoming the many difficulties which have built up in the Russian Federation's life.

...What other instructions do voters have? It is necessary to raise prices for agricultural produce. They have remained unchanged for decades, whereas prices for equipment and services for the countryside have risen several times over. The question of closing down a number of cooperatives was raised urgently, particularly those cooperatives which buy up construction materials and gas equipment from stores and then resell it to the rural population at incredible prices. There was sharp criticism of the mass media, including Central Television, for a lack of objectivity and for bias on certain items and transmissions.

During his visit to Adygey, V.I. Vorotnikov also met with voters from Koshekhablskiy, Giaginskiy, and Teuchezhskiy Rayons, visited remote auls and settlements in the oblast, and called in at a number of industrial and agricultural enterprises, where he had conversations with residents and labor collectives. There was a friendly conversation with V.A. Larionov, alternate candidate RSFSR people's deputy and director of the Krasnogvardeyskiy interfarm forestry [mezhleskhoz], who has nominated himself for this okrug.

The chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium met with representatives of labor collectives and social organizations of the oblast center, to whom he delivered a speech.

Bashkiriya Obkom Forms Provisional Bureau

LD1602095990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] We have already reported on the collective resignation of the bureau of the Bashkiriya Oblast party committee [obkom] of the party. A provisional bureau of the oblast committee has been established. Its members began their first working meeting with the resolution of matters ensuring the life of towns and villages of the autonomous republic.

They paid particular attention to transportation, food supplies, and deliveries of industrial goods to the retail network. We draw attention to the fact that the provisional bureau allocated some 70,000 rubles from the party budget to the fund for assistance to families who are not well provided for.

Ligachev, Belgorod Workers Hold 'Frank' Talks

LD0603181990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Belgorod, 6 Mar (TASS)—The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress as well as the Central Committee's February plenum were the center of attention in the meetings of Yegor Ligachev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with workers of Belgorod Oblast.

Frank and, at times, tense discussions on the paths for democratizing the party and its place and role in the socialist renewal of society arose in the workers' collectives where the CPSU Central Committee secretary spent some time.

People asked questions about enhancing the role of the primary organizations, which must become a real force and obtain extensive independence, and about the fact that 50 percent of party subscriptions should remain in the organizations themselves. The question of changing the principle of democratic centralism, which is already obsolete, was also raised. Answering this question, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee said:

"I think that it is not basically obsolete. But in the draft platform, you will notice, it is already a matter of a different, renewed principle of democratic centralism which will give opportunities for the utmost development of internal party democracy. The stress is placed on the first word and not on the second. At the same time, it is also necessary to preserve centralist principles. You must agree, the party should be united and organized. It must not be changed into a club for the endless discussion of debatable problems. Decisions must be carried out."

It was noted in the conversations that the key issue in the draft platform is the problem of the renewal of the party itself. It is currently, as was emphasized at the meetings, a main political force, capable of extricating the country from a very acute situation. And the party will not

confirm its role as the political vanguard of society by legislative methods but by specific work.

An animated conversation on the resolution of socioeconomic issues and on the necessity for decisively strengthening discipline and order at the factory also took place at the meetings.

Baklanov Visits Kirov Oblast 12-14 Feb

PM1602163790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Working Platform of People"]

[Text] Kirov—The CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the upcoming party congress, which was approved by the February (1990) plenum, is a reference point in Soviet society's political life. Communists and all the country's working people see it as a reliable basis for the consolidation of all perestroyka forces.

This convincingly was confirmed by the meetings between O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and working people and communists in Kirov Oblast 12-14 February. Attention was focused on the plenum's results and the questions which must be resolved by the party itself, which has chosen the path of renewal.

The discussion of the platform began with numerous conversations with the labor collectives of the Kirov machine-building production association and the "Mayak" plant. These major defense enterprises find themselves in an unusual situation in which defense orders have been substantially reduced and collectives have immediately come up against difficult problems. A number of jobs are in jeopardy, wages have fallen, and the enterprises' potential for developing the social sphere has been reduced.

The solution to the situation is to increase production of consumer goods, which the market acutely needs, the CPSU Central Committee secretary said. The oblast's mighty industrial base, possessing great scientific and technical potential, is capable of producing such goods as washing machines, domestic sewing machines, refrigerators, and domestic electronic goods. Some of these are already in production and prototypes of new products which meet the highest standards have been created. It is important that they go into production as soon as possible.

Communists must create the appropriate attitude in labor collectives. Their task is to motivate people to eliminate everything which hinders efficient work in this area.

There was an objective and keen discussion of ways to sharply increase the amount of housing construction and make maximum use of collectives' entire potential for this, especially the own-resources method of construction. Specific steps to develop the food base of industrial enterprises were also discussed.

Roads are a vitally important problem for the northern oblast. Without them the outlying regions will wither and die.

Army units have been brought in to tackle this problem. The CPSU Central Committee secretary visited some of them. Together with leaders of the oblast and the USSR Defense Ministry he examined questions of making the most efficient use of this contingent and of creating good living conditions for the soldiers.

Addressing a meeting of the oblast's party-economic aktiv, O.D. Baklanov stressed that the ideas contained in the platform are the product of life itself and therefore reflect the vital interests of the party and the country. In these conditions, the CPSU must be a party of action. And that means being more active and strengthening ties with the masses. That must be the personal platform of each communist. The speech gave rise to many questions, which received extensive answers.

The final conversation, which took place at the CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], examined the oblast party organization's tasks in preparing for the 28th congress.

Siberian Official on Economic Consequences

LD2602161190 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 26 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Yelmakov]

[Text] Novosibirsk February 26 TASS—Preparations are now under way in Novosibirsk for a scientific conference that will meet next summer to discuss, among other problems, the development of an economic, organisational and legal mechanism capable of raising the quality of life of Siberians.

Many scientists believe that, from the viewpoint of most indices of social development, Siberia now lags seriously behind.

"Siberia, more than other regions of the Soviet Union, suffers from the imperfection of the economic reform in the country," said Aleksandr Granberg, director of the Institute of Economics and the Organisation of Industrial Production of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

"The reform has been poorly dovetailed or not dovetailed at all with the specificity of individual regions. In Siberian conditions this leads to a number of quite negative consequences.

"For example, the share of the mining industry in Siberia is 3.5 times as large as in the country as a whole. But all types of fuel and raw materials are taken out of the region at low wholesale prices. Siberia loses much because of that.

"At the same time the European regions of the Soviet Union, specifically the Baltic republics and Belorussia

which have been granted economic independence, seek to deliver consumer goods to Siberia at increased prices.

"If exchanges between republics were carried out on a fair basis, i.e., at world prices, Russia would have gained 70 billion roubles every year more than it gets now, with Siberia accounting for the bulk of the amount," Granberg maintains.

"Siberia has found itself in such a position also because more than 90 per cent of products in a majority of its areas are produced by enterprises which are under the authority of all-union ministries," Granberg said.

"The lowest share of allocations from profit to the local budget have been established for them.

"For example, only one per cent of allocations from the profit of enterprises of union and republican subordination will be assigned to the local budget this year in Novosibirsk and Tyumen regions. This indicator can be compared, say, with that in Estonia which keeps 84.1 per cent of all profits gained on its territory.

"We beleive that it is necessary to reconsider the economic exchange conditions that discriminate against our region. The scientists, the public and authorities of territories and regions of Siberia will closely cooperate to work out a common position on the issue. This will be promoted by the forthcoming conference," Granberg said.

Western Republics

Results of Belorussian Elections Updated

LD0603190790 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Minsk March 6 TASS—Only a third of deputies to the new Belorussian parliament won seats after the elections of March 4. This result was expected: Five candidates ran, on average, in every constituency.

All contenders for parliamentary seats can be divided into four main groups: representatives of the party and government offices, economic executives, intellectuals and members of informal organisations.

Among those who were elected to parliament in the first round are Belorussian Communist Party leader Yefrem Sokolov, chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Nikolay Dementey, Prime Minister Mikhail Kovalev, Professor Stanislav Shushkevich, who is also member of the All-Union Parliament, and leader of the Republican National Front Zenon Poznyak.

The elections were held in a quiet and business-like atmosphere. Eighty-six per cent of voters went to the polls. The lowest turn-out was in Minsk. Incidentally, only five out of 48 deputies were elected here.

There are many doctors among the new deputies, especially in the Gomel and Mogilev regions where the population suffered more than in other areas from the Chernobyl disaster.

Another 200 deputies have to be elected. New candidates will be nominated in 20 constituencies.

Further on Ukrainian Election Campaign

Political Impressions

LD0303232990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Correspondent V. Lyaskalo report from Kiev; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] The general impression of the present election campaign is that nowadays there is less noise but more coherence, with the candidates trying to appear to the electorate as sober-minded, businesslike politicians rather than fiery orators. Without doubt, the campaign's high level of efficiency has been ensured by the Ukrainian SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republic] new democratic law on elections. No longer do public organizations select deputies for themselves; still, as a rule their candidates band together and run openly on the platforms of their societies, unions, blocs, or their party.

I would say there are three real political forces in the republic that are producing the clearest showing: the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the Ecological Association Zeleniy Svit, and the Ukrainian Popular Rukh. [passage omitted]

Masol, Gurneko, Kravchuk Elected

LD0603162590 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Kiev March 6 TASS—The Ukrainian Republic Election Commission reports that 120 people's deputies were elected in last Sunday's elections. Candidates in another 330 constituencies are facing run-off elections. Nearly 3,000 candidates ran for 450 seats in the Republican parliament.

The winners in the first round include Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol, Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Stanislav Gurneko, and Central Committee Secretary Leonid Kravchuk.

Ivashko Fails To Obtain 50 Percent

LD0603211890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Interview with Vitaliy Fedorovich Boyko, chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Central Electoral Commission, by correspondent in the Ukraine Vladimir Sokolov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Sokolov] As a preliminary I'll recall, Vitaliy Fedorovich, that election day in the republic was preceded by ever-increasing tension of the election struggle. On the eve of that day, for various reasons—and evidently most of all because of an inability to stand such tension—about 200 candidates for deputy to the republic's Supreme Soviet withdrew their candidatures. Still, there remained on average more than six candidates for each of the 450 deputy mandates to the soviet. On the other hand, in many places a kind of voter apathy was to be seen, so that at times even their meetings with candidate deputies were wrecked and there were fears about whether in the elections themselves there would be enough activity. I ask you, Vitaliy Fedorovich, let us start with that:

[Boyko] The fears were in vain. Voting was sufficiently active. According to preliminary data, throughout the republic about 80 percent of the electorate took part in the elections. As quite a few candidates withdrew their candidature, four electoral districts were without an alternative candidate where all the remaining candidates were elected. However, in many districts—where at times there were 20, 30, and even more candidates that were put forward—the votes were naturally divided, and a second round of voting lies ahead in 315 districts out of 450. Apart from that, in the districts where two candidates and not one received the confidence of citizens—and there were six such districts—repeat elections lie ahead with different candidates who will be named by the citizens. It is planned to hold them at the end of April.

As is known, the overwhelming majority of candidate deputies named by the electorate are Communists. In particular, Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, first secretary of Ukraine's Communist Party Central Committee, stood as a candidate in the constituency of a workers' rayon in Kiev, where another 11 candidates were put forward: 41.4 percent voted for Ivashko, and the candidate nearest to him received 9.1 percent. Now they will go into the second round of voting. So one can say the elections have taken place, but the election campaign is continuing.

Caucasus

Lack of Progress at Border Talks Discussed

NC0603095890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] When will the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road be opened? Will security be guaranteed in fields in the border regions for spring agricultural work? Will [words indistinct] crimes on interethnic grounds be prevented? These problems were discussed at a meeting in Lachin which was attended by Major General Safonov, military commandant of the state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast; Colonel Grigoryan, Armenia's deputy minister of internal affairs; Colonel (?Cherbik), commandant of the state of emergency in Gorisskiy Rayon; and representatives of the law enforcement bodies of Gorisskiy and Lachinskiy Rayons.

However, the issues under discussion were not resolved and tension persists in the border areas of the two rayons. What is more, shots were fired from Lachinskiy Rayon on the eve of the talks. This confirms the lack of seriousness on the part of the Azerbaijanis toward the negotiations.

This was the sixth meeting between the sides and again achieved no results. The sides agreed to meet again at a site close to the Armenian border in the mid-March.

Passport Check Exposes Violators, Weapons Found

PM2702164390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Byrkin report: "Attention: Passport Check"]

[Text] Stepanakert—At dawn, when the village was waking, the following loudspeaker appeal was made to the population: "Comrades, stay calm and collected, passports are going to be checked..."

The press has already reported on more than one occasion that there are considerable numbers of both Azerbaijani and Armenian guerrillas in and around Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and that they have large amounts of weapons. The troop operation aimed at checking passports was targeted precisely at detecting people without local residence permits, arresting people of an extremist mentality, and confiscating their weapons.

Since the state of emergency was declared in the NKAO and adjoining regions of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] there have been many such operations. But the most important point is that all these operations have been carried out without using special means and without a single shot being fired.

"Their main task is to defend the interests and safeguard the security of the civilian inhabitants, and carry out explanatory work among the population," Lieutenant Colonel of the Militia V. Lenovskiy, member of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Operational Staff, said.

He is no newcomer to passport checks, he is deputy chief of the Perm Internal Affairs Main Administration for passports. But this usually quite peaceful procedure takes on a different character here in the NKAO and serves to normalize the situation in the region. I would cite just a few figures scrupulously compiled by the officer: Eighteen operations have been carried out in 27 population centers in the oblast and adjoining regions of the Azerbaijan SSR, 1,132 passport violators and persons violating the 15 January 1990 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree have been revealed, 53 people have been administratively detained, and criminal proceedings have been brought against some of them. In the

past 10 days alone 56 people without local residence permits have been expelled from the oblast, and the number of people expelled from rayons adjoining the oblast is three times this figure. Moreover, individuals on the run for previous crimes—including ethnically motivated crimes—have been arrested. Large amounts of weapons and munitions have been confiscated or voluntarily handed in by residents. For instance, during the passport checks even two homemade guns and two homemade mortars were confiscated.

There is a lot of work—it is a gigantic task. Later, following a discussion with V. Lenovskiy, a joint session of the leaders of the military prosecutor's office, the oblast's law-enforcement organs, and the republic organizing committee for the NKAO decided to set up a service to deal with the issuing of passports and with refugee problems—there are 20,537 refugees in the oblast.

According to Lenovskiy's calculations, approximately one-third of the oblast's residents have passports that are simply invalid—the second page, where the entry in Azerbaijani is made, has been torn out. Over the past two years most 16-year-olds have not received passports. Indeed, we do need a service to sort out these obstacles.

Armenians Concerned About Villages in Azerbaijan

NC0203173090 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Yerevan, 2 Mar (ARMENPRES)—[passage omitted] In view of the prevailing situation in the region, during the 1 March Operational Staff meeting, members discussed the situation in the Armenian villages of Getashen, Kamo, Azat, and Martunashen, which are in Azerbaijan. The members are seriously concerned about the fate of Azat village. Lately, the number of inhabitants leaving that village has increased because of the unimpeded influx of Azerbaijanis from other regions who are forcing the natives to sell their property and leave. Thus, the ethnically homogeneous Armenian villages are gradually becoming mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani areas. In view of the current ethnic tension, this is not contributing to normalizing the situation in that region and restoring peace and tranquillity.

The members also discussed the Army units of the Internal Affairs Ministry being brought there [to the villages] to protect the Armenian population. They have been deployed in a way so that the Armenian villages are isolated from each other. It is not clear whom these units are protecting.

The Armenian Government is well informed about these problems and is taking the necessary steps to halt the population's emigration from these areas. Already, the question of redeploying Army units around these villages has been raised with the Internal Affairs Ministry, and other steps are being planned. To implement this plan it is extremely important to organize regular air links with these villages, to equip them with reliable telephone lines, and to ensure the native population's security.

The Ministry of Communications began a broad program for developing a communications and television network that will enable Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] to get better reception of the republican television. This program also aims at providing telephone service to the regions where refugees from Azerbaijan have settled en masse.

The republic's doctors are continuing to provide necessary assistance to NKAO and to the Armenian-inhabited regions of Azerbaijan. Medical care, medicine, and medical equipment are being provided promptly.

The committee presented a report on receiving and settling the Armenians returning to Armenia. It was indicated that presently there are 230,000 refugees in Armenia, and 52,000 of them have been employed. So far nearly 100,000 refugees are unemployed. Additional resources in the republic are being explored to provide housing and jobs for these people.

The members also pointed out that so far the relevant union bodies have not recognized the refugee status for these people and have not solved the issue of compensation for their houses and property. This makes it difficult to create normal living conditions for these people in their present localities.

More on Armenian Villages

NC0603112490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0700 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] At its meeting on 5 March, the Operational Staff heard a report on the situation in Azat, Kamo, Martunashen, and Getashen villages in Azerbaijan's Khanlarskiy Rayon. As has already been reported, native Armenians are being forcibly ousted from these areas by large-scale property purchases and the active participation of local authorities in this scheme. The forced acceptance of documents confirming the legality of the purchase of houses in Kamo village has already begun. If resolute measures are not taken, Kamo could suffer the same fate as Azat, where only five Armenian families remain.

The commandant of the Army units of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry has facilitated these illegal actions. The units are supposed to enforce law and order and protect the Armenian villages, but they are deployed in such a way as to blockade Armenian villages and cut communications between them. However, they allow [words indistinct] from the rayon center. Despite the presence of the Internal Affairs Ministry troops, Getashen village has been fired on.

The Operational Staff conclued that the illegal actions taken by the local authorities against the Armenian inhabitants of those villages could exacerbate the situation in the region. It was decided to keep the third

session of the USSR Supreme Soviet informed about these developments in the region.

According to the information provided by the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry, the situation in regions bordering Azerbaijan is tense. Azerbaijani assailants recently took two [word indistinct] of our republic hostage.

Sit-In Demands Referendums, End to Expulsions

NC0603115590 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] A group of young people from the National Self-Determination Association, the Constitutional Rights Union, the Society for Union, the Armenian National Youth Union, and the Armenian Women's Community have chosen the sit-in demonstration as a form of protest. For the last few days, they have (?taken up positions) near the entrance to the republic's Supreme Soviet. They are carrying placards, one of which lists their 10 demands.

Their first demand is that Paruyr Ayrikyan [Armenian nationalist movement leader] be allowed to return to the fatherland. The expulsion of any Armenian from Armenia cannot be allowed; otherwise, all of us will be under the threat of expulsion from our fatherland in the name of ideology, say the participants in the sit-in demonstration.

Their second demand is that the people must be able to express their will through referendums. No one has yet asked the people what they want. We demand that the people be able to express themselves through referendums. We must ascertain whether people want independence or are satisfied with the present state of affairs.

Armenian Catholicos Blesses Religious Classes

NC0303101190 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Many generations have grown up ignorant of customs and morals of our spiritual leaders and of their messages. During the period of "total atheism" churches were destroyed and monasteries demolished, yet the spark of faith simmered in the people's souls under these ruins.

It is a universal truth: The first condition to impart noble patriotic feelings in people is to teach them consummate history. The history of the Armenian people and Armenian church are inseparable. The Armenian language and Armenian church were the spiritual prop ensuring the survival of the Armenian people during all the tragic and bloody turns of history. Besides, only that nation with a national school of its own has a future.

Today, under the conditions of the restructuring in our country, the first real steps are being taken to establish that school.

Acceding to the wishes of the students, the administrative board of the Yerevan Pedagogical Institute for Russian and Foreign Languages named after Bryusov has decided to offer a course on religious thought and history of religion during the present semester.

Since the institute was the first of the educational institutes to appeal to the Mother See; Holy Edzhmiatsin Vazgen I, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of all Armenians, expressed the desire to meet the students and the lecturers to give his blessings to this initiative.

The hall of the institute was packed on 28 February. Aram Parlesizyan, the dean of the scientific branch of the institute opened the meeting. After greeting his holiness the Catholicos; Bishop Garegin Nersisyan, deputy-prelate of the Ararat diocese; mace-bearer Father Natan; Grigor Khanchyan, a member of the Edzhmiatsin holy synod; and Grigor Papazyan, director of "SOS Armenie," he invited the Catholicos to address the students.

At the suggestion of Vazgen I, those present observed a minute's silence on the second anniversary of Sumgait genocide.

The Catholicos said: This is a memorable day in my 35 years of pontification, for it is for the first time that I meet with the students of a major educational institute.

In his address he referred to the role played by the Christian faith and the Armenian Apostolic Church in the life of the Armenian people and in all the phases of its history. He advised the students to approach their pedagogical calling with utmost seriousness and not to lose spiritual courage and faith regardless of the difficulties.

If the just cause of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] had been solved speedily, Armenian history probably would not have taken such a turn. That history is one of struggle, stressed the Catholicos. Perhaps we owe this Artsakhian [NKAO] tempest for our peoples return to its roots—in the religious-eclesiatical sense as well. I am sure that this problem will continue to put its creative imprint on all aspects of our people's life.

The dean of the institute deeply thanked the Catholicos in the name of those present for that first spiritual and meaningful lesson and presented him with tokens in memory of his visit.

The third-course students in all the faculties of the institute will hear lectures on the history of the Armenian church and biblical stories during a 20-hour course. There will be lectures on the lives of Armenian church leaders and commentaries on old and new testaments. All the students will be permitted to attend the courses. [Yerevan International Service in Armenian at 1630 GMT on 2 March in a similar report adds: that this "special course has been included in the curriculum in

place of scientific atheism." The radio adds that "this initiative has gained support in other higher education institutes in Armenia."]

Azerbaijan Presidium Condemns Armenian Claims

NC0603093590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Presidium has adopted a decision on the inadmissibility of claims by the Armenian SSR for land. The decision said: The Armenian SSR adopted a decision on 13 February which (?concerned) the Azerbaijan SSR territorial integrity and which was aimed at disrupting stability in the republic and worsening the already complicated situation.

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium noted that the 13 February decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, which declared the decision adopted by the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Bolsheviks Party Central Committee on 5 (?June) 1921 to be illegal, intentionally distorted the facts. The presidium said that the question of subordinating the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was an inseparable part of Azerbaijan even before the establishment of Soviet sovereignty and has never come within the framework of Armenia, was not determined by the said decision of the Caucasus Bureau. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the following decision: The declaration by the Armenian SSR on 13 February that the decision adopted by the Russian Communist Bolsheviks Party Central Committee Bureau on 5 (?June) 1921 is illegal is regarded as one which is devoid of legal force on grounds that it distorts the facts and maintains a course which creates confrontation between the two neighboring peoples.

Helicopter Services for Border Rayons To Increase

NC2802103490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to improve helicopter links among Azerbaijan SSR's mountain and border rayons and towns, which are difficult to reach by road. The decision notes that the people in the mountain and border rayons have had significant transportation difficulties because of the recent situation. Provisions, mail, and other (?materials) are not being delivered on time. This situation has made the residents of many regions in the republic justifiably dissatisfied.

The decision adopted by the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers instructed the local people's deputies soviet executive committees to cooperate with the Azerbaijan Civil Aviation Administration to draw up a list of the regions requiring air transport for passengers, newspapers, journals, mail, parcels, and other materials. Helicopter landing sites and new [word indistinct] should be established to receive and serve the passengers, and other technical problems related to the organization of flight links should be resolved as soon as possible. Plans will be made to increase the number of passenger aircraft and helicopters. Meanwhile, new flight schedules will be drawn up.

Lost Working Days Due to Strikes Outlined

NC2702100390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] On their first pages today, the newspapers publish a report based on material from the Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee. The report is headed: "Normal Work Must be Resumed."

The report says that, based on the number of workers, more than 3.1 million working days, including 2.2 million working days in the industrial sector, were lost because of the strikes which disrupted work in the economic sector as a whole in 1988 and 1989. In other words, about 7,000 workers, including about 5,000 in the industrial sector, did not report to work. Consequently, the output of manufactured products in the republic's industrial field was reduced by 1.2 billion rubles. It must be noted that this is based on what has been registered by the statistical workers. The real [words indistinct].

The report also says that the republic must adopt the system of land economy and self-financing. It is not difficult to think that the more we work and the stronger our new economic relations are, the more confident our steps will be. This will give us an opportunity to resolve the urgent problems in our economic sovereignty more quickly and significantly upgrade the welfare of the people. The results of all our initiatives will be increased many times if the republic's existing economic potential is fully used.

We have the necessary conditions to extricate the republic from the current crisis. This depends on how each and every individual [words indistinct] his responsibilities for the outcome of the planned changes. No one will help us move out of the existing crisis. Therefore, let us help ourselves.

Threats to Non-Georgians Termed Provocation

90US0593A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by O. Chikhladze under the rubric "Retort": "Be Careful: It Is a Provocation"]

[Text] Several residents of Tbilisi—representatives of non-Georgian nationality—recently began to find anonymous letters in their mailboxes with one and the same message: If you do not leave Georgia, you can expect violence. The rumor also went around that the threats were the work of the People's Front of Georgia. In connection with this, GRUZINFORM has disseminated a statement in the local press by Professor N. Natadze,

chairman of the republic's People's Front. Refuting the provocative rumors, the professor said in particular, "I am a philologist and a linguist by specialty. The representatives of various nationalities commit characteristic errors in a text, and there is no room for mistakes when I am determining which nationality it is. Those orthographic, grammatical, and stylistic errors which were made in the texts are not mistakes as such, but simulations of mistakes. No Georgian, however poorly he knew Russian, would commit the errors which are contained in these texts. The mistakes would be of another kind. It is apparent that the texts were specially 'concocted' in bad Russian for the purpose of creating the impression that they had been written by Georgians."

As we see, the provocateurs are not asleep. Let us be vigilant.

Central Asia

Tajik Party Leader on Election Participation

LD0203102690 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Kakhar Makhkamovich Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee, held a meeting on 26 February with representatives of the republican press, radio, and television. The leader of the republican party organization familiarized journalists with the preliminary results of Sunday's [25 February] elections to the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. Electorates were active in the elections despite the complex political situation in the republic, particularly Dushanbe, arising from the 12-13 February incidents and the introduction of a state of emergency. For instance, he stressed, in the capital of Tajikistan nearly 80 percent of voters fulfilled their citizen's duty. All bureau members and secretaries of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee, who were contesting mandates to become deputies in the republic's parliament, were elected with a majority of votes. Full election results will be published soon.

It was stressed at the meeting that instances were noted of not observing the election law, efforts by certain forces to pressure the electorate and misuse the (?authority) of some candidate deputies. The central election commission will comprehensively investigate each of these incidents, and all persons involved will receive punishment in accordance with the election law regardless of their position.

Issues connected with recent tragic events were also discussed at the meeting. Journalists showed interest at the progress of investigations of crimes committed by hooligans in the streets of Dushanbe and forces who had instigated youths to commit unlawful deeds that caused bloodshed, and the assessment of the republican leadership from a political point of view.

In accordance with journalists who spoke, people are worried that (?common) extremists and criminal elements will receive punishment but their ideological instigators and the organizers of the bloody disorders will go unpunished.

Comrade Makhkamov respondend by promising that republican law enforcement bodies are doing their best to find the direct participants of disorders as well as their ideological leaders. No one will go without due punishment.

Participants of the meeting were informed of measures taken by republican ideological activists to prevent sections of nonlocal inhabitants from leaving Tajikistan and to stop instigatory rumors by individuals. Jornalists in talks with party leaders also discussed issues concerning the work of self-defense groups, their future development, and the possibilities of transforming them to self-management public organs for housing. Attention was paid to the issue of the rights of members of initiator organizations to government jobs and adding work for unofficial organizations to CPSU membership. The republican Ministry of Communications was severely criticized for not delivering periodical publications in time. Other issues were also discussed during the meeting.

Dushanbe Situation Reported 'Outwardly Peaceful'

PM0503152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Special Correspondent N. Sautin report: "Warm Winds Over the City"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The situation in the Tajik capital is outwardly quite peaceful and the briefings for journalists at the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] have lost their urgency. News reports are the usual kind, typical of any large city. The Dushanbe streets are full of cars, the bazaars are crowded, and the windows of the stores and workshops that were looted are being repaired.

Nevertheless, a sense of alarm remains. Perhaps because the state of emergency has not been lifted yet. The self-defense detachments have not been disbanded and you cannot get into a single apartment block without passing a sentry wearing a white armband. Pickets manned by local residents stop every vehicle, even militia vehicles, at road junctions and thoroughfares. This spontaneously formed structure is still unfamiliar in our society: The neighborhood self-defense teams have united and created their own central headquarters for the whole city.

The law enforcement agencies have equipped the volunteer militia with radios and field telephones to enable them to keep in touch with the MVD and the KGB. The city's crime rate, not only ethnically motivated crime but conventional crime—theft, robbery, fraud—has dropped sharply. The self-defense detachments' leaders are

already saying that the time has come not only to perform defensive functions but also to switch to the creation of local neighborhood self-management committees.

"The republic's Supreme Soviet elections," S. Galanin, chairman of a staff in Dushanbe's Frunzenskiy Rayon, "has aroused concern among the population. Whom are people to vote for? In some places there are 10-15 candidates for a single seat. Clearly, those who are to blame for the events which brought grief into our homes have no chance of becoming the people's elected representatives. Life compels us all to join in an uncompromising political struggle..."

Galanin's headquarters is next to the school named for Hero of the Soviet Union A. Mironenko, the late internationalist serviceman. People remember him well. Many of those who have now joined the volunteer militia's ranks were with Mironenko in Afghanistan. But even there things were easier, they say: They were all one big family—the Russians, the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, the Ukrainians... They shared their last rusk, their last cartridge. They dreamt about returning to their native home. What has happened to our home now?..

The decisions of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee extraordinary plenum are given an unambiguous reception: It is right that the republic leaders' resignation was not accepted. They are to blame for the events which shook Tajikistan. Therefore, they are the ones who should unravel the knot of contradictions and stabilize the explosive situation. The Supreme Soviet elections and the forthcoming republic Communist Party Congress will determine the forces on which the people will rely and will put forward a reserve enjoying trust and support.

Tragedy has brought people together. They have realized the true meaning of internationalism, without which life in the region is inconceivable.

Whereas the passions generated by the recent conflict have hardly subsided, the topic which was the real cause of the rallies is now being taken up keenly in discussions, especially in the republic Supreme Soviet elections: Dissatisfaction with housing conditions, the rising cost of food, the quality of treatment in polyclinics and hospitals, and of course, the environment. Dushanbe is suffocating from industrial enterprises' discharges. At one time the streets and public gardens used to smell of roses—Dushanbe's symbol. Now it is an asphyxiating smog that greets visitors...

Of course, it would be unfair to criticize the republic's leadership for failing to take measures to improve what is now called the quality of life. The ralliers' attacks on the party apparatus were not always entirely justified. There are factors which have been hampering Tajikistan in its attempt to remedy its difficult situation. With bitterness T. Gafarov, chief of the Communist Party Central Committee's Socioeconomic Department, told me: "Each year natural disasters undermine all our efforts. There was the Leninabad earthquake in 1985, then Khorog and Gissar. All the construction industry's capacities are being used to eliminate the after-effects of the disasters. Last year 600 apartment blocks were built in Gissar, where virtually the entire population was left homeless. This year another 1,000 buildings are to be handed over. At the moment we are building to replace those which were destroyed. But the construction base has been strengthened now. Primarily we are building housing and reducing the construction of industrial enterprises."

"We see the solution to the chronic backlog," T. Gafarov went on, "primarily in breaking up the existing structure whereby the republic is assigned the role of a raw-materials producing region. We used to produce cotton, others processed it. Now we are going to build our own cotton processing plants. This will sharply increase the republic's budget revenue and ensure employment for the population."

On the subject of employment, the republic has many unemployed people. At the same time, there are around 15,000 vacancies in industry alone. But the need is for specialists, not unskilled workers. Labor reserves must be retrained.

The cotton boom, which hit the republic badly, impoverished Tajikistan's food-producing reserves. It is planned to accelerate the development of orchards and vineyards. And that means that not only will the supply become more abundant but that there will be permanent work for thousands currently living on seasonal pay.

The equalization of the socioeconomic development of all oblasts and regions is another problem. At the moment, the distribution of production forces is extremely uneven. That creates tension in the republic and uncertainty among young people as to whether there will be work for them.

These are big plans. They will lead the republic toward economic autonomy. They can be fulfilled only if people are united by a single purpose and do not yield to the illusion that they can resolve their difficulties by means of street meetings. The past demonstrations, which caused the republic losses running to many millions, forced people to look seriously at life, even those who quite recently ranted hysterically into the microphones during the bloody events in the streets.

The weather in Dushanbe is changeable. Sometimes a cold wind blows down from the mountains, sometimes warm air rises from the valley. The political climate is changeable, too. It will largely determine the people's choice—whom will they trust to represent the interests of multinational Tajikistan in the republic's Supreme Soviet... The deputies in 118 of the republic's okrugs are already known, 112 of them are communists.

Tashkent Ban on Apartment Swaps Deemed Illegal

PM0603161590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Reprint from TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA under the rubric "From the Local Press": "Ban on Moves?"]

[Text] Tashkent Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] has banned the people of Tashkent from carrying out intercity exchanges of apartments.

In the opinion of readers who have protested to the UZTAG editorial office about the Gorispolkom decision relating to a temporary ban on intercity exchanges of housing, this is an illegal action.

Yu. Shakirova, general supervision prosecutor of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Prosecutor's Office, comments on the Tashkent Gorispolkom decision:

"The Gorispolkom's ban on intercity exchanges of apartments is a violation, above all, of the country's Fundamental Law—the USSR Constitution, which guarantees the rights of citizens to freely choose their place of residence. A number of laws and regulations have also been violated in addition to the Constitution. Thus, there is no provision in the Uzbek SSR Housing Code for 'temporary restrictions' on intercity apartment exchanges, still less any mention of an equivalent exchange of newcomers for people who have departed.

"It should be remembered that the legislative organ in the republic is the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, not local soviet executive committees. In this situation Tashkent Gorispolkom is illegally endowing itself with the function of the legislative organ and of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, to which is delegated the right to adopt legally binding normative acts that are compulsory throughout the republic's territory, like the said regulations, and to make changes to them.

"You can imagine what problems will also be created by the decision that the Gorispoliskom is preparing on the equivalent number of citizens moving out of and into the city in intercity exchanges. It is obvious that people's legitimate rights are infringed here."

Uzbek Officials Offer Condolences to Tashkent

LD0603131490 Moscow World Service in English
1200 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The government of Uzbekistan, a Soviet republic in Central Asia, has expressed deep condolences to the families of those who died in ethnic clashes in the Tashkent region. [passage omitted] According to latest figures, four persons were killed and dozens injured as a result of the disturbances. Uzbek party leaders have visited the site where the worst clashes took place.

Kazakh Enterprises Criticize Ban on Exports

PM0603162590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by own correspondent Oleg Stefashin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Enterprises Protest"]

[Text] Karaganda—The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Supreme banned the export from the republic of any goods produced in excess of the state order as of 1 March.

It is pointed out in the adopted resolution that the proposed measure was forced on the republic and serves as a countermove to similar acts of legislation operating in a number of other union republics. Enterprises which venture to breach the new procedure have stern punishment in store—they will have to pay a fine into the local budget equivalent to twice the value of the exported goods.

I do not presume to judge how lawful these decisions are. One thing is clear: The Kazakh Supreme Soviet's attempt to bolt all doors leading to the free market have bewildered many of the republic's labor collectives. The metallurgists of Kazakhstan's Magnitka have, for example, reacted to the resolution with sharp displeasure.

"It is difficult even to imagine the kind of consequences this ban will have for us," USSR People's Deputy O. Soskovets, general director of the Karaganda Metallurgy Combine said. "The situation now is that almost half the material resources necessary to fulfill the state order have to be obtained in exchange for surplus rolled metal. It is only through direct ties established with dozens of cities in the country and foreign firms that we are able to build housing, boost consumer goods output, and modernize the whole of our giant production unit. The cancellation of contracts will entail losses worth many millions and inevitable bankruptcy."

In the opinion of USSR People's Deputy N. Kravstov, general director of the "Karbid" association, chemical industry workers will be in a still worse position. Denied the opportunity to make barter deals with the Western partner who supplies them with raw materials, they will be forced to cut the production of their basic output by 30-40 percent.

It is perfectly obvious that proscriptive sanctions introduced by one or other republic can scarcely help restore the economy of the regions or create the long-awaited free market. On the contrary, such a path leads to a blind alley which it will subsequently be very difficult to get out of. Mindful of this, Kazakhstan's Magnitka labor collective has submitted to the republic Supreme Soviet a firm demand that the hasty decision be repealed. The metallurgists have been joined by workers of other enterprises of Karaganda and neighboring oblasts. An appeal against the Kazakh Supreme Soviet's unlawful actions, which, as it points out, infringe labor collectives'

autonomy and rights, has been lodged with the USSR General Prosecutor's Office.

Muslim Leader Appeals for End of Ethnic Conflict

LD0603212690 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek 0215 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Text] Now, Mufti Mukhammad Sadyk Mukhammad Yusuf, chairman of the spiritual administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, will speak:

[Begin Yusuf recording] In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful. Thank God and greetings and peace be upon the messenger of God. Right from the start the religion of Islam has opposed nationalism and nationalist disputes, and it is a religion sent by the great God to eliminate these disputes. God has created people of various nationalities, ethnic characteristics, and languages. But they must know each other and gather experiences from each other and must work to learn good deeds from each other [words indistinct]. But people attempt to go in a path other than the path provided by God when he created them, and try to humiliate each other on the basis of nationalism, to hurt each other, try to cause each other losses, shed each other's blood and kill each other, and damage each other's properties. This is extremely (?unpleasant). I have told you before that the conflict between non-Muslims and Muslims has bad consequences [words indistinct]. If this continues, it means that tomorrow all of us will kill each other—fathers will kill brothers, fathers will kill their sons, and neighbors will kill neighbors. The way events are developing shows this. All of these people are servants of God, all of them are people. But killing them for belonging to another group of people and another nationality is an extremely grave act. This is what I am saying on general questions concerning nationalism.

Now, if we talk particularly about the event in Parkent—I have known the people of Parkent for a long time. Serving in the mosque there are students I trained. On the basis of their proposals we have been visiting the residents and holding meetings with them. They are very good people. As far as the event in Parkent is concerned, in my opinion ways of stopping the development of (?unpleasant) cases were revealed after talks to people [words indistinct].

I appeal once again to (?people) who think correctly, religious brothers, to fathers and younger brothers and to all, and say: Let us put an end to these things. It is enough. We have suffered so many difficulties, there was so much bloodshed; we destroyed so many properties of our own. And the worst of all is (?being defamed) abroad. [end recording]

Preliminary Kirghiz Election Results Outlined

PM0603121490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Gennadiy Shipitko report under the rubric "Hot Line": "Deputies Named, Elections Continue"]

[Text] Frunze—The results of voting in elections to the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet have been compiled. In Kirghizia's highest legislative organ 250 deputies seats have already found their owners.

In 84 okrugs no candidate received half the electors' votes. Runoffs will take place here on 4 March. In 16 okrugs everything will have to start from scratch: from nominations to elections, which will be held in two months.

Every fifth person in the republican parliament is a worker or peasant. The 70 deputies who were running in uncontested okrugs are mainly leaders of the republic and high- and middle-ranking party and soviet workers. The remaining seats were divided among economic leaders and low-ranking soviet and party workers, and partly among the scientific, technical, and creative intelligentsia. One deputy is a Muslim clergyman and two are journalists on central newspapers (elected, alas, in uncontested okrugs).

So far there are only 24 women and four members of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] in parliament. Ninety percent of deputies are CPSU members.

I will observe that not everywhere did the apparatus manage to conduct the elections according to its own scenario. The will of the electorate often proved stronger.

Masilyev Addresses Meeting of Working People

LD2402150490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] A meeting of representatives of the working people of the capital of Kirghizia was held in Frunze today. The representatives of plants, factories, scientific organizations, and students discussed the draft CPSU platform for the 28th Party Congress. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia, presented a report. There was unanimous support for the CPSU Central Committee address to the Soviet people. Those taking part in the meeting called on all working peole of Kirghizia to halt the work of extremists who are endeavoring to destabilize the situation and involve the republic in a conflict between the nationalities. The force of conviction and the law must be fully used to these ends.

Turkmen Council of Elders Meeting Held

LD0503162790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A Maslakhat—a grand council of the elders of Turkmenia—was held in Ashkhabad today. The talk there was on the problems that trouble the republic's population, of the need to strengthen friendship between the people living there and to educate the young people to respect the customs and culture of the people. Comrade Niyazov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic Communist Party and chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, spoke at the meeting. An address to the working people and young people of Turkmenia was adopted.